Statement by Herbert Brownell, Jr., attorney general of the United States before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 1 (83d Cong.) a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements, and S. J. Res. 43 (83d Cong.) a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the legal effect of certain treaties.

Mode of access: Internet.

Os antagonismos da integração sul-americana na ordem jurídica brasileira

The economic regional integration is a phenomenon observed in numerous occasions inside the global economic reality. Watchful to that phenomenon, the 1988 s Brazilian constitutional order establish in its 4th article, single paragraph, the commitment to seek for the Latin- American integration, as a Fundamental Principle to the Brazilian Federative Republic. Regarding the mentioned constitutional disposition s realization, the Brazilian State celebrated, specially, the 1980 s Montevideo Treaty, creating the Latin-American Integration Association, and the 1991 s Asuncion Treaty, performing the duty to establish a common market, in sub regional level, with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, called Mercado Comum do Sul. However, due to an addiction to a wrong comprehension of State s Sovereignty Principle, the Constitution imposes to the international rules an incorporation process, without providing any privilege to those ones regarding the integration constitutional disposition s realization, whether original or derived. The Brazilian s Supreme Court, as matter of fact, affirmed that it is not possible, facing the actual constitutional order, to grant any character of preference. Also in the controversies solution mechanism, responsible for the law s execution in case of its noncompliance, where found malfunctions, most notably the system s open character and its excessive procedural flexibility, in addiction to restricting the access of individuals. It follows from these findings, then, the lack of legal certainty provided by the Mercosul s legal system, considering its effects both international and within the Brazilian state. Among the possible solutions to reduce or eliminate the problem are using the practice of the so-called executive agreements in the Mercosul s original rules incorporation to the Brazilian state, the creation of a Mercosul s court of law and/or a constitutional reform

La construcción teórica de los acuerdos ejecutivos en el derecho estadounidense. El aporte de la Corte Suprema

La celebración de acuerdos ejecutivos constituye una práctica fuertemente arraigada en la política internacional de los Estados Unidos. En el desarrollo teórico sobre el tema, la jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de ese país ha desempeñado un papel significativo al contribuir al esclarecimiento de algunos aspectos complejos de esta clase de convenios. Precisamente, este aporte se propone, como objetivo, examinar algunas instancias relevantes en la evolución de la jurisprudencia del alto tribunal referente a los acuerdos en forma simplificada. El recorrido por el tema permite advertir que la construcción teórica de los acuerdos ejecutivos en el escenario normativo estadounidense constituye un proceso dinámico expuesto a una frecuente renovación de sus criterios centrales.

Views from the executive suite : lessons from the introduction of performance management

Performance management introduced to the senior health executive levels in the New South Wales public health care system included the senior executive service in 1989 and, as a key element of that service, performance agreements in 1990. This is the first qualitative study examining senior health executives' personal experiences of these changes. In consideration of what has been learnt from the most relevant literature and this study, this paper concludes that the introduction and implementation performance management is a continuous process. This process includes the key steps of planning, measuring, monitoring and evaluating. It can be used as a means to achieve overall effective organisation performance by bringing in a two way management process for the organisation and its senior health executives.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Europeanization and the inclusive strategies of executive actors

In Europeanized policy domains, executive actors are considered especially powerful because they are directly responsible for international negotiations. However, in order to avoid failing in the ratification process, they are also highly dependent on the support of domestic, non-state actors. We argue that in Europeanized decision-making processes, state actors are not passively lobbied, but actively seek collaboration with - and support from - domestic actors. We apply stochastic actor-based modelling for network dynamics to collaboration data on two successive bilateral agreements on the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the European Union (EU). Results confirm our hypotheses that state actors are not passively lobbied, but actively look for collaboration with other actors, and especially with potential veto players and euro-sceptical actors from both the conservative Right and the Left.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board appointed February 4, 1950, by Executive order 10105, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended : to investigate and report in respect to a dispute between the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, a carrier, and certain of its employees represented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (NMB case A-3065), Denver, Colorado, February 28, 1950.

Signed: Robert G. Simmons, chairman, Robert O. Boyd, member, Harold R. Korey, member.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board created June 23, 1948 by Executive order 9971 pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act : to investigate and report upon a dispute between the Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., Wabash Railroad and the Ann Arbor Railroad Co. and certain of its employees represented by the National Maritime Union of America, N.M.B. cases A-2801, A-2802, A-2803, A-2804, Detroit, Michigan, July 20, 1948.

Signed: Robert G. Simmons, chairman, Thomas F. Gallagher, member, Joseph L. Miller, member.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board appointed September 15, 1949, by Executive order 10078, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended : to investigate an unadjusted dispute between the Monongahela Connecting Railroad Company and certain of its employees represented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a labor organization (N.M.B. no. A-3220), Pittsburgh, Pa., October 7, 1949.

Signed: Harry H. Schwartz, chairman, Francis J. Robertson, member, Andrew Jackson, member.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board, created August 1, 1947 by Executive order 9880 pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act : to investigate and report upon a dispute between the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and River Terminal Railway Co. : (NMB case no. A-2542) : Cleveland, Ohio, August 20, 1947.

Signed on page ii: Frank M. Swacker, chairman, Hugh B. Fouke, member, Sidney St. F. Thaxter, member.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board created March 18, 1948 by Executive order 9936 pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act : to investigate and report upon a dispute between the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis and certain of its employees represented by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen : St. Louis, Missouri, April 7, 1948.

Signed: Frank M. Swacker, chairman, George Cheney, member, James H. Wolfe, member.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board appointed May 12, 1949 by Executive order 10056 pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended : to investigate a dispute between the Union Railroad Company (Pittsburgh) and certain of its employees represented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen : (NMB case A-3083) : Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, July 29, 1949.

Signed: Andrew Jackson, chairman, Leif Erickson, member, Elmer T. Bell, member.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board appointed March 15, 1949 by Executive order 10045 pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended : to investigate and report in respect to a dispute involving the Wabash Railroad Co. and the Ann Arbor Railroad Co., carriers, and certain of their employees, represented by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Order of Railway Conductors, and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen : (NMB case A-3028) : St. Louis, Mo., April 6, 1949.

Signed: Roger I. McDonough, chairman, Curtis G. Shake, member, John W. Yeager, member.

Report of the United States Trade Representative's Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC), to the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations : submitted to the Congress, January 14, 1994.

Shipping list no.: 94-0061-P.