977 resultados para Public contracts Queensland
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Issued with the Following Variations In Title: Bulletin
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Mode of access: Internet.
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By focusing on developments between 1996 and 2006, this paper explains the reasons for one of Australia’s public health inconsistencies, the comparatively low adoption of adjusted water fluoridation in Queensland. As such, this work involved literature review and traditional historical method. In Queensland, parliamentary support for water fluoridation is conditional on community approval. Political ambivalence and the constraints of the “Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies Act (1963)” Qld have hindered the advocacy of water fluoridation. The political circumstance surrounding the “Lord Mayor’s Taskforce on Fluoridation Report” (1997) influenced its findings and confirms that Australia’s biggest local authority, the Brisbane City Council, failed to authoritatively analyse water fluoridation. In 2004, a private member’s bill to mandate fluoridation failed in a spectacular fashion. In 2005, an official systems review of Queensland Health recommended public debate about water fluoridation. Our principal conclusion is that without mandatory legislation, widespread implementationof water fluoridation in Queensland is most unlikely.
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
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Public contracting in Colombia is conflicting and inefficient. It frequently leads to damage to State property. The Colombian legal system cannot assure efficient and transparent public contracting. The cause is the institutional environment characterized by high transaction costs. Colombian law worsens the process by recognizing the principle of economic equilibrium in public contracts. This principle increasese contract incompleteness and renders impossible the use of economic incentives to control the opportunism of the economic agents. The authors present the hypothesis that the economic equilibrium principle increases the conflictive nature of public contracting. They test the hypothesis empirically. The first section of the paper presents a summary of the literature on transaction costs economics, as well as the legal literature on the historical origin and the content of the economic equilibrium principle. The second section describes the methodology of the empirical study. The third section shows the empirical evidence of the effects that the economic equilibrium principle exerts over the public contracting. The last section presents the conclusions.
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Maynard E. Pirsig, chairman.
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Maynard E. Pirsig, chairman.
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Maynard E. Pirsig, chairman.
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Maynard E. Pirsig, chairman.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Description based on: June 1988.