The origins of the control of information in war coverage

The conflict’s coverage, since its inception, has been closely linked to the relationship that both the military and the media have. The freedom they maintained during their first conflicts, although not without problems, though they suffered strict censorship suffered during World War I, and lastly the straitjacket treatment that they have endured during recent wars. The Vietnam War marked a turning point in this relationship, and after the invasion of Grenada, the military would launch new information guidelines, called Department of Defense National Media Pool. The lack of clear guidance of both control and space, has made for a complicated relationship between media and military, so the rules have evolved after every conflict shaping the future of press coverage and thus, war reporting.

Status and security: how Russian media is spinning airstrikes in Syria

Even before the Russian air force launched its first strikes over Syria, there was already a Russian presence on the battleground. These were not the spetsnaz, Kremlin’s special forces, but war correspondents from the leading Russian media outlets. This was as clear a sign as any that the Russia’s priority has shifted from Ukraine, where these reporters spent most of the past 18 months, to Syria.

There is, however, no unanimity on Russia’s latest escalation in Syria. As Russian state TV stations report successes of Russia’s high-precision weapons projecting an image of a high-tech Russian military equal to the US, doubts persist about the latest adventure in the Middle East.

Iz vrazheskago pli︠e︡na : ocherki spasshagosi︠a︡ : istorīi︠a︡ mytarstv russkago zhurnalista v Germanīi /

Mode of access: Internet.

Many celebrities and a few others : a bundle of reminiscences /

A boy's ambitions.--First lessons in journalism.--Midnight oil and beach combing.--A handy man of literature.--A corner of Bohemia.--The lure of the play.--Thomas Bailey Aldrich.--Edgar Fawcett.--Mark Twain and E.C. Stedman.--Some Boston memories.--Henry M. Stanley and Paul du Chaillu.--A royal academician [George H. Boughton] and his friends.--Glimpses of London society.--Charles Reade and Mrs. Oliphant.--James Payn.--Wilkie Collins, Sir Walter Besant and "Ian Maclaren."--Field Marshal Lord Wolseley.--Two famous war correspondents [Archibald Forbes and Sir William Howard Russell]--Lady St. Helier and Thomas Hardy.--"Toby, M.P." and his circle.--The author of "Lorna Doone."--My acquaintance with Mr. Gladstone.

Dissenters in dock at injustice of war

Review of 'The Trial of the Catonsville Nine', Brisbane Festival / Brisbane Powerhouse, published in The Australian, 28 September 200.

The language of neofeudal corporatism and the war on Iraq

In this paper we argue that the term “capitalism” is no longer useful for understanding the current system of political economic relations in which we live. Rather, we argue that the system can be more usefully characterised as neofeudal corporatism. Using examples drawn from a 300,000 word corpus of public utterances by three political leaders from the “coalition of the willing”— George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and John Howard—we show some defining characteristics of this relatively new system and how they are manifest in political language about the invasion of Iraq.

Air evacuation in war : the role of RAAF nurses undertaking air evacuation of casualties between 1943-1953

Air transportation of Australian casualties in World War II was initially carried out in air ambulances with an accompanying male medical orderly. By late 1943 with the war effort concentrated in the Pacific, Allied military authorities realised that air transport was needed to move the increasing numbers of casualties over longer distances. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) became responsible for air evacuation of Australian casualties and established a formal medical air evacuation system with trained flight teams early in 1944. Specialised Medical Air Evacuation Transport Units (MAETUs) were established whose sole responsibility was undertaking air evacuations of Australian casualties from the forward operational areas back to definitive medical care. Flight teams consisting of a RAAF nursing sister (registered nurse) and a medical orderly carried out the escort duties. These personnel had been specially trained in Australia for their role. Post-WWII, the RAAF Nursing Service was demobilised with a limited number of nurses being retained for the Interim Air Force. Subsequently, those nurses were offered commissions in the Permanent Air Force. Some of the nurses who remained were air evacuation trained and carried out air evacuations both in Australia and as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Australia became responsible for the air evacuation of British Commonwealth casualties from Korea to Japan. With a re-organisation of the Australian forces as part of the British Commonwealth forces, RAAF nurses were posted to undertake air evacuation from Korea and back to Australia from Iwakuni, Japan. By 1952, a specialised casualty staging section was established in Seoul and staffed by RAAF nurses from Iwakuni on a rotation basis. The development of the Australian air evacuation system and the role of the flight nurses are not well documented for the period 1943-1953. The aims of this research are three fold and include documenting the origins and development of the air evacuation system from 1943-1953; analysing and documenting the RAAF nurse’s role and exploring whether any influences or lessons remain valid today. A traditional historical methodology of narrative and then analysis was used to inform the flight nurse’s role within the totality of the social system. Evidence was based on primary data sources mainly held in Defence files, the Australian War Memorial or the National Archives of Australia. Interviews with 12 ex-RAAF nurses from both WWII and the Korean War were conducted to provide information where there were gaps in the primary data and to enable exploration of the flight nurses’ role and their contributions in war of the air evacuation of casualties. Finally, this thesis highlights two lessons that remain valid today. The first is that interoperability of air evacuation systems with other nations is a force multiplier when resources are scarce or limited. Second, the pre-flight assessment of patients was essential and ensured that there were no deaths in-flight.

Making sense of Australia's war memorials

War memorials are an important part of the Australian landscape and culture. This essay suggests five possible explanations for this: a) imperial loyalty, at least initially; b) the warrior cult; c) guilt at the loss of so many young people in a seemingly senseless fashion; d) the demise of formal religion, and; e) the insecure nature of Australian nationalism.

The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice