INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH POLICY-MAKING A Case Study of the Brazilian Central Bank

A number of contemporary studies rightly emphasize the notion that policy outcomes result from institutional determinants. But as a growing literature on institutional development notes, these institutions are themselves impermanent. Sometimes, in crisis moments, institutions are replaced wholesale. More frequently, institutions evolve gradually over time. Using the Brazilian Central Bank as a case study, this article illustrates that the policy-making process itself can be a central driver of gradual institutional development, with institutions evolving through the accumulation of policy choices made over many years and under different policymakers in response to contemporaneous events and unforeseeable economic and political challenges.

Open-economy central banking: Explaining Australia's recommitment to central bank independence

Why do governments offload major instruments such as monetary policy to an independent central bank? This article answers this question in relation to the Australian case, a case which reflects wider global developments. The article challenges the methodology of quantitative approaches to explaining central bank independence and instead argues that a model of 'embedded statism' is the most fruitful explanatory approach.

The role of central bank operating procedures in an economy with productive government spending

The choice of either the rate of monetary growth or the nominal interest rate as the instrument controlled by monetary authorities has both positive and normative implications for economic performance. We reexamine some of the issues related to the choice of the monetary policy instrument in a dynamic general equilibrium model exhibiting endogenous growth in which a fraction of productive government spending is financed by means of issuing currency. When we evaluate the performance of the two monetary instruments attending to the fluctuations of endogenous variables, we find that the inflation rate is less volatile under nominal interest rate targeting. Concerning the fluctuations of consumption and of the growth rate, both monetary policy instruments lead to statistically equivalent volatilities. Finally, we show that none of these two targeting procedures displays unambiguously higher welfare levels.

Official Central Bank Interventions in the Foreign Exchange Markets: A DCC Approach with Exogenous Variables

This paper assesses the impact of official central bank interventions (CBIs) on exchange rate returns, their volatility and bilateral correlations. By exploiting the recent publication of intervention data by the Bank of England, this study is able to investigate fficial interventions by a total number of four central banks, while the previous studies have been limited to three (the Federal Reserve, Bundesbank and Bank of Japan). The results of the existing literature are reappraised and refined. In particular, unilateral CBI is found to be more successful than coordinated CBI. The likely implications of these findings are then discussed.

The Signalling Channel of Central Bank Interventions: Modelling the Yen/US Dollar Exchange Rate

This paper presents a theoretical framework analysing the signalling channel of exchange rate interventions as an informational trigger. We develop an implicit target zone framework with learning in order to model the signalling channel. The theoretical premise of the model is that interventions convey signals that communicate information about the exchange rate objectives of central bank. The model is used to analyse the impact of Japanese FX interventions during the period 1999 -2011 on the yen/US dollar dynamics.

The Signalling Channel of Central Bank Interventions: Modelling the Yen/US Dollar Exchange Rate

This paper presents a theoretical framework analysing the signalling channel of exchange rate interventions as an informational trigger. We develop an implicit target zone framework with learning in order to model the signalling channel. The theoretical premise of the model is that interventions convey signals that communicate information about the exchange rate objectives of central bank. The model is used to analyse the impact of Japanese FX interventions during the period 1999 -2011 on the yen/US dollar dynamics.

Designing the Optimal Conservativeness of the Central Bank

In this paper we propose a new measure of the degree of conservativeness of an inde- pendent central bank and we derive the optimal value from the social welfare perspective. We show that the mere appointment of an independent central bank is not enough to achieve lower inflation, which may explain the mixed results found between central bank independence and inflation in the empirical literature. Further, the optimal central bank should not be too conservative. For instance, we will show that in some circumstances it will be optimal that the central bank is less conservative than society in the Rogoff sense. JEL classification: E58, E63. Keywords: Central bank; Conservativeness; Independence.

Rational Partisan Theory with fiscal policy and an independent central bank

The empirical evidence testing the validity of the rational partisan theory (RPT) has been mixed. In this article, we argue that the inclusion of other macroeconomic policies and the presence of an independent central bank can partly contribute to explain this inconclusiveness. This article expands Alesina s (1987) RPT model to include an extra policy and an independent central bank. With these extensions, the implications of RPT are altered signi ficantly. In particular, when the central bank is more concerned about output than public spending (an assumption made by many papers in this literature), then the direct relationship between in flation and output derived in Alesina (1987) never holds. Keywords: central bank, conservativeness, political uncertainty. JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.

The Conservativeness of the Central Bank when Institutional Quality is Poor

We propose an extension of Alesina and Tabellini 's model (1987) to include corruption, which is understood as the presence of weak institutions collecting revenue through formal tax channels. This paper analyses how conservative should an independent central bank be when the institutional quality is poor. When there are no political distortions, we show that the central bank has to be more conservative than the government, except with complete corruption. In this particular case, the central bank should be as conservative as the government. Further, we obtain that the relationship between the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of the central bank and the degree of corruption is affected by supply shocks. Concretely, when these shocks are not important, the central bank should be less conservative if the degree of corruption increases. However, this result may not hold when the shocks are relevant. JEL classi fication: D6, D73, E52, E58, E62, E63. Keywords: Central Bank Conservativeness; Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.

Customer relationship management and central bank payment system services

Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää, miten kirjallisuudessa kuvattua asiakkuuden hallintaa voitaisiin soveltaa keskuspankin maksuliikepalveluissa. Tarkasteltavana ovat yleiset toimintatavat, sekä asiakkuuden hallintaa tukevat järjestelmät. Tutkimuksen päätavoitteena on Help Desk toiminnan kehittäminen. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan asiakkuuden hallinnan eri osa-alueita ottaen huomioon sekä asiakkaan, että palvelun tarjoajan näkökulmat. Asiakkuuden hallinta ymmärretään strategiana, jolla kyetään kuvaamaan kuinka koko organisaatio toimii asiakkaiden kanssa. Asiakkuuden hallinnan ydin on asiakkaan arvontuotantoprosessin ymmärtäminen. Käytettyjä lähdeaineistoja ovat olleet alan kirjallisuus, artikkelit sekä Internet-lähteet. Empirian taustan ovat muodostaneet asiantuntijahaastattelut sekä keskuspankin julkaisut, sisäiset toimintaohjeet ja vakiintuneet käytännöt. Tutkimuksen keskeinen tulos on, että asiakkuudenhallinnan perusajatukset ovat monin tavoin sovellettavissa keskuspankin melko ainutkertaiseen, teknisesti ja viestinnällisesti vaativaan maksuliikepalveluympäristöön, vaikka asiakkaiden lukumäärä onkin pieni. Hyötyjä voidaan saavuttaa jo asiakkuudenhallinnan peruskomponenttien ml. strategianäkökulma tuntemuksella ja melko pieniltäkin näyttävillä toimintatapa-, työnkulku- ja asennemuutoksilla. Asiakkuuden hallintaa tukevan tietoteknologian jonkinasteinen käyttöönotto voi tuoda lisäarvoa, mutta sen kustannukset ja hyödyt on punnittava tämäntyyppisessä ympäristössä tarkoin.

The Impact of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis on the Relationship between Central Bank Rates and the Corresponding Interbank Interest Rates in 2002-2014

The role of central banks throughout the global financial system has become even more important during and after the events of the financial crisis. In order to stabilize the market conditions and provide solid ground for future development, the central banks use discount rate as their primary monetary policy tool in many developed and emerging economies. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the relationship between central bank rates and corresponding interbank rates has developed before, during and after the crisis period of 2007-2009 in five developed countries and five emerging market countries. The results indicate that during the before-crisis period the interest rate markets reacted diversely but the joint recovery attempts of global economies seem to have stabilized the reactions during and especially after the crisis. The crisis also seems to have highlighted the characteristics of each country’s survival strategy as the role of other policy instruments arose.

“Who is steering the ship and which constellation guides the way? Exploring transparency in the European Central Bank during the time of crisis”

This paper explores transparency in the decision-making of the European Central Bank (ECB). According to ECB´s definition, transparency means that the central bank provides the general public with all relevant information on its strategy, assessments and policy decisions as well as its procedures in an open, clear and timely manner. In this paper, however, the interpretation of transparency is somewhat broader: Information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by the decisions. Moreover, the individuals shall be able to master this material. ECB´s negative attitude towards publication of documents has demonstrated central bank´s reluctance to strive towards more extensive transparency. By virtue of the definition adopted by the ECB the bank itself is responsible for determining what is considered as relevant information. On the grounds of EU treaties, this paper assesses ECB`s accountability concentrating especially on transparency by employing principal-agent theory and constitutional approach. Traditionally, the definite mandate and the tenet of central bank independence have been used to justify the limited accountability. The de facto competence of the ECB has, however, considerably expanded as the central bank has decisively resorted to non-standard measures in order to combat the economic turbulences facing Europe. It is alleged that non-standard monetary policy constitutes a grey zone occasionally resembling economic policy or fiscal policy. Notwithstanding, the European Court of Justice has repeatedly approved these measures. This dynamic interpretation of the treaties seems to allow temporarily exceptions from the central bank´s primary objective during extraordinary times. Regardless, the paper suggests that the accountability nexus defined in the treaties is not sufficient in order to guarantee the accountability of the ECB after the adoption of the new, more active role. Enhanced transparency would help the ECB to maintain its credibility. Investing in the quality of monetary dialogue between the Parliament and the ECB appears to constitute the most adequate and practicable method to accomplish this intention. As a result of upgraded transparency the legitimacy of the central bank would not solely rest on its policy outputs.

The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.