Country review on the main building energy-efficiency policy instrument

Building energy-efficiency (BEE) is the key to drive the promotion of energy saving in building sector. A large variety of building energy-efficiency policy instrument exist. Some are mandatory, some are soft scheme, and some use economic incentives from country to country. This paper presents the current development of implementing BEE policy instruments by examining the practices of BEE in seven selected countries and regions. In the study, BEE policy instruments are classified into three groups, including mandatory administration control instruments, economic incentive instruments and voluntary scheme instruments. The study shows that different countries have adopted different instruments in their practices for achieving the target of energy-saving and gained various kinds of experiences. It is important to share these experiences gained.

Strengthening value chains as an industrial policy instrument. Methodology and experience of ECLAC in Central America

Foreword by Alicia Bárcena.

Policy Instrument Selection under Uncertainty: The Case of Micropollution Regulation

The paper addresses the question of which factors drive the formation of policy preferences when there are remaining uncertainties about the causes and effects of the problem at stake. To answer this question we examine policy preferences reducing aquatic micropollutants, a specific case of water protection policy and different actor groups (e.g. state, science, target groups). Here, we contrast two types of policy preferences: a) preventive or source-directed policies, which mitigate pollution in order to avoid contact with water; and b) reactive or end-of-pipe policies, which filter water already contaminated by pollutants. In a second step, we analyze the drivers for actors’ policy preferences by focusing on three sets of explanations, i.e. participation, affectedness and international collaborations. The analysis of our survey data, qualitative interviews and regression analysis of the Swiss political elite show that participation in the policy-making process leads to knowledge exchange and reduces uncertainties about the policy problem, which promotes preferences for preventive policies. Likewise, actors who are affected by the consequences of micropollutants, such as consumer or environmental associations, opt for anticipatory policies. Interestingly, we find that uncertainties about the effectiveness of preventive policies can promote preferences for end-of-pipe policies. While preventive measures often rely on (uncertain) behavioral changes of target groups, reactive policies are more reliable when it comes to fulfilling defined policy goals. Finally, we find that in a transboundary water management context, actors with international collaborations prefer policies that produce immediate and reliable outcomes.

Designing Climate Mitigation Policy

This paper provides an exhaustive review of critical issues in the design of climate mitigation policy by pulling together key findings and controversies from diverse literatures on mitigation costs, damage valuation, policy instrument choice, technological innovation, and international climate policy. We begin with the broadest issue of how high assessments suggest the near and medium term price on greenhouse gases would need to be, both under cost-effective stabilization of global climate and under net benefit maximization or Pigouvian emissions pricing. The remainder of the paper focuses on the appropriate scope of regulation, issues in policy instrument choice, complementary technology policy, and international policy architectures.

Inflation targeting and the consistency of monetary policy decisions in Mexico: an empirical analysis with discrete choice models

This paper examines the nature of monetary policy decisions in Mexico using discrete choice models applied to the Central Bank's explicit monetary policy instrument. We find that monetary policy adjustments in Mexico have been strongly consistent with the CB's inflation targeting strategy. We also find evidence that monetary policy responds in a forward-looking manner to deviations of inflation from the target and that observed policy adjustments exhibit asymmetric features, with stronger responses to positive than to negative deviations of inflation from the target and a greater likelihood of policy persistence during periods when monetary policy is tightened, compared with periods when policy is loosened.

Tax policy stance over the business cycle: evidence from Europe

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.

Coordonner les transports et l'urbanisme dans un contexte urbain concret : le TOD comme instrument d'action publique, le cas de Sainte-Therese, QC

