On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.

Does ownership structure matter? Three essays in finance

Management

Garland, since 1776- a unique ownership structure

The case is based on Garland, a 240 years old Portuguese family business, now owned by the Dawson family. It focuses on a decision made 50 years ago, aligned with what had been the company’s history, about the ownership rules for family members, which influences the ownership structure of the firm. It addresses the main issues about ownership in family businesses, and tackles the problem of succession planning and fair process. It contains a teaching note to support the utilization of the case in a classroom context, with learning objectives, target audience, a teaching plan, questions and proposed answers, and theory that relates to the case. It is also complemented with an epilogue and an overview of the case.

How does ownership structure invfluence bank risk? Analyzing the role of managerial incentives

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of a positive direct effect, which reflects monitoring and opportunistic behavior, and a negative indirect effect, which works through the design of managerial incentive contracts and reflects shareholder preferences toward risk. Large shareholders reduce bank risk by reducing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) and by increasing the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta). In addition, we show that the direct and indirect effect of ownership concentration on bank risk depends on the type of the largest shareholder (a family, a bank, a corporation or an institutional investor), as well as, on the total shareholding held by each type as a group. Our results suggest that the positive relation between ownership concentration and risk is not the result of preferences towards more risk. Rather, they point at opportunistic behavior of large shareholders.

Impact of Ownership Structure on the Performance of China’s Feed Mill Sector, April 2005

In the decade of the 1990s, China’s feed sector became increasingly privatized, more feed mills opened, and the scale of operation expanded. Capacity utilization remained low and multi-ministerial supervision was still prevalent, but the feed mill sector showed a positive performance overall, posting a growth rate of 11 percent per year. Profit margin over sales was within allowable rates set by the government of China at 3 to 5 percent. Financial efficiency improved, with a 20 percent quicker turnover of working capital. Average technical efficiency was 0.805, as more efficient feed mills increasingly gained production shares. This study finds evidence that the increasing privatization explains the improved performance of the commercial feed mill sector. The drivers that shaped the feed mill sector in the 1990s have changed with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. With the new policy regime in place, the study foresees that, assuming an adequate supply of soy meal and an excess capacity in the feed mill sector, it is likely that China will allow corn imports up to the tariff rate quota (TRQ) of 7.2 mmt since the in-quota rate is very low at 1 percent. However, when the TRQ is exceeded, the import duty jumps to a prohibitive out-quota rate of 65 percent. With an import duty for meat of only 10 to 12 percent, China would have a strong incentive to import meat products directly rather than bringing in expensive corn to produce meat domestically. This would be further reinforced if structural transformation in the swine sector would narrow the cost differential between domestic and imported pork.

The interaction of ownership structure and customer satisfaction as determinants of brand equity

In this paper we study the interaction between ownership structure and customer satisfaction, and their impact on a firm's brand equity. We find that customer satisfaction has a positive direct effect on brand equity but an indirect negative one, through reductions in ownership concentration. This latter effect emerges when managers are focused mainly on satisfying customers. It gives out a warning signal that highlights the perverse effect of implementing policies focused excessively on satisfying customers at the expense of shareholders, on a firm's brand equity. We demonstrate our theoretical contention, empirically, making use of an incomplete panel data comprising 69 firms from 11 different nations for the period 2002-2005.

Ownership structure, customer satisfaction and brand equity

This paper studies the interaction between ownership structure, taken as a proxy for shareholders commitment, and customer satisfaction - the main driver of consumer loyalty - and their impact on a firm s brand equity. The results show that customer satisfaction has a positive direct effect on brand equity but an indirect negative one because of reductions in ownership concentration. This latter effect emerges when managers are mainly customer-oriented. Such result gives out a warning signal that highlights the perverse effect of implementing policies, focused excessively on satisfying customers at the expense of shareholders, on a firm s brand equity. The empirical analysis uses an incomplete panel data comprising 69 firms from 11 nations, for the period 2002-2005.

Ownership structure and innovation: Is there a real link?

This work focuses on the study of the relationship between ownership and control structure of the company and its innovative activity. Its aim consists of analysing the role that may be played by determinants within the company related to ownership structure when the decision to incur research and development activities is taken as well as on the output of this innovate process. Among these determinants we may think of issues such as who owns the firm and how the control of decision-making is distributed, the nature of this control and the level of concentration of ownership, among others. The study is carried out for the year 2001 using a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing industries.

Ownership structure and innovation: Is there a real link?

This work focuses on the study of the relationship between ownership and control structure of the company and its innovative activity. Its aim consists of analysing the role that may be played by determinants within the company related to ownership structure when the decision to incur research and development activities is taken as well as on the output of this innovate process. Among these determinants we may think of issues such as who owns the firm and how the control of decision-making is distributed, the nature of this control and the level of concentration of ownership, among others. The study is carried out for the year 2001 using a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing industries.

Evidence on the role of ownership structure on firms' innovative performance

Based on the Knowledge Production Function framework given by Griliches -1979-, we slightly modify it so that the innovative output depends upon a set of factors related to the firm internal characteristics and are influenced by the environment. Specifically, regarding the firm internal determinants the effect of the concentration of the ownership, the composition of the boards of directors and the effect of the nature of the ownership (foreign and public) are analyzed. Additionally, in order to capture the determinants of the environment in which the firm operates other variables concerning the internationalization of market, the agglomeration economies and the regional knowledge externalities are also considered. In order to assess the impact of these determinants on the number of patents and models of use awarded by the firm, the discreteness of the latter variable has to be taken into account. We apply Poisson and Negative Binomial models for a more comprehensive evaluation of the hypothesis in a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms. The results show patenting activity is positively favoured by being located in an environment with a high innovative activity, due to the existence of knowledge spillovers and agglomeration economies.

Ownership structure and risk at Colombian banks

The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk.

The Dual Ownership Structure: a Model to Connect the Cooperative Model With Financial Markets

In business literature, the conflicts among workers, shareholders and the management have been studied mostly in the frame of stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory recognizes this issue as an agency problem, and tries to solve the problem by establishing a contractual relationship between the agent and principals. However, as Marcoux pointed out, the appropriateness of the contract as a medium to reduce the agency problem should be questioned. As an alternative, the cooperative model minimizes the agency costs by integrating the concept of workers, owners and management. Mondragon Corporation is a successful example of the cooperative model which grew into the sixth largest corporation in Spain. However, the cooperative model has long been ignored in discussions of corporate governance, mainly because the success of the cooperative model is extremely difficult to duplicate in reality. This thesis hopes to revitalize the scholarly examination of cooperatives by developing a new model that overcomes the fundamental problem in the cooperative model: the limited access to capital markets. By dividing the ownership interest into financial and control interest, the dual ownership structure allows cooperatives to issue stock in the capital market by making a financial product out of financial interest.

Board composition, ownership structure and dividend policies in an emerging market: further evidence from CASE 50

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine dividend policies in an emerging capital market, in a country undergoing a transitional period. Design/methodology/approach – Using pooled cross-sectional observations from the top 50 listed Egyptian firms between 2003 and 2005, this study examines the effect of board of directors’ composition and ownership structure on dividend policies in Egypt. Findings – It is found that there is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and firm performance, and both dividend decision and payout ratio. The results confirm that firms with a higher return on equity and a higher institutional ownership distribute higher levels of dividend. No significant association was found between board composition and dividend decisions or ratios. Originality/value – This study provides additional evidence of the applicability of the signalling model in the emerging market of Egypt. It was found that despite the high institutional ownership and the closely held nature of the firms, which imply lower agency costs, the payment of higher dividend was considered necessary to attract capital during this transitional period.