986 resultados para executive stock options


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Orientadora: Mestre Cláudia Maria Ferreira Pereira Lopes

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Mestrado em Contabilidade

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El presente artículo comenta las consecuencias tributarias en Derecho español del uso de stock options.

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We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to the residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.

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This study supports the proposition that managerial welfare affects merger decisions. The abnormal stock returns experienced by bidder firms, from the time of the announcement of a merger bid through the stockholder approval date, are positively relaterd to the percentage of own-company stock held by the senior management of the bidder. The results suggest that substantial amounts of own-company share ownership help align the interests of stockholders and management.

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The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated the expensing of stock options with FAS 123 (R). As of March 2006, 749 companies had accelerated the vesting of their employee stock options and avoided a reduction in their reported profits that otherwise would have occurred under the new standard. There are many different motives for the acceleration strategy, and the focus of this study is to determine whether shareholders viewed these motives as either positive or negative. A favorable return subsequent to an acceleration announcement would signify that shareholder's viewed management's motives as positive. An unfavorable return subsequent to an acceleration announcement would signify that shareholder's viewed management's motives as negative. The evidence from this study suggests that shareholders reacted favorably, on average, to acceleration announcements. However, these results lack statistical significance and are based on a small sample, thus, they should be interpreted with caution.

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Ph.D. in the Faculty of Business Administration

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract has on the executive s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.