Strategische Erfolgsfaktoren für ein kosten-risiko-optimales Public Debt Management - Organisatorische und inhaltliche Parameter im internationalen Vergleich

Aus den im Rahmen dieser Forschungsarbeit empirisch gewonnenen Erkenntnissen werden Gestaltungsempfehlungen für das Public Debt Management abgeleitet. Diese zeigen, dass ein wirtschaftliches Public Debt Management nicht ein ausschließlich kostenminimierendes (sparsames), sondern ein kosten-risiko-optimales Public Debt Management mit effektiven internen und externen Überwachungsinstrumenten und wirksamer externer Finanzkontrolle sein muss.

Debt management in Brazil: evaluation of the Real Plan and challenges ahead

The Brazilian domestic debt has posed two challenges to policy-makers: it has grown very fast and its maturity is extremely short. This has prompted fears that a default or a compulsory lengthening scheme would be imposed. Here, we analyse the domestic public debt management experience in Brazil, searching for policy prescriptions for the next few years. After briefiy reviewing the recent domestic public debt history, we decompose the large rise in federal bonded debt during 1995-2000, searching for its macroeconomic causes. The main culprits are the extremely high interest payments-which, unti11998, were caused by the weak fiscal stance and the quasi-fixed exchange-rate regime; and since 1999, by the impact ofthe currency depreciation On the dollar-indexed and the externai debt-, and the accumulation of assets of doubtful value, much of which may have to be written off in the future. Simulation exercises of the net debt path for the near future underscore the importance of a tighter fiscal stance to prevent the debt-GDP ratio from growing further. Given the need to quickly lengthen the debt maturity, our main policy advice is to foster, and rely more on, infiation-linked bonds.

Public debt management, monetary policy and financial institutions

Despite the large size of the Brazilian debt market, as well the large diversity of its bonds, the picture that emerges is of a market that has not yet completed its transition from the role it performed during the megainflation years, namely that of providing a liquid asset that provided positive real returns. This unfinished transition is currently placing the market under severe stress, as fears of a possible default from the next administration grow larger. This paper analyzes several aspects pertaining to the management of the domestic public debt. The causes for the extremely large and fast growth ofthe domestic public debt during the seven-year period that President Cardoso are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 computes Value at Risk and Cash Flow at Risk measures for the domestic public debt. The rollover risk is introduced in a mean-variance framework in Section 4. Section 5 discusses a few issues pertaining to the overlap between debt management and monetary policy. Finally, Section 6 wraps up with policy discussion and policy recommendations.

Public-debt management: the Brazilian experience

Includes bibliography

A Cost-Benefit analysis model for technical debt management considering uncertainty and time

In the last few years, technical debt has been used as a useful means for making the intrinsic cost of the internal software quality weaknesses visible. This visibility is made possible by quantifying this cost. Specifically, technical debt is expressed in terms of two main concepts: principal and interest. The principal is the cost of eliminating or reducing the impact of a, so called, technical debt item in a software system; whereas the interest is the recurring cost, over a time period, of not eliminating a technical debt item. Previous works about technical debt are mainly focused on estimating principal and interest, and on performing a cost-benefit analysis. This cost-benefit analysis allows one to determine if to remove technical debt is profitable and to prioritize which items incurring in technical debt should be fixed first. Nevertheless, for these previous works technical debt is flat along the time. However the introduction of new factors to estimate technical debt may produce non flat models that allow us to produce more accurate predictions. These factors should be used to estimate principal and interest, and to perform cost-benefit analysis related to technical debt. In this paper, we take a step forward introducing the uncertainty about the interest, and the time frame factors so that it becomes possible to depict a number of possible future scenarios. Estimations obtained without considering the possible evolution of the interest over time may be less accurate as they consider simplistic scenarios without changes.

Impact on money and credit policy of federal debt management : hearing before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, April 25, 1983.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

Problems associated with federal debt management : hearings before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, March 23 and 24, 1982.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

Public debt limit--1982 [microform] : hearing before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, May 27, 1982.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 82 S361-51

1981-82 miscellaneous tax bills III : hearing before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, on S. 388, S. 446, S. 464, S. 476, S. 499, S. 500, S. 501, March 30, 1981

Item 1038-A, 1038-B (microfiche)

Tuition tax relief bills : hearings before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress, second session on ... January 18, 19, and 20, 1978

Hearings on S. 96, 311, 834, 954, 1570, 1781, and 2142