The post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament in the EU's Common Commercial Policy: Implications for bilateral trade negotiations. EU Diplomacy Paper 05/2012, July 2012

This paper sets out to conduct an empirical analysis of the post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament (EP) in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy through an examination of the ‘deep and comprehensive’ bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) currently negotiated as part of the EU’s Global Europe strategy. The EU-Korea and EU-India FTAs are used as case studies in order to determine the implications of the EP’s enhanced trade powers on the processes, actors and outcomes of EU bilateral trade policy. The EP is now endowed with the ‘hard power’ of consent in the ratification phase of FTAs, acting as a threat to strengthen its ‘soft power’ to influence negotiations. The EP is developing strategies to influence the mandate and now plays an important role in the implementation of FTAs. The entry of this new player on the Brussels trade policy field has brought about a shift in the institutional balance of power and opened up the EP as a new point of access for trade policy lobbyists. Finally, increased EP involvement in EU trade policy has brought about a politicisation of EU trade policy and greater normative outcomes of FTAs.

The politics of CAP reform: Trade negotiations, institutional settings and blame avoidance

In this article we argue that the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and the subsequent role of the WTO has changed the international context of CAP policy-making. However, comparing the three latest CAP reforms, we demonstrate that pressures on the CAP arising from international trade negotiations cannot alone account for the way in which the EU responds in terms of CAP reform. The institutional setting within which the reform package was determined also played a crucial role. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the CoAM seems to be a more conducive setting than the European Council for undertaking substantial reform of the CAP. We suggest that the choice of institutional setting is influenced by the desire of farm ministers and of heads of state or government to avoid blame for unpopular decisions. When CAP reform is an integral part of a broader package, farm ministers pass the final decision to the European Council and when CAP reform is defined as a separate issue the European Council avoids involvement.

On the use (fulness) of CGE modelling in trade negotiations and policy

This paper discusses a series of issues related to the use and different possible applications of CGE modelling in trade negotiations. The points addressed range from practical to methodological questions: when to use the models, what they provide the users and how far the model structure and assumptions should be explained to them, the complementary roles of partial and general equilibrium modelling, areas to be improved and data questions. The relevance of the modeller as the final decision maker in all these instances is also highlighted.

Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 2013: A sluggish postcrisis, mega trade negotiations and value chains: scope for regional action

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The changing politics of preference formation in international trade negotiations: the European Union in the Doha Round

This research seeks to provide an explanation for variations of “politics” of preference formation in international trade negotiations. Building on the ‘policy determines politics’ argument, I hypothesize the existence of a causal relationship between issue-characteristics and their variations with politics dynamics and their variations. More specifically, this study seeks to integrate into a single analytical framework two dimensions along which variations in the “politics of preference formation” can be organized: configurations of power relationships among the relevant actors in the structures within which they interact as well as the logic and the motivations of the actors involved in the policy making process. To do so, I first construct a four-cell typology of ‘politics of preference formation’ and, then, I proceed by specifying that the type of state-society configurations as well as the type of actors’ motivations in the “politics of preference formation” depend, respectively, on the degree to which a policy issue is perceived as politically salient and on the extent to which the distributional implications of such an issue can be calculated by the relevant stakeholders in the policy making process. The empirical yardstick against which the validity of the theoretical argument proposed is tested is drawn from evidence concerning the European Union’s negotiating strategy in four negotiating areas in the context of the so-called WTO’s Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations: agriculture, competition, environment and technical assistance and capacity building.

The EU’s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power?

This article focuses on the EU’s strategy for choosing regulatory venues to negotiate trade agreements. It analyses the existence of a clear venue hierarchy since the late 1990s and the recent change leading to a blurring of any clear preference for using bilateral, inter-regional or multilateral settings. The article challenges domestic explanations of the EU’s choice of venue, stressing the autonomy of the Commission as a major factor. Using a principal-agent framework, it shows that the Commission’s agenda-setting powers, the existence of interest divergence among principals (e.g. Member States, business groups) and the multi-level system facilitate agency.

Persistent Deadlock in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Case of Doha

The history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations is full of anecdotes on missed deadlines, failed ministerial conferences, and brinkmanship situations. Tactics such as walking away from the table or sleep-depriving night sessions are legendary in the context of attempting to overcome impasse in negotiations. This article traces and explains the recurrent deadlock in the Doha Round negotiations. It identifies four structural/contextual factors – ideas, institutions, interests, and information – as necessary for understanding and anticipating potential deadlocks. The article also offers a definition of deadlock, and discusses a set of factors highlighted in the international relations literature that explain the existence and persistence of deadlock. With the help of game theory, it then illustrates the challenges faced by actors during trade negotiations. The article concludes by outlining two general scenarios for the Doha Development Agenda and discusses their implications for the World Trade Organization.