Le concept de transit-oriented development (TOD) est habituellement abordé en tant qu'ensemble fixe de caractéristiques physico-spatiales. Cette approche ne s'avere pas suffisante pour comprendre comment le TOD peut être pertinent pour coordonner les transports et l'urbanisme dans un contexte urbain concret. Afin de combler cette lacune, nous proposons d'étudier le TOD en tant qu'instrument d'action publique, adopté, produit et utilisé par les acteurs sur le territoire en fonction des enjeux, des ressources et des contraintes qui y sont présents. Ce travail exploratoire est fondé sur une étude de cas de la mise en place du TOD a Sainte-Thérese. Pour comprendre comment se sont arrimés les intérêts des acteurs impliqués et ce qui en a résulté, la collecte de données se fait a l'aide de sources écrites, mais aussi d’entretiens semi-directifs avec les acteurs clé. Les résultats de l'étude confirment la pertinence de l'approche adoptée pour aborder le TOD. Le TOD comme instrument d'action publique peut être qualifié d'opérateur de congruence, car il permet de faire converger les intérêts différents, et même potentiellement contradictoires, qui sont en jeu sur le territoire. Cependant, il n'y a pas de formule passe-partout: la production du TOD se fait en grande partie de façon incrémentale, en fonction des conditions sur le territoire. La mise en place du TOD n'exige pas nécessairement l'invention d'un nouveau cadre d'action et peut se faire en grande partie a l'aide des outils existants. Toutefois, pour pouvoir se servir pleinement de ces outils, le leadership des acteurs clé s'avere crucial.

Monetary Policy Under a Currency Board

The consensus view is that central banks under currency boards do not have tools for active monetary policy. In this paper, we analyze the foreign exchange fee as a monetary policy instrument that can be used by a central bank under a currency board. We develop a general equilibrium model showing that changes in this fee may have the same effects as a change in the monetary policy stance. Thus central banks under the currency board are shown to have an avenue to implement active monetary policy.

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

The role of EU Special Representatives in the post-Lisbon foreign policy system: A renaissance? IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/02/June 2012

Summary. EU Special Representatives have been deployed since 1996 in order to contribute to the EU’s crisis management efforts in various crisis regions. As they are not part of the formal hierarchy of the European External Action Service and thus a rather flexible foreign policy instrument at the disposal of the Member States, new special representatives have been appointed in 2011 and 2012. This Policy Brief argues that the representatives’ autonomy must not necessarily lead to ‘clashes of competence’ with the EU’s diplomatic service.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). CEPS Special Report No. 109/May 2015

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings (BEEP) 35/2015.

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

Powering innovation through tax concessions : the changing research and development tax incentives

The changing R&D Tax Concession has been touted as the biggest reform to business innovation policy in over a decade. But, is it a changing tax for changing times? This paper addresses this question and further asks ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’. To answer this question, the paper argues that rather than substantive tax reform, the proposed measures simply alter the criteria and means by which companies become eligible for a Federal Government subsidy for qualifying R&D activity. It further argues that when considered as part of the broader innovation agenda, the R&D Tax Concession should be evaluated as a government spending program in the same way as any direct spending on innovation. When this is done, the tax regime is arguably only the administrative policy instrument by which the subsidy is delivered. However, it is proposed that this may not be best practice to distribute those funds fairly, efficiently, and without distortion, while at the same time maintaining adequate government control and accountability. Finally, in answering the question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’ the paper concludes that the answer is ‘very little’.

Powering innovation through tax concessions: The changing research & development tax incentives

The changes to the R&D tax concession in 2011 were touted as the biggest reform to business innovation policy in over a decade. Three years later, as part of the 2014 Federal Budget, a reduction in the concession rates was announced. While the most recent of the pro-posed changes are designed to align with the reduction in company tax rate, the Australian Federal Government also indicated that the gain to revenue from the reduction in the incentive scheme will be redirected by the Government to repair the Budget and fund policy priori-ties. The consequence is that the R&D concessions, while designed to encourage innovation, are clearly linked with the tax system. As such, the first part of this article considers whether the R&D concession is a changing tax for changing times. Leading on from part one, this article also addresses a second question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it’? To answer this question, the article argues that, rather than ever being substantive tax reform, the constantly changing measures simply alter the criteria and means by which companies become eligible for a Federal Government subsidy for qualifying R&D activity, whatever that amount is. It further argues that when considered as part of the broader innovation agenda, all R&D tax concessions should be evaluated as a government spending program in the same way as any direct spending on innovation. When this is done, the tax regime is arguably merely the administrative policy instrument by which the subsidy is delivered. However, this may not be best practice to distribute those funds fairly, efficiently, and without distortion, while at the same time maintaining adequate government control and accountability. Finally, in answering the question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’ the article concludes that the answer is: very little.