Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

MODEL-BASED COMPENSATION FOR BURST MESSAGE LOSS IN WIRELESS NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A recent trend in networked control systems (NCSs) is the use of wireless networks enabling interoperability between existing wired and wireless systems. One of the major challenges in these wireless NCSs (WNCSs) is to overcome the impact of the message loss that degrades the performance and stability of these systems. Moreover, this impact is greater when dealing with burst or successive message losses. This paper discusses and presents the experimental results of a compensation strategy to deal with this burst message loss problem in which a NCS mathematical model runs in parallel with the physical process, providing sensor virtual data in case of packet losses. Running in real-time inside the controller, the mathematical model is updated online with real control signals sent to the actuator, which provides better reliability for the estimated sensor feedback (virtual data) transmitted to the controller each time a message loss occurs. In order to verify the advantages of applying this model-based compensation strategy for burst message losses in WNCSs, the control performance of a motor control system using CAN and ZigBee networks is analyzed. Experimental results led to the conclusion that the developed compensation strategy provided robustness and could maintain the control performance of the WNCS against different message loss scenarios.

School Principals' Attitudes Towards Performance Based Compensation

The main objective of this study is to determine the attitudes of school principals regarding a performance based compensation system. This study identifies the attitudes towards specific factors that should be considered in the implementation of a system of performance based compensation. The data have been analyzed to determine if a principal's demographic characteristics affect his/her level of agreement with performance based compensation and the factors for implementation. In addition, this study unveils areas of concern that principals have conveyed regarding the implementation of a performance based compensation system. Data was obtained from 444 public school principals representing 444 schools and 178 districts in the state of Colorado. Measures used in the treatment of the data include descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVA. The major findings of this study were: 1. 82.4% of respondents believe that teachers, principals and administrators should be included in performance based compensation (PBC). 2. The top two indicators that respondents believed should be included in a PBC system are student achievement (88.5%) and teacher evaluations (77.6%) 3. The 3 largest obstacles to PBC that respondents identified are: a. The capacity to link student achievement to teacher evaluations (82.9%) b. Teacher Union Resistance (67.1%) c. Cost (55.9%) 4. Principals in urban, rural and suburban geographic groups disagree about the effects of performance based compensation. 5. The top 5 overall concerns regarding Performance Based Compensation were: a. Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure performance of all teachers/equity between teachers b. Concerns regarding evaluation (time for principals to learn, consistency from school to school, time for principals to evaluate, quality of evaluation tool). c. Not in favor of PBC due to philosophical views or concerns about lack of research. d. Concerns regarding the equity between classrooms and districts across the state due to poverty levels and unequal resources. e. Concerns that performance based compensation will result in a decline in teacher collaboration and an increase in competition between teachers. Based upon these findings, the researcher concluded that there is not a strong general acceptance of performance based compensation systems. However, urban principals in Colorado tend to view PBC somewhat more favorably than do principals in suburban or rural areas. Most importantly, systems to link student achievement to teacher evaluation must be collaboratively created to ensure PBC systems are equitable, consistent and fair.

An Empirical Analysis of Continuing Improvements Following the Implementation of a Performance-Based Compensation Plan

Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and/or because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees’ performance declines before they leave the firm.

IFRS 2 Osakeperusteiset maksut – ylimmän johdon osakeperusteisten palkitsemisjärjestelmien kirjaaminen sekä vaikutus tilinpäätökseen

Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on pyrkiä selvittämään kansainvälisen tilipäätösstandardin, IFRS 2 Osakeperusteiset maksut, vaikutusta yritysten palkitsemisjärjestelmäkäytäntöihin standardin voimaanastumisesta aina nykyhetkeen saakka. Tarkastelun ensisijaisena pyrkimyksenä on selvittää, miten osakeperusteiset palkitsemisjärjestelmät, kirjataan yritysten tilinpäätöksiin. Tutkimuksessa on myös tarkoitus yritysten tilinpäätösinformaatioiden kautta pyrkiä tuomaan esille osakeperusteisten maksujen tilinpäätöksellinen vaikutus, eli selvittää, millaisia vaikutuksia osakeperusteisten maksujen kirjaamisella on yritysten tunnusluvuille.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

Analysis and compensation of power amplifier nonlinearity in MIMO transmit diversity systems

The nonlinearity of high-power amplifiers (HPAs) has a crucial effect on the performance of multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) systems. In this paper, we investigate the performance of MIMO orthogonal space-time block coding (OSTBC) systems in the presence of nonlinear HPAs. Specifically, we propose a constellation-based compensation method for HPA nonlinearity in the case with knowledge of the HPA parameters at the transmitter and receiver, where the constellation and decision regions of the distorted transmitted signal are derived in advance. Furthermore, in the scenario without knowledge of the HPA parameters, a sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)-based compensation method for the HPA nonlinearity is proposed, which first estimates the channel-gain matrix by means of the SMC method and then uses the SMC-based algorithm to detect the desired signal. The performance of the MIMO-OSTBC system under study is evaluated in terms of average symbol error probability (SEP), total degradation (TD) and system capacity, in uncorrelated Nakagami-m fading channels. Numerical and simulation results are provided and show the effects on performance of several system parameters, such as the parameters of the HPA model, output back-off (OBO) of nonlinear HPA, numbers of transmit and receive antennas, modulation order of quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM), and number of SMC samples. In particular, it is shown that the constellation-based compensation method can efficiently mitigate the effect of HPA nonlinearity with low complexity and that the SMC-based detection scheme is efficient to compensate for HPA nonlinearity in the case without knowledge of the HPA parameters.

