Executive compensation and corporate governance with special reference to Bangladesh; some emerging issues

This discussion paper considers corporate governance issues associated with executive compensation arrangements. An historical perspective is used to demonstrate the absence of a sound empirically-based understanding of good corporate governance practices in relation to share-based payment arrangements. The paper provides an overview of issues including the potential earnings dilution and volatility effects of the introduction of regulations affecting executive remuneration. Potential future research questions have been framed addressing each of the major issues identified in this paper. We conclude that corporate regulators should ensure they are familiar with and consider best practice models for corporate governance when developing new, or revising existing business regulation. It is proposed that further research to remedy this deficiency would enable a more accurate assessment of the impact of management on accounting regulation and the better design and implementation of regulation.

Characterising derivative-based loan arrangements

The income tax and GST laws contain an array of rules that apply to debt and gains in the nature of interest. The definitions of 'debt' or 'loan' and amounts in the nature of 'interest' vary across the provisions and tax officials, taxpayers and courts must decide whether the terms should be read as applying to debt, loans or interest in a narrow legal sense or should be read more broadly to catch multi-element arrangements that give effect to a debt or loan relationship in an economic or commercial sense but not in conventional single document form. This article reviews the UK, US and Australian approaches to interpreting multi-element transactions and considers whether four tax provisions dealing with debt should be interpreted to apply to multi-element, derivative-based loan arrangements.

Corporate governance of executive remuneration with special reference to Bangladesh

This discussion paper focuses on corporate governance issues associated with executive compensation arrangements. An historical perspective is used to demonstrate the absence of a sound empirically-based understanding of good corporate governance practices in relation to share-based payment arrangements. The paper provides an overview of issues including the potential earnings dilution and volatility effects of the introduction of regulations affecting executive remuneration. Potential research questions have been framed addressing each of the major issues identified in this paper. It is concluded that corporate regulators should ensure they are familiar with and that they consider best practice models for corporate governance when developing new or revising existing business regulation. It is proposed that further research to remedy this deficiency would enable a more accurate assessment of the impact of management on accounting regulation and the better design and implementation of regulation.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

MODEL-BASED COMPENSATION FOR BURST MESSAGE LOSS IN WIRELESS NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A recent trend in networked control systems (NCSs) is the use of wireless networks enabling interoperability between existing wired and wireless systems. One of the major challenges in these wireless NCSs (WNCSs) is to overcome the impact of the message loss that degrades the performance and stability of these systems. Moreover, this impact is greater when dealing with burst or successive message losses. This paper discusses and presents the experimental results of a compensation strategy to deal with this burst message loss problem in which a NCS mathematical model runs in parallel with the physical process, providing sensor virtual data in case of packet losses. Running in real-time inside the controller, the mathematical model is updated online with real control signals sent to the actuator, which provides better reliability for the estimated sensor feedback (virtual data) transmitted to the controller each time a message loss occurs. In order to verify the advantages of applying this model-based compensation strategy for burst message losses in WNCSs, the control performance of a motor control system using CAN and ZigBee networks is analyzed. Experimental results led to the conclusion that the developed compensation strategy provided robustness and could maintain the control performance of the WNCS against different message loss scenarios.

School Principals' Attitudes Towards Performance Based Compensation

The main objective of this study is to determine the attitudes of school principals regarding a performance based compensation system. This study identifies the attitudes towards specific factors that should be considered in the implementation of a system of performance based compensation. The data have been analyzed to determine if a principal's demographic characteristics affect his/her level of agreement with performance based compensation and the factors for implementation. In addition, this study unveils areas of concern that principals have conveyed regarding the implementation of a performance based compensation system. Data was obtained from 444 public school principals representing 444 schools and 178 districts in the state of Colorado. Measures used in the treatment of the data include descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVA. The major findings of this study were: 1. 82.4% of respondents believe that teachers, principals and administrators should be included in performance based compensation (PBC). 2. The top two indicators that respondents believed should be included in a PBC system are student achievement (88.5%) and teacher evaluations (77.6%) 3. The 3 largest obstacles to PBC that respondents identified are: a. The capacity to link student achievement to teacher evaluations (82.9%) b. Teacher Union Resistance (67.1%) c. Cost (55.9%) 4. Principals in urban, rural and suburban geographic groups disagree about the effects of performance based compensation. 5. The top 5 overall concerns regarding Performance Based Compensation were: a. Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure performance of all teachers/equity between teachers b. Concerns regarding evaluation (time for principals to learn, consistency from school to school, time for principals to evaluate, quality of evaluation tool). c. Not in favor of PBC due to philosophical views or concerns about lack of research. d. Concerns regarding the equity between classrooms and districts across the state due to poverty levels and unequal resources. e. Concerns that performance based compensation will result in a decline in teacher collaboration and an increase in competition between teachers. Based upon these findings, the researcher concluded that there is not a strong general acceptance of performance based compensation systems. However, urban principals in Colorado tend to view PBC somewhat more favorably than do principals in suburban or rural areas. Most importantly, systems to link student achievement to teacher evaluation must be collaboratively created to ensure PBC systems are equitable, consistent and fair.

An Empirical Analysis of Continuing Improvements Following the Implementation of a Performance-Based Compensation Plan

Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and/or because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees’ performance declines before they leave the firm.

Factor analysis based VTS and JUD noise estimation and compensation

Model based compensation schemes are a powerful approach for noise robust speech recognition. Recently there have been a number of investigations into adaptive training, and estimating the noise models used for model adaptation. This paper examines the use of EM-based schemes for both canonical models and noise estimation, including discriminative adaptive training. One issue that arises when estimating the noise model is a mismatch between the noise estimation approximation and final model compensation scheme. This paper proposes FA-style compensation where this mismatch is eliminated, though at the expense of a sensitivity to the initial noise estimates. EM-based discriminative adaptive training is evaluated on in-car and Aurora4 tasks. FA-style compensation is then evaluated in an incremental mode on the in-car task. © 2011 IEEE.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.