Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopolies

This article is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions which are to be imposed on the demand curve to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints.

A Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok (Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies – a survey of the literature)

Az irodalomban az olyan oligopolmodellek, amelyekben mind az ár, mind a mennyiség döntési változó, Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok néven ismertek. E tanulmányban a Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumokkal kapcsolatos érdekesebb eredményeket tekintjük át. Tárgyaljuk a Bertrand-Edgeworth-típusú oligopolmodellek specifikációját, a Nash-egyensúly létezését, a Nash-egyensúly meghatározását és a Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok alkalmazásait. / === / Oligopoly models in which both price and quantity are decisive variables are known in the literature as Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies, the most interesting results with which are surveyed in this paper. The author assumes the existence of the Nash equilibrium, as the specification of Bertrand-Edgeworth-type oligopoly models, the determination of the Nash equilibrium, and the application of Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies.

Exclusive contracts with private information in successive differentiated oligopolies

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. In contrast with the previous literature, exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers selling highly differentiated products, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that exclusive contracts decrease both consumer and social welfare.

Privatization and social welfare in an international mixed Stackelberg duopoly

Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.

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We study the relation between the number of firms and market power in experimental oligopolies. Price competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy equilibrium prices. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. Less collusion with more firms leads to lower average prices. With more than two firms, the predominant market price is 24. A simple imitation model captures this phenomenon. For the long run, the model predicts that prices converge to the Walrasian outcome, but for the intermediate term the modal price is 24

Regional integration and specialisation patterns in Spain

The aim of this paper is to analyse how economic integration in Europe has affected industrial geographical concentration in Spain and explain what the driving forces behind industry location are. Firstly, we construct regional specialisation and geographical concentration indices for Spanish 50 provinces and 30 industrial sectors in 1979, 1986 and 1992. Secondly, we carry out an econometric analysis of the determinants of geographical concentration of industries. Our main conclusion is that there is no evidence of increasing specialisation in Spain between 1979 and 1992 and that the most important determinant of Spain¿s economic geography is scale economies. Furthermore, traditional trade theory has no effects in explaining the pattern of industrial concentration

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

Regional integration and specialisation patterns in Spain

The aim of this paper is to analyse how economic integration in Europe has affected industrial geographical concentration in Spain and explain what the driving forces behind industry location are. Firstly, we construct regional specialisation and geographical concentration indices for Spanish 50 provinces and 30 industrial sectors in 1979, 1986 and 1992. Secondly, we carry out an econometric analysis of the determinants of geographical concentration of industries. Our main conclusion is that there is no evidence of increasing specialisation in Spain between 1979 and 1992 and that the most important determinant of Spain¿s economic geography is scale economies. Furthermore, traditional trade theory has no effects in explaining the pattern of industrial concentration

Measuring conduct and cost parameters in the Spanish air transport market

This paper estimates a model of airline competition for the Spanish air transport market. I test the explanatory power of alternative oligopoly models with capacity constraints. In addition, I analyse the degree of density economies. Results show that Spanish airlines conduct follows a price-leadership scheme so that it is less competitive than the Cournot solution. I also find evidence that thin routes can be considered as natural monopolies

Hay competencia en el mercado europeo de transporte aéreo?: el caso español

La liberalización del transporte aéreo que se llevó a término en la Unión Europea a principios de los años noventa ha tenido efectos positivos sobre el bienestar del viajero. No obstante, existe un consenso en la literatura académica que estos efectos dependen de la existencia de una competencia efectiva en el nivel de la ruta. En este sentido, se plantea el problema que puede llegar a suponer las ventajas de escalera de las compañías dominantes en cada mercado interior. Además, se pretende capturar la diferenciación de productos como característica esencial de la industria del transporte aéreo. El análisis de estas cuestiones se realiza de la forma siguiente. En primer lugar, se hace referencia a los principales aspectos económicos que condicionan la competencia en el transporte aéreo. Y en segundo lugar, se implementa un modelo empírico basado en un sistema de tres ecuaciones, que se estima mediante la técnica de las variables instrumentales. La muestra utilizada hace referencia al año 2001 para la mayoría de las rutas del mercado interior español de vuelos regulares en dónde hay competencia. Los resultados de la estimación muestran la existencia de unas condiciones de competencia diferentes según el segmento del mercado al cual se dirigen las compañías aéreas. Efectivamente, la competencia en precios (calidad) parece ser predominante en el segmento de viajeros por motivos personales (negocios). Adicionalmente, el dominio que la compañía dominante tiene sobre la mayoría de las rutas parece descansar en las ventajas competitivas, tanto en términos de costes como en términos de demanda, que le proporciona el control de la red aeroportuaria nacional. De todo esto se puede inferir que el mantenimiento y/o aumento de los beneficios de la liberalización de los servicios de transporte aéreo exige extender la liberalización al uso del aeropuertos así como descentralizar su gestión.

Regional integration and specialisation patterns in Spain

The aim of this paper is to analyse how economic integration in Europe has affected industrial geographical concentration in Spain and explain what the driving forces behind industry location are. Firstly, we construct regional specialisation and geographical concentration indices for Spanish 50 provinces and 30 industrial sectors in 1979, 1986 and 1992. Secondly, we carry out an econometric analysis of the determinants of geographical concentration of industries. Our main conclusion is that there is no evidence of increasing specialisation in Spain between 1979 and 1992 and that the most important determinant of Spain¿s economic geography is scale economies. Furthermore, traditional trade theory has no effects in explaining the pattern of industrial concentration

Hay competencia en el mercado europeo de transporte aéreo?: el caso español

La liberalización del transporte aéreo que se llevó a término en la Unión Europea a principios de los años noventa ha tenido efectos positivos sobre el bienestar del viajero. No obstante, existe un consenso en la literatura académica que estos efectos dependen de la existencia de una competencia efectiva en el nivel de la ruta. En este sentido, se plantea el problema que puede llegar a suponer las ventajas de escalera de las compañías dominantes en cada mercado interior. Además, se pretende capturar la diferenciación de productos como característica esencial de la industria del transporte aéreo. El análisis de estas cuestiones se realiza de la forma siguiente. En primer lugar, se hace referencia a los principales aspectos económicos que condicionan la competencia en el transporte aéreo. Y en segundo lugar, se implementa un modelo empírico basado en un sistema de tres ecuaciones, que se estima mediante la técnica de las variables instrumentales. La muestra utilizada hace referencia al año 2001 para la mayoría de las rutas del mercado interior español de vuelos regulares en dónde hay competencia. Los resultados de la estimación muestran la existencia de unas condiciones de competencia diferentes según el segmento del mercado al cual se dirigen las compañías aéreas. Efectivamente, la competencia en precios (calidad) parece ser predominante en el segmento de viajeros por motivos personales (negocios). Adicionalmente, el dominio que la compañía dominante tiene sobre la mayoría de las rutas parece descansar en las ventajas competitivas, tanto en términos de costes como en términos de demanda, que le proporciona el control de la red aeroportuaria nacional. De todo esto se puede inferir que el mantenimiento y/o aumento de los beneficios de la liberalización de los servicios de transporte aéreo exige extender la liberalización al uso del aeropuertos así como descentralizar su gestión.

Measuring conduct and cost parameters in the Spanish air transport market

This paper estimates a model of airline competition for the Spanish air transport market. I test the explanatory power of alternative oligopoly models with capacity constraints. In addition, I analyse the degree of density economies. Results show that Spanish airlines conduct follows a price-leadership scheme so that it is less competitive than the Cournot solution. I also find evidence that thin routes can be considered as natural monopolies