Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Earnings management and the role of the audit committee: an investigation of the influence of cross-listing and government officials on the audit committee

This paper extends research on the corporate governance practices of transitional economies by examining whether the ability of the audit committee to constrain earnings management in Chinese firms is associated with the listing environment and the presence of government officials on the audit committee. Despite considerable regulatory reforms by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, there remain incentives for Chinese firms to manage earnings. However, government initiatives to encourage domestic firms to cross-list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are accompanied by improved governance. We find that the expertise and independence of the audit committee for cross-listed (CL) Chinese firms are associated with lower abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management. Both domestic only listed firms and CL Chinese firms appoint government officials as independent members on the audit committee. However, due to the political connection between government officials and the controlling shareholder (the State), these appointments can severely mitigate audit committee independence. Subsequently, we find a significant and positive association between audit committee independence and experience and earnings management when there are government officials on the audit committee.

Capacidad informativa de los resultados contables en la empresa familiar

[ES] El presente trabajo analiza la relación entre el control familiar y la credibilidad de los resultados contables. Utilizando un panel de datos de empresas españolas cotizadas no financieras para el período 1997-2003, los resultados alcanzados muestran que la credibilidad de la información contable de la empresa familiar es inferior a la de la no familiar. Asimismo, el incremento de los derechos de voto en manos del último propietario familiar incide negativamente en la credibilidad de sus resultados divulgados. Las únicas empresas en las que la naturaleza familiar incide positivamente en la credibilidad de la información contable son aquellas en las que el presidente del consejo de administración no pertenece a la familia controladora.

Conflito de interesses na sociedade de economia mista: interesse público versus interesse privado

A presente tese tem por objetivo tratar do conflito de interesses na sociedade de economia mista. Referida sociedade tem na sua base constitutiva o conflito como elemento inerente. Por possuir capital público e privado, não é fácil solucionar facilmente os problemas que se apresentam no decorrer de sua existência frente à possibilidade de que o detentor do poder de controle pode decidir em prol do interesse público. E é visando limitar a má utilização do interesse público como resposta à tomada de decisões por parte do acionista controlador que se propõe uma mudança de paradigma. Para tanto, propõe-se analisar o papel do Estado empresário na atual conjuntura de limitação de intervenção do Estado na economia. Também é abordada a forma com que o poder Executivo vem intervindo no mercado, de forma a limitar a livre iniciativa e, por vezes, até mesmo eivada de certa inconstitucionalidade. No entanto, para evitar que haja afronta à Constituição no que diz respeito à exploração de atividade econômica por parte do Estado sem que sejam observados os limites constitucionais impostos, apresenta-se o meta-interesse como meio de solução. Sendo o meta-interesse o interesse da própria companhia, e considerando que o interesse público que fundamenta a autorização para a criação da sociedade de economia mista se extingue com a criação da referida companhia, tem-se que as normas que devem reger as sociedades de economia mista são as normas de direito privado. Com o meta-interesse o Estado passa a intervir na seara privada em igualdade de condições com as demais companhias, não podendo mais se valer de sua posição de acionista majoritário para tomar decisões que conflitem com o interesse da companhia e que privilegiem o interesse público secundário ou até mesmo o interesse político do Estado em detrimento do interesse social e dos acionistas minoritários. Dessa forma, o meta-interesse tem por finalidade colocar fim aos conflitos em relação à aplicação das normas jurídicas e as indefinições da própria natureza da sociedade de economia mista.

A responsabilidade do cotista do fundo de investimento em participações

A presente dissertação tem por escopo traçar os contornos do regime de responsabilidade do cotista de fundo de investimento em participações FIP. Para tanto, serão analisados os aspectos históricos, a natureza jurídica e a forma como os fundos de investimento são estruturados no direito brasileiro, com foco no fundo de investimento em participações. Tendo em vista que o FIP pode assumir posição de controlador de companhia na qual realiza investimento,a dissertação também trata, de forma sucinta, da estrutura do poder de controle, da identificação do acionista controlador e das hipóteses de sua responsabilização. Na sequência, são apontadas as hipóteses de responsabilização direta e indireta dos cotistas de fundos de investimento em participações. A pesquisa busca demonstrar que o cotista do FIP, em razão da responsabilidade subsidiária decorrente da obrigação de arcar com o patrimônio negativo do fundo, está sujeito a responsabilidade indireta incompatível com o seu papel de investidor. Por fim, aponta-se uma possível solução para o problema da responsabilidade do cotista do FIP.

The cost of multiple large shareholders

Previous research argues that large non-controlling shareholders enhance firm value because they deter expropriation by the controlling shareholder. We propose that the conflicting incentives faced by large shareholders may induce a nonlinear relationship between the relative size of large shareholdings and firm value. Consistent with this prediction, we present evidence that there are costs of having a second (and third) largest shareholder, especially when the largest shareholdings are similar in size. Our results are robust to various relative size proxies, firm performance measures, model specifications, and potential endogeneity issues.

L’activisme actionnarial : une perspective canadienne

Si l’on considère que le rôle des actionnaires varie dans un continuum qui s’étend de la passivité à l’une des extrémités jusqu’au contrôle total de la société dans laquelle ils ont investi, on peut affirmer que si, à une certaine époque, les investisseurs institutionnels ont privilégié une certaine forme d’apathie rationnelle, cette réalité a évolué. Loins d’avoir atteint l’autre extrémité du spectre, on doit néanmoins constater que désormais, les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants doivent faire face à un nombre limité d’actionnaires institutionnels qui se connaissent et détiennent une part importante des titres d’une société. Malgré la présence d’obstacles légaux et organisationnels qui entravent toujours aujourd’hui l’exercice des droits des actionnaires, il semble que les interventions des investisseurs institutionnels aient transcendé la règle de la majorité en ayant recours à des moyens inusités pour diminuer les risques d’opportunisme au sein des sociétés ouvertes. En effet, si l’activisme des investisseurs institutionnels est un phénomène complexe qui prend des formes multiples souvent opaques et qui est difficile à cerner avec précision, il est néanmoins possible d’affirmer que ce mécanisme de gouvernance joue un rôle des plus importants en contribuant à limiter les coûts d’agence découlant de l’extraction de bénéfices privés par les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants. En effet, au Canada, où la structure de propriété d’une majorité de sociétés est concentrée, l’activisme actionnarial permet de faire contrepoids au vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire des dirigeants ainsi qu’à l’influence qu’exercent les actionnaires dominants afin d’assurer une certaine forme de protection aux droits des actionnaires minoritaires.

A relação entre origem do controle acionário, valor e desempenho das empresas no Brasil

Este trabalho tem como objetivo identificar se a origem do acionista controlador tem relação com o valor e desempenho das empresas no Brasil. A literatura existente sobre essa tema é extensa e, embora a teoria possa elencar diversos fatores que influenciariam no valor e desempenho, os estudos já efetuados mostraram resultados divergentes e, em alguns casos, inconclusivos. Este trabalho realiza um estudo no Brasil, com 407 empresas no período de 2002 a 2009. Os resultados indicam que o controle familiar e governamental reduz o valor das empresas. Por sua vez, não encontramos evidências relacionando origem do controle e desempenho das empresas.

Determinants of ownership concentration in the Chilean stock market

Includes bibliography.

A admissibilidade e a conveniência da exclusão do controlador em S.A.

O estudo refere-se à verificação da admissibilidade e da conveniência da exclusão facultativa de acionista controlador em sociedade anônima. O tema não é propriamente novo no Brasil. Intenciona-se, no entanto, construir a hipótese a partir de fundamento legal diferente. A Lei 6.404/76 (LSA) apenas destina a exclusão para casos de acionista remisso (artigo 107, II), permanecendo silente com relação ao inadimplemento de deveres de colaboração e lealdade (em conjunto, deveres de cooperação). Nesse contexto, a doutrina e a jurisprudência brasileiras tendem a admitir a hipótese de exclusão em tais casos por aplicação do artigo 1.030 do Código Civil, destinado a regular a matéria no âmbito das sociedades simples. Para tanto, aproximam a companhia fechada das sociedades de pessoas a fim de justificar, dada a alegada omissão da lei especial a esse respeito, o tratamento por analogia. A partir do estudo sistemático da LSA, que compreende, entre outros, o entendimento do princípio da circulação de ações e da extensão dos deveres de boa-fé entre os sócios, pretende-se admitir a hipótese com base na própria lógica acionária, em razão da eventual relevância do relacionamento societário para a consecução do fim social. Em tais companhias, o adimplemento dos deveres de cooperação torna-se tão imprescindível quanto o adimplemento do dever de conferimento para o alcance do escopo comum. Em decorrência desse raciocínio, a exclusão torna-se admissível na ocorrência de inadimplemento de qualquer dever social que inviabilize, real ou potencialmente, o preenchimento do fim social. A identificação de eventual affectio societatis entre os acionistas, portanto, passa a ser irrelevante. Admitir a hipótese no que se refere a acionista controlador se revela ainda importante instrumento de limitação do exercício ilegítimo do poder de controle e não se confunde com a sanção de perdas e danos prevista na LSA por abuso de poder de controle. Por fim, será analisada a conveniência da exclusão do controlador, em razão de sua relevância pessoal para a consecução da atividade, a participação societária por ele detida e da possibilidade de dissolver-se parcialmente a sociedade, com a saída do acionista minoritário descontente.

Expropriation of minority shareholders and payout policy

This paper studies the payout policy of Italian firms controlled by large majority shareholders (controlled firms). The paper reports that a firm’s share of dividends in total payout (dividends plus repurchases) is negatively related to the size of the cash flow stake of the firm’s controlling shareholder and positively associated with the wedge between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights. These findings are consistent with the substitute model of payout. One of the implications of this model is that controlled firms with weak corporate governance set-ups, in which controlling shareholders have strong incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, tend to prefer dividends over repurchases when disgorging cash.

Corporate philanthropy, reputation risk management and shareholder value: A study of Australian corporate giving

This study examines the role of corporate philanthropy in the management of reputation risk and shareholder value of the top 100 ASX listed Australian firms for the three years 2011-2013. The results of this study demonstrate the business case for corporate philanthropy and hence encourage corporate philanthropy by showing increasing firms’ investment in corporate giving as a percentage of profit before tax, increases the likelihood of an increase in shareholder value. However, the proviso is that firms must also manage their reputation risk at the same time. There is a negative association between corporate giving and shareholder value (Tobin’s Q) which is mitigated by firms’ management of reputation. The economic significance of this result is that for every cent in the dollar the firm spends on corporate giving, Tobin’s Q will decrease by 0.413%. In contrast, if the firm increase their reputation by 1 point then Tobin’s Q will increase by 0.267%. Consequently, the interaction of corporate giving and reputation risk management is positively associated with shareholder value. These results are robust while controlling for potential endogeneity and reverse causality. This paper assists both academics and practitioners by demonstrating that the benefits of corporate philanthropy extend beyond a gesture to improve reputation or an attempt to increase financial performance, to a direct collaboration between all the factors where the benefits far outweigh the costs.