An evolutionary model explaining the Neolithic transition from egalitarianism to leadership and despotism.

The Neolithic was marked by a transition from small and relatively egalitarian groups to much larger groups with increased stratification. But, the dynamics of this remain poorly understood. It is hard to see how despotism can arise without coercion, yet coercion could not easily have occurred in an egalitarian setting. Using a quantitative model of evolution in a patch-structured population, we demonstrate that the interaction between demographic and ecological factors can overcome this conundrum. We model the coevolution of individual preferences for hierarchy alongside the degree of despotism of leaders, and the dispersal preferences of followers. We show that voluntary leadership without coercion can evolve in small groups, when leaders help to solve coordination problems related to resource production. An example is coordinating construction of an irrigation system. Our model predicts that the transition to larger despotic groups will then occur when: (i) surplus resources lead to demographic expansion of groups, removing the viability of an acephalous niche in the same area and so locking individuals into hierarchy; (ii) high dispersal costs limit followers' ability to escape a despot. Empirical evidence suggests that these conditions were probably met, for the first time, during the subsistence intensification of the Neolithic.

Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule and discuss related criteria.

Choices, chance and change: luck egalitarianism over time

The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., result only from the choices of agents). I grant that the broad approach is correct but argue that the temporal standpoint from which we judge whether the person can be held responsible, or the extent to which they can be held responsible, should be radically altered. Instead of asking, as Standard (or Static) Luck Egalitarianism seems to, whether or not, or to what extent, a person was responsible for the choice at the time of choosing, and asking the question of responsibility only once, we should ask whether, or to what extent, they are responsible for the choice at the point at which we are seeking to discover whether, or to what extent, the inequality is just, and so the question of responsibility is not settled but constantly under review. Such an approach will differ from Standard Luck Egalitarianism only if responsibility for a choice is not set in stone – if responsibility can weaken then we should not see the boundary between luck and responsibility within a particular action as static. Drawing on Derek Parfit’s illuminating discussions of personal identity, and contemporary literature on moral responsibility, I suggest there are good reasons to think that responsibility can weaken – that we are not necessarily fully responsible for a choice for ever, even if we were fully responsible at the time of choosing. I call the variant of luck egalitarianism that recognises this shift in temporal standpoint and that responsibility can weaken Dynamic Luck Egalitarianism (DLE). In conclusion I offer a preliminary discussion of what kind of policies DLE would support.

Hypothetical choice, egalitarianism, and the separateness of persons

Luck egalitarians claim that disadvantage is worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk than when it emerges from a chosen risk. I argue that disadvantage is also worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would have declined to take, had he or she been able to do so, than when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would not have declined to take. Such a view is significant because it allows both luck egalitarians and prioritarians to respond to Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey's charge that they fail to accommodate intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries – the so-called separateness of persons objection. I argue that the view is plausible independently of its ability to answer the separateness of persons objection, and is a natural extension of the luck egalitarian concern with the impact of unchosen circumstance.

On the significance of the basic structure: a priori baseline views and luck egalitarianism

This paper uses the exploration of the grounds of a common criticism of luck egalitarianism to try to make an argument about both the proper subject of theorising about justice and how to approach that subject. It draws a distinction between what it calls basic structure views and a priori baseline views, where the former take the institutional aspects of political prescriptions seriously and the latter do not. It argues that objections to luck egalitarianism on the grounds of its harshness can in part be explained by this blindness to relevant features of institutions. Further, it may be that luck egalitarianism cannot regard its own enactment as just. A related objection to Dworkin’s equality of resources, which claims that it cannot pick a particular institutional background to set the costs of resources and so is radically indeterminate, is also presented. These results, I argue, give us good reason to reject all a priori baseline views.

Egalitarianism under Earmark Constraints

Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm. Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers. Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution.

An evolutionary model explaining the Neolithic transition from egalitarianism to leadership and despotism.

The Neolithic was marked by a transition from small and relatively egalitarian groups, to much larger groups with increased stratification. But the dynamics of this remain poorly understood. It is hard to see how despotism can arise without coercion, yet coercion could not easily have occurred in an egalitarian setting. Using a quanti- tative model of evolution in a patch-structured population, we demonstrate that the interaction between demographic and ecological factors can overcome this conundrum. We model the co-evolution of individual preferences for hierarchy alongside the degree of despotism of leaders, and the dispersal preferences of followers. We show that voluntary leadership without coercion can evolve in small groups, when leaders help to solve coordination problems related to resource production. An example is coordinating construction of an irrigation system. Our model predicts that the transition to larger despotic groups will then occur when: 1. surplus resources lead to demographic expansion of groups, removing the viability of an acephalous niche in the same area and so locking individuals into hierarchy; 2. high dispersal costs limit followers' ability to escape a despot. Empirical evidence suggests that these conditions were likely met for the first time during the subsistence intensification of the Neolithic.

Earnings management and cultural values

Using theory and empirical data from social psychology to measure for cultural differences between countries, we study the effect of individualism as defined by Hofstede (1980) and egalitarianism as defined by Schwartz (1994, 1999, 2004) on earnings management. We find a significant influence of both cultural measures. In line with Licht et al. (2004), who argue that individualistic societies may be less susceptible to corruption, we find that countries scoring high on individualism tend to have lower levels of earnings management. In addition, we find that egalitarianism, defined as a society's cultural orientation with respect to intolerance for abuses of market and political power, is negatively related with earnings management. Our results are robust to different specifications and controls. The main message of this paper is that besides formal institutions, cultural differences are relevant to explain earnings management behaviour. We think that our work adds to the understanding of the importance of cultural values in managerial behaviour across countries contributing to the literature on earnings management and law and institutions.

An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution

In this paper we axiomatize the strong constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1991) over the class of weak superadditive games using constrained egalitarianism, order-consistency, and converse order-consistency. JEL classification: C71, C78. Keywords: Cooperative TU-game, strong constrained egalitarian solution, axiomatization.

Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Contexts and typologies in the analysis of welfare state legitimacy : a social psychological approach to political opinion formation

This dissertation analyses public opinion towards the welfare state across 29 European countries. Based on an interdisciplinary approach combining social psychological, sociological, and public opinion approaches to political opinion formation, it investigates how social position and shared beliefs shape perceived legitimacy of welfare institutions, and how social contexts impact on the processes of opinion formation. Drawing on social representations theory, as well as socialization and self-interest approaches, the dissertation analyses the role of social position in lay support for institutional solidarity. Normative beliefs-defined as preferred views regarding the organisation of social relations-mediate the effect of social position on welfare support. In addition, drawing on public opinion literature, the dissertation analyses opinion formation as a function of country-level structural (e.g., level of social spending, unemployment) and ideological factors (e.g., level of meritocracy). The dissertation comprises two theoretical and four empirical chapters. Three of the empirical chapters use data from the European Social Survey 2008. Using multilevel and typological approaches, the dissertation contributes to welfare attitude literature by showing that normative beliefs, such as distrust or egalitarianism, function as underlying mechanisms that link social position to policy attitudes (Chapter 3), and that characteristics of the national contexts influence the processes of political opinion formation (Chapters 3 and 4). Chapter 5 proposes and predicts a typology of the relationship between attitudes towards solidarity and attitudes towards control, reflecting the two central domains of government intervention. Finally, Chapter 6 examines welfare support in the realm of action and social protest, using data from a survey on Spanish Indigados activists. The findings of this dissertation inform contemporary debates about welfare state legitimacy and retrenchment. - Cette thèse avait pour but d'analyser l'opinion publique envers l'Etat social dans 29 pays européens. Basée sur une approche interdisciplinaire qui combine des perspectives psycho-sociales, sociologiques et d'opinion publique sur la formation d'opinion politique, la thèse étudie comment la position sociale et les croyances partagées façonnent la légitimité perçue des institutions de l'Etat social, et comment les contextes sociaux influencent les processus de formation d'opinion. Basée sur la théorie des représentations sociales, ainsi qu'une approche de socialisation et d'intérêt propre, cette thèse analyse le rôle des positions sociales dans le soutien envers la solidarité institutionnelle. Les croyances normatives-définies comme les visions préférées de l'organisation des rapports sociaux-médiatisent l'effet de la position sociale sur le soutien pour l'Etat social. De plus, s'inspirant de la littérature sur l'opinion publique, la thèse analyse la formation d'opinion en fonction des facteurs structurels (ex. le taux de dépenses sociales, le chômage) et idéologiques (ex. le degré de méritocratie). Cette thèse est composée de deux chapitres théoriques et quatre chapitres empiriques. Trois chapitres empiriques utilisent des données provenant de l'enquête European Social Survey 2008. Appliquant des approches multi-niveux et typoloqiques, la thèse contribue à la littérature sur les attitudes envers l'Etat social en montrant que les croyances normatives, telles que la méfiance ou l'égalitarisme, fonctionnent comme des mécanismes sous-jacents qui relient la position sociale aux attitudes politiques (Chapitre 3), et que les caractéristiques des contextes nationaux influencent les processus de formation d'opinion politique (Chapitres 3 et 4). Le chapitre 5 propose et prédit une typologie sur le rapport entre les attitudes envers la solidarité et celles envers le contrôle, renvoyant à deux domaines centraux de régulation étatique. Enfin, le chapitre 6 examine le soutien à l'Etat social dans le domaine de l'action protestataire, utilisant des données d'une enquête menée auprès des militants espagnols du mouvement des Indignés. Les résultats de cette thèse apportent des éléments qui éclairent les débats contemporains sur la légitimité de l'Etat social et son démantèlement.

A note on the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set

In this note we introduce the Lorenz stable set and provide an axiomatic characterization in terms of constrained egalitarianism and projection consistency. On the domain of all coalitional games, we find that this solution connects the weak constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1989) with their strong counterpart (Dutta and Ray, 1991)