Uma contribuição à teoria das contribuições

A insuficiente definição conceitual das contribuições, seja a nível constitucional, seja a nível do Código Tributário Nacional, tem possibilitado a instituição de contribuições especiais pela União Federal sem quase nenhum parâmetro de controle, exceto pelas exigências de afetação do produto da arrecadação a uma finalidade específica (social, econômica ou profissional) e de referibilidade dos benefícios ao grupo de contribuintes. Ocorre que o primeiro requisito (da afetação) é de dificílimo controle e tem sido pouco observado, enquanto que o segundo (da referibilidade) é um conceito ainda muito aberto e sujeito a uma interpretação elástica pelos tribunais, que tem reconhecido a sua existência mesmo nos casos em que a atuação estatal não se refere direta e imediatamente ao grupo de contribuintes. Isso, na prática, abriu à União Federal um campo de incidência quase ilimitado a explorar por meio da criação de contribuições que muitas vezes não passam de meros impostos com destinação especial, agravando os problemas de escalada da carga tributária, concentração das receitas tributárias na União Federal, crescente dependência de Estados e Municípios de transferências federais e perda da racionalidade do já precário Sistema Tributário Nacional. Em vista disso, o presente trabalho visa contribuir para o desenvolvimento da teoria das contribuições, identificando novos parâmetros jurídicos para a sua classificação, estruturação e controle. Por meio desses aportes teóricos, busca-se também conferir maior racionalidade e coerência ao Sistema Tributário Nacional, o que de maneira indireta também tende a contribuir para o desenvolvimento institucional do País.

Double tax agreements and the international allocation of business income in Australia

Increasingly, the effectiveness of the present system of taxation of international businesses is being questioned. The problem associated with the taxation of such businesses is twofold. A system of international taxation must be a fair and equitable system, distributing profits between the relevant jurisdictions and, in doing so, avoiding double taxation. At the same time, the prevention of fiscal evasion must be secured. In an attempt to achieve a fair and equitable system Australia adopts unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures to avoid double taxation and restrict the avoidance of tax. The first step in ascertaining the international allocation of business income is to consider the taxation of business income according to domestic law, that is, the unilateral measures. The treatment of international business income under the Australian domestic law, that is, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), will depend on two concepts, first, whether the taxpayer is a resident of Australia and secondly, whether the income is sourced in Australia. After the taxation of business profits has been determined according to domestic law it is necessary to consider the applicability of the bilateral measures, that is, the Double Tax Agreements (DTAs) to which Australia is a party, as the DTAs will override the domestic law where there is any conflict. Australia is a party to 40 DTAs with another seven presently being negotiated. The preamble to Australia's DTAs provides that the purpose of such agreements is 'to conclude an Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income'. Both purposes, for different reasons, are equally important. It has been said that: The taxpayer hopes the treaty will prevent the double taxation of his income; the tax gatherer hopes the treaty will prevent fiscal evasion; and the politician just hopes. The first purpose, the avoidance of double taxation, is achieved through the provision of rules whereby the Contracting States agree to the classification of income and the allocation of that income to a particular State. In this sense DTAs do not allocate jurisdiction to tax but rather provide an arrangement whereby the States agree to restrict their substantive law. The restriction is either through the non-taxing of the income or via the provision of a tax credit.

Tax Collection in History

Methods of tax collection employed by modern governments seem dull when compared to the rich variety observed in history. Whereas most governments today typically use salaried agents to collect taxes, various other types of contractual relationships have been observed in history, including sharing arrangements which divide the tax revenue between the government and collectors at fixed proportions, negotiated payment schemes based on the tax base, and sale of the revenue to a collector in exchange for a lump-sum payment determined at auction. We propose an economic theory of tax collection that can coherently explain the temporal and spatial variation in contractual forms. We begin by offering a simple classification of tax collection schemes observed in history. We then develop a general economic model of tax collection that specifies the cost and benefits of alternative schemes and identifies the conditions under which a government would choose one contractual form over another in maximizing the net revenue. Finally, we use the conclusions of the model to explain some of the well-known patterns of tax collection observed in history and how choices varied over time and space.

Industrial classification listing for corporation statistics of income.

Mode of access: Internet.