A normative approach to the criminalisation of cartel activity

Although cartel behaviour is almost universally (and rightly) condemned, it is not clear why cartel participants deserve the full wrath of the criminal law and its associated punishment. To fill this void, I develop a normative (or principled) justification for the criminalisation of conduct characteristic of ‘hard core’ cartels. The paper opens with a brief consideration of the rhetoric commonly used to denounce cartel activity, eg that it ‘steals from’ or ‘robs’ consumers. To put the discussion in context, a brief definition of ‘hard core’ cartel behaviour is provided and the harms associated with this activity are identified. These are: welfare losses in the form of appropriation (from consumer to producer) of consumer surplus, the creation of deadweight loss to the economy, the creation of productive inefficiency (hindering innovation of both products and processes), and the creation of so-called X-inefficiency. As not all activities which cause harm ought to be criminalised, a theory as to why certain harms in a liberal society can be criminalised is developed. It is based on JS Mill's harm to others principle (as refined by Feinberg) and on a choice of social institutions using Rawls's ‘veil of ignorance.’ The theory is centred on the value of individual choice in securing one's own well-being, with the market as an indispensable instrument for this. But as applied to the harm associated with cartel conduct, this theory shows that none of the earlier mentioned problems associated with this activity provide sufficient justification for criminalisation. However, as the harm from hard core cartel activity strikes at an important institution which permits an individual's ability to secure their own well-being in a liberal society, criminalisation of hard core cartel behaviour can have its normative justification on this basis.

How high (and far) can you go? On setting fines in cartel cases involving vertically-integrated undertakings and foreign sales

Le Cartel burlesque entre deux amis, envoyé de Paris à Ruel, et refusé pendant la conférance

[Mazarinade. 1649]

Aspectos didácticos del collage y del cartel publicitario a través de la educación multicultural.

Obtuvo Primer Premio Antonio Domínguez Ortiz resuelto por el XVI Concurso para el Fomento de la Investigación e Innovación Educativa

Incidencia del conflicto entre el cartel del Golfo y de los Zetas en la gobernabilidad del Estado de Tamaulipas, México. Periodo 2007-2011

La violencia generada por los grupos del crimen organizado en México, ha afectado la esfera social, política, económica e incluso cultural del país. A nivel regional este impacto ha sido aún más profundo,donde la delincuencia organizada rivaliza con el Estado por el control territorial y la soberanía. Esta situación ha puesto a prueba la capacidad del Estado mexicano para responder a este reto y otras demandas sociales. En el noreste de México, en el Estado de Tamaulipas, este fenómeno tiene unas características especiales que no son fruto de años recientes. Esta investigación recopila y analiza las particularidades del caso de Tamaulipas, México, el conflicto entre organizaciones criminales que allí se presenta y cómo éste incide en la gobernabilidad del Estado mexicano a nivel regional y local.

L'autor del cartell del saló del llibre infantil i juvenil. 'El autor del cartel del salón del libro infantil y juvenil'.

Resumen en catalán