Paying for long-term performance: restructuring bankers’ pay for risk regulation

The purpose of this paper is to propose hybrid capital securities as a new approach to compensation for senior bank executives and risk-takers instead of cash or equity-based compensation currently adopted by the industry. The global financial turmoil indicated that misaligned pay-for-performance compensation arrangements encouraged management short-termism and rewarded excessive risk-taking behaviour in Anglo-Saxon system. Rather than regulating specific instruments and processes, we believe that it is much more efficient to overhaul the compensation scheme to align it with risk management and governance. This empirical paper investigates the European hybrid market by employing data from the Merrill Lynch Global Index System from 2000 to 2010. Our paper contributes to both literature and practices by designing a structured scheme to tie the executive’s interests to long-term performance of the bank, the goal of regulators and the economy at large which consequently reduce the probability of future bank failures.

The Taxation of Bonuses and its Effect on Executive Compensation - Evidence from the UK Experience

This paper explores the reaction of compensation components awarded to executive directors of UK financial institutions following the adoption of the bonus tax in December 2009. Excessive bonuses are blamed for encouraging risk taking and are regarded as one of the pull factors of the financial crisis. The British government attempted to reduce bonuses and accordingly corporate risk-taking by means of a special tax on cashbased bonuses. Using a comprehensive dataset on executive compensation we show that the introduction of the bonus tax decreased the net cash bonuses awarded to directors by about 43%, accompanied however by a simultaneous increase in other compensation components leaving both variable as well as total compensation unaffected. Hence, the incidence of the bonus tax was borne by the firms which compensated their managers for the decrease in cash-based compensation by awarding them different forms of pay. Consistent with this finding our data also suggests that firms reduced dividend pay-outs as a consequence of the bonus tax.

The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

A Field Study of the Impact of a Performance-Based Incentive Plan

Much management accounting research focuses on design of incentive compensation contracts. A basic assumption in these contracts is that performance-based incentives improve employee performance. This paper reports on a field test of the multi-period incentive effects of a performance-based compensation plan on the sales of a retail establishment. Analysis of panel data for 15 retail outlets over 66 months indicates a sales increase when the plan is implemented, an effect that persists and increases over time. Sales gains are significantly lower in the peak selling season when more temporary workers are employed.

The structure of middle management remuneration packages: An application to Australian mine managers

This paper investigates the composition of remuneration packages for middle managers and relates the structure of remuneration contracts to firm-specific attributes. A statutorily defined position in a single industry is studied as an example of middle management. This allows us to control for differences in task complexity across managers and industry-induced factors that could determine differences in remuneration contracts. Higher-risk firms are expected to pay their mine managers a greater proportion of variable salaries and market and/or accounting-based compensation than low-risk firms. Results indicate that high-risk firms pay a higher proportion of variable salaries and more compensation based on market and/or accounting performance.

Reforming the law of medical negligence: Solutions in search of a problem

The Commonwealth Government's Principles Based Review of the Law of Negligence recently recommended reforms aimed at limiting liability and damages arising from personal injury and death, in response to the growing perception that the current system of compensating personal injury had become financially unsustainable. Recent increases in medical liability and damages have eroded the confidence of doctors and their professional bodies, with fears of unprecedented desertion from and reduced recruitment into high risk areas, and one of the primary foci of the review concerned medical negligence. The article analyses proposals to redefine the principles necessary for the finding of negligence, against the terms of reference of the review. The article assumes that for the foreseeable future, Australia will persist with tort-based compensation for personal injury rather than developing a no-fault scheme. If the suggested changes to the fundamental principles of negligence are unlikely to reduce medical liability, greater attention might be given to the processes which come into play after the finding of negligence, where reform is more likely to benefit both plaintiffs and defendants.

IFRS 2 Osakeperusteiset maksut – ylimmän johdon osakeperusteisen palkitsemisjärjestelmien käyttöä selittävät tekijät

Työn tarkoituksena on selvittää, mitkä tekijät vaikuttavat IFRS 2 - standardin mukaisen osakeperusteisen palkitsemisen käyttöön ja sen yleisyyteen sekä mitkä tekijät selittävät IFRS 2 -standardin mukaisen osakeperusteisen palkitsemisen osuutta koko henkilöstökuluista tutkimuksessa esiintyvissä OMX-Nordic pörssin listatuissa Suomen ja Ruotsin large cap - yrityksissä. Työn empiirinen tutkimus toteutetaan laadullisella tutkimuksella, jossa lisäksi käytetään hyväksi regressioanalyysin tuloksia vahvistamaan tutkimuksessa muodostettuja ennakko-oletuksia. Tutkimuksesta kävi ilmi, että IFRS 2 -standardin mukaisen osakeperusteisen palkitsemisen käyttöä selittävät toimitusjohtajan ikä, yrityksen koko sekä yrityksen tutkimus- ja kehitystoiminta. Osakeperusteisen palkitsemisen osuutta yrityksen koko henkilöstökuluista puolestaan selittävät yrityksen velkaantuneisuus, palkitsemistapa sekä toimialan riskisyys.