Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes

The iterative two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game has been generalised to theN-person case. The evolution of cooperation is explored by matching the Tit For Tat (TFT) strategy (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) against the selfish strategy. Extension of TFT toN-person situations yields a graded set of strategies from the softest TFT, which continues cooperation even if only one of the opponents reciprocates it, to the hardest, which would do so only when all the remaining opponents cooperate. The hardest TFT can go to fixation against the selfish strategy provided it crosses a threshold frequencypc. All the other TFT are invadable by the selfish (D) or the pure defector strategy, while none can invadeD. Yet, provided a thresholdpc is crossed, they can coexist stably withD. AsN, the size of the group increases, the threshold pc also increases, indicating that the evolution of cooperation is more difficult for larger groups. Under certain conditions, only the soft TFT can coexist stably against the selfish strategyD, while the harder ones cannot. An interesting possibility of a complete takeover of the selfish population by successive invasions by harder and harder TFT strategies is also presented.

An analytical approach to the study of cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks

In wireless ad hoc networks, nodes communicate with far off destinations using intermediate nodes as relays. Since wireless nodes are energy constrained, it may not be in the best interest of a node to always accept relay requests. On the other hand, if all nodes decide not to expend energy in relaying, then network throughput will drop dramatically. Both these extreme scenarios (complete cooperation and complete noncooperation) are inimical to the interests of a user. In this paper, we address the issue of user cooperation in ad hoc networks. We assume that nodes are rational, i.e., their actions are strictly determined by self interest, and that each node is associated with a minimum lifetime constraint. Given these lifetime constraints and the assumption of rational behavior, we are able to determine the optimal share of service that each node should receive. We define this to be the rational Pareto optimal operating point. We then propose a distributed and scalable acceptance algorithm called Generous TIT-FOR-TAT (GTFT). The acceptance algorithm is used by the nodes to decide whether to accept or reject a relay request. We show that GTFT results in a Nash equilibrium and prove that the system converges to the rational and optimal operating point.

The EU and Institutional Twinning in Morocco - An inquiry into the motives of cooperation through discourse ethics

This study examines Institutional Twinning in Morocco as a case of EU cooperation through the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics. As a former accession tool, Twinning was introduced in 2004 for legal approximation in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy. Twinning is a unique instrument in development cooperation from a legal perspective. With its long historical and cultural ties to Europe, Morocco presents an interesting case study of this new form of cooperation. We will analyse motives behind the Twinning projects on illegal immigration, environment legislation and customs reform. As Twinning is a new policy instrument within the ENP context, there is relatively little preceding research, which, in itself, constitutes a reason to inquire into the subject. While introducing useful categories, the approaches discussing “normative power Europe” do not offer methodological tools precise enough to analyse the motives of the Twinning cooperation from a broad ethical standpoint. Helene Sjursen as well as Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués have elaborated on Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics in determining the extent of altruism in the ENP in general. Situating the analysis in the process-oriented framework of Critical Theory, discourse ethics provides the methodological framework for our research. The case studies reveal that the context in which they operate affects the pragmatic, ethical and moral aspirations of the actors. The utilitarian notion of profit maximization is quite pronounced both in terms of the number of Twinning projects in the economic sphere and the pragmatic logics of reason instrumental to security and trade-related issues. The historical background as well internal processes, however, contribute to defining areas of mutual interest to the actors as well as the motives Morocco and the EU sometimes described as the external projection of internal values. Through its different aspects, Twinning cooperation portrays the functioning of the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in international relations.

The EU and Institutional Twinning in Morocco - An inquiry into the motives of cooperation through discourse ethics

This study examines Institutional Twinning in Morocco as a case of EU cooperation through the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics. As a former accession tool, Twinning was introduced in 2004 for legal approximation in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy. Twinning is a unique instrument in development cooperation from a legal perspective. With its long historical and cultural ties to Europe, Morocco presents an interesting case study of this new form of cooperation. We will analyse motives behind the Twinning projects on illegal immigration, environment legislation and customs reform. As Twinning is a new policy instrument within the ENP context, there is relatively little preceding research, which, in itself, constitutes a reason to inquire into the subject. While introducing useful categories, the approaches discussing “normative power Europe” do not offer methodological tools precise enough to analyse the motives of the Twinning cooperation from a broad ethical standpoint. Helene Sjursen as well as Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués have elaborated on Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics in determining the extent of altruism in the ENP in general. Situating the analysis in the process-oriented framework of Critical Theory, discourse ethics provides the methodological framework for our research. The case studies reveal that the context in which they operate affects the pragmatic, ethical and moral aspirations of the actors. The utilitarian notion of profit maximization is quite pronounced both in terms of the number of Twinning projects in the economic sphere and the pragmatic logics of reason instrumental to security and trade-related issues. The historical background as well internal processes, however, contribute to defining areas of mutual interest to the actors as well as the motives Morocco and the EU sometimes described as the external projection of internal values. Through its different aspects, Twinning cooperation portrays the functioning of the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in international relations.

Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

Emergence of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Population: A Discrete-Time Replicator Dynamics Analysis

The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: individuals are able to identify the type of every other individual, but fail to recognize their own type, and thus behave under partial information conditions. The interactions between individuals are described by 2 × 2 symmetric games where individuals can either cooperate or defect. The evolution of such populations is studied in the framework of evolutionary game by means of the replicator dynamics. Overlapping generations are considered, so the replicator equations are formulated in discrete-time form. The well-posedness conditions of the system are derived. Depending on the parameters of the game, a restriction may exist for the generation length. The stability analysis of the dynamical system is carried out and a detailed description of the behavior of trajectories starting from the interior of the state-space is given. We find that, provided the conditions of well-posedness are verified, the linear stability of monomorphic states in the discrete-time replicator coincides with the one of the continuous case. Specific from the discrete-time case, a relaxed restriction for the generation length is derived, for which larger time-steps can be used without compromising the well-posedness of the replicator system.

The evolution of cooperation in asymmetric systems

Explaining "Tragedy of the Commons" of evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. Asymmetrical interaction, which is one of the most important characteristics of cooperative system, has not been sufficiently considered in the existing models of the evolution of cooperation. Considering the inequality in the number and payoff between the cooperative actors and recipients in cooperation systems, discriminative density-dependent interference competition will occur in limited dispersal systems. Our model and simulation show that the local but not the global stability of a cooperative interaction can be maintained if the utilization of common resource remains unsaturated, which can be achieved by density-dependent restraint or competition among the cooperative actors. More intense density dependent interference competition among the cooperative actors and the ready availability of the common resource, with a higher intrinsic contribution ratio of a cooperative actor to the recipient, will increase the probability of cooperation. The cooperation between the recipient and the cooperative actors can be transformed into conflict and, it oscillates chaotically with variations of the affecting factors under different environmental or ecological conditions. The higher initial relatedness (i.e. similar to kin or reciprocity relatedness), which is equivalent to intrinsic contribution ratio of a cooperative actor to the recipient, can be selected for by penalizing less cooperative or cheating actors but rewarding cooperative individuals in asymmetric systems. The initial relatedness is a pivot but not the aim of evolution of cooperation. This explains well the direct conflict observed in almost all cooperative systems.

Community Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) in Sunamganj district of Bangladesh: the nature of cooperation and conflicts

There are altogether 411 haors comprising an area of about 8000 square kilometer, covering 25% of entire region dispersed in the districts of Sunamgonj, Sylhet, Moulvibazar, Hobigonj, Netrokona and Kishoreganj. Sunamganj district is particularly known as a district of haors and baors where a large number of people depend on fishing for their livelihood. Some people are basically fishermen and fish all the year round. Community Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) project has been initiated in this area to develop fishery sector as well as for the development of the inland fishermen of haor area. Healthy cooperation among the beneficiaries of the project is very much present and some NGOs are found working actively there to help the fishermen for the sound implementation of the project. But the influentials of different villages around create troubles and conflicts intentionally in the project area because of which fishermen cannot fish smoothly and the implementation of the project is getting hampered. Therefore, a kind of consensus needs to be reached among the inhabitants of the haor area and a powerful association of the fishermen should be established so that fishing may be undertaken in the beel without having any troubles and conflicts. In this article the conflicts and cooperation that are in existence in the implementation process of CBFM project in the haor areas of Sunamgonj district have been discussed. Some suggestions have been offered in the paper to overcome the existing conflicts impeding the smooth implementation of CBFM project in the fishery sector of haor area under Sunamganj district.

Promotion of cooperation in the form C0C1D classified by 'degree grads' in a scale-free network

In this paper, we revisit the issue of the public goods game (PGG) on a heterogeneous graph. By introducing a new effective topology parameter, 'degree grads' phi, we clearly classify the agents into three kinds, namely, C-0, C-1, and D. The mechanism for the heterogeneous topology promoting cooperation is discussed in detail from the perspective of C0C1D, which reflects the fact that the unreasoning imitation behaviour of C-1 agents, who are 'cheated' by the well-paid C-0 agents inhabiting special positions, stabilizes the formation of the cooperation community. The analytical and simulation results for certain parameters are found to coincide well with each other. The C0C1D case provides a picture of the actual behaviours in real society and thus is potentially of interest.

Neuroendocrinology of cooperation: the role of neuropeptides on the modulation of mutualistic behaviour of the Indo-Pacific Cleaner Wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus)

Tese de doutoramento, Ciências do Mar, da Terra e do Ambiente, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade do Algarve, 2015

Lessons from Flanders: drivers & pitfalls of cooperation on a business park

For almost ten years several companies located in De Zaubeek Business Park in Flanders have been collaborating with the goal of creating a more sustainable industrial zone. Many initiatives have been developed in this business park, many successful, but some clearly pointed to constraints that require action beyond the reach of the companies or the business association. The former chairman of the association has been involved in several of these initiatives and we asked him to tell his story.