"Grandmothers for Life" a group from the Peace and Freedom contingent demonstrate against nuclear arms in the USA and USSR at the Federal Court House

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Overview of nuclear arms control and defense strategy in NATO : hearings before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, February 23, March 18 and 22, 1982.

Mode of access: Internet.

The future of arms control : hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, on the control of nuclear arms, January 20, 21 and 25, 1982.

Mode of access: Internet.

Nuclear arms reduction proposals : hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, on S.J. Res. 163, 171, 177, 191; S. Res. 242, 323, 343, 370, 391; S. Ex. Res. 5, 6; and S. Con. Res. 81, April 29, 30, May 11, 12, and 13, 1982.

Mode of access: Internet.

Scientists against time,

Mode of access: Internet.

Against small arms: An analysis of an international network

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation was undertaken by the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as the next important issue in international relations after the success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). This dissertation focuses on the reasons why the issue of SALW resulted in an Action Program rather than an international convention. Thus, this result was considered as unsuccessful by the advocates of regulating the illicit trade in SALW. The study provides a social movement theoretical approach, using framing, political opportunity and network analysis to explain why the advocates of regulating the illicit trade in SALW did no succeed in their goals. The UN is taken as the arena in which NGOs, States and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) discussed the illicit trade in SALW. ^ The findings of the study indicate that the political opportunity for the issue of SALW was not ideal. The network of NGOs, States and IGOs was not strong. The NGOs advocating regulation of SALW were divided over the approach of the issue and were part of different coalitions with differing objectives. Despite initial widespread interest among States, only a couple of States were fully committed to the issue till the end. The regional IGOs approached the issue based on their regional priorities and were less interested in an international covenant. The advocates of regulating illicit trade in SALW attempted to frame SALW as a humanitarian issue rather than as a security issue. Thus they were not able to use frame alignment to convince states to treat SALW as a humanitarian issue. In conclusion it can be said that all three items, framing, political opportunity and the network, play a role in the lack of success of advocates for regulating the illicit trade in SALW. ^

Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [microform] : hearing before the subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security, and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, August 1, 1985.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 86 H381-49

Promoting an agenda for nuclear weapons elimination: The Canberra Commission and dilemmas of disarmament

This paper examines the role of the Canberra Commission in terms of consolidating and influencing the agenda on international negotiations towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Commission's Report is significant for two main reasons. First, it represents a unique form of disarmament diplomacy by the Australian Government which combined the post-Cold War international climate of security cooperation with the foreign policy aspirations of an activist middle power. Second, the Report refutes the strategic, technological and political arguments against nuclear elimination in a comprehensive and convincing manner, arguing that without elimination, the world faces increased threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This paper thus concludes that the Canberra Commission has been instrumental in strengthening the taboo against the possession, testing or use of nuclear weapons.

Análisis de los intereses geoestratégicos de China y Estados Unidos en Corea del Sur tras el programa nuclear de Corea del Norte

La península coreana ha sido desde la Guerra Fría y a la actualidad una zona convulsionada por intereses políticos, económicos e ideológicos. Ese panorama obliga un análisis sobre la configuración y los cambios que se han dado entre las potencias actuales, China y Estados Unidos, desde la existencia de un programa nuclear norcoreano que afecta a Corea del Sur y la definición de los intereses de Beijin y Washington.

Defense's nuclear agency, 1947-1997.

Shipping list no.: 2003-0023-S.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Shipping list no.: 98-0230-P.

Essays on arms control and national security /

Mode of access: Internet.

Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) /

"As currently interpreted, it is difficult to see why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) warrants much support as a nonproliferation convention. Most foreign ministries, including that of Iran and the United States, insist that Article IV of the NPT recognizes all states' "inalienable right" of all states to develop "peaceful nuclear energy". This includes money-losing activities, such as nuclear fuel reprocessing, which can bring countries to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. If the NPT is intended to ensure that states share peaceful "benefits" of nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear bomb making technologies, it is difficult to see how it can accomplish either if the interpretation identified above is correct."--P. 3

New purposes and priorities for arms control : a report to Sherman M. Funk, Inspector General of ACDA.

Shipping list no.: 93-98-P.