A Study on Non Performing Assets of Public Sector Banks in India with Special Reference to State Bank of Travancore

The reforms in Indian banking sector since 1991 is deliberated mostly in terms of the significant measures that were implemented in order to develop a more vibrant, healthy, stable and efficient banking sector in India. The effect of a highly regulated banking environment on asset quality, productivity and performance of banks necessitated the reform process and resulted the incorporation of prudential norms for income recognition, asset classification and provisioning and capital adequacy norms, in line with international best practices. The improvements in asset quality and a reduction in non-performing assets were the primary objective enunciated in the reform measures. In this context, the present research critically evaluates the trend in movement of nonperforming assets of public sector banks in India during the period 2000-01 to 2011-12, thereby facilitates an evaluation of the effectiveness of NPA management in the post-millennium period. The non-performing assets is not a function of loan/advance alone, but is influenced by other bank performance indicators and also by the macroeconomic variables. In addition to explaining the trend in the movement of NPA, this research also explained the moderating and mediating role of various bank performance and macroeconomic indicators on incidence of NPA

Mercado brasileiro de non-performing loans (NPL): uma abordagem teórica e prática na precificação de ativos

O estudo objetiva dar os primeiros passos em direção ao desenvolvimento do campo de distress credit no Brasil via a estimação da taxa de recuperação (liquidação) e sua respectiva precificação. Para isso, foi selecionado o segmento de crédito para pessoa física, inadimplido, com atraso superior a trezentos e sessenta dias que não possuam garantia; ou seja, crédito direto ao consumidor não performado (NPL). No estudo será analisada a dinâmica do ativo e as variáveis que impactam no valor do mesmo, visando a proposição de metodologias e arcabouço teórico para sua precificação.

Related Lending and Bank Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, it was confirmed that banks lend to their related parties in many countries. The question examined in this article is whether related lending functions to alleviate the problems of asymmetric information or transfers profits from depositors and minority shareholders to related parties. The effects of related lending on the profitability and risk of banks in Indonesia are examined using panel data from 1994 to 2007 comprising a total of 74 Indonesian banks. The effects on return on asset (ROA) varied at different periods. Before and right after the crisis, a higher credit allocation to related parties increased ROA. In middle of the crisis, it turned to negative; and this has also been the case in the most recent period as the Indonesian economy has normalized. Effects of related lending on bank risk measured by the Z-score and non-performing loan is not clear. After undergoing bank restructuring, related lending has decreased and the profit structure of banks has changed.

CROSS-COUNTRY STUDY ON THE DETERMINANTS OF BANK FINANCIAL DISTRESS

ABSTRACTBank failures affect owners, employees, and customers, possibly causing large-scale economic distress. Thus, banks must evaluate operational risks and develop early warning systems. This study investigates bank failures in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, newly industrialized countries, the G20, and the G8. We use financial ratios to analyze and explore the appropriateness of prediction models. Results show that capital ratios, interest income compared to interest expenses, non-interest income compared to non-interest expenses, return on equity, and provisions for loan losses have significantly negative correlations with bank failure. However, loan ratios, non-performing loans, and fixed assets all have significantly positive correlations with bank failure. In addition, the accuracy of the logistic model for banks from NAFTA countries provides the best prediction accuracy regarding bank failure.

Gestão do risco de crédito e rentabilidade dos bancos: o caso português

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação do Mestre Adalmiro Álvaro Malheiro de Castro Andrade Pereira.

Ensaios em gestão de risco e regulação bancária

Esta tese é constituída por três ensaios. O primeiro ensaio analisa a informação pública disponível sobre o risco das carteiras de crédito dos bancos brasileiros, sendo dividido em dois capítulos. O primeiro analisa a limitação da informação pública disponibilizada pelos bancos e pelo Banco Central, quando comparada a informação gerencial disponível internamente pelos bancos. Concluiu-se que existe espaço para o aumento da transparência na divulgação das informações, fato que vem ocorrendo gradativamente no Brasil através de novas normas relacionadas ao Pilar 3 de Basileia II e à divulgação de informações mais detalhas pelo Bacen, como, por exemplo, aquelas do “Top50” . A segunda parte do primeiro ensaio mostra a discrepância entre o índice de inadimplência contábil (NPL) e a probabilidade de inadimplência (PD) e também discute a relação entre provisão e perda esperada. Através da utilização de matrizes de migração e de uma simulação baseada na sobreposição de safras de carteira de crédito de grandes bancos, concluiu-se que o índice de inadimplência subestima a PD e que a provisão constituída pelos bancos é menor que a perda esperada do SFN. O segundo ensaio relaciona a gestão de risco à discriminação de preço. Foi desenvolvido um modelo que consiste em um duopólio de Cournot em um mercado de crédito de varejo, em que os bancos podem realizar discriminação de terceiro grau. Neste modelo, os potenciais tomadores de crédito podem ser de dois tipos, de baixo ou de alto risco, sendo que tomadores de baixo risco possuem demanda mais elástica. Segundo o modelo, se o custo para observar o tipo do cliente for alto, a estratégia dos bancos será não discriminar (pooling equilibrium). Mas, se este custo for suficientemente baixo, será ótimo para os bancos cobrarem taxas diferentes para cada grupo. É argumentado que o Acordo de Basileia II funcionou como um choque exógeno que deslocou o equilíbrio para uma situação com maior discriminação. O terceiro ensaio é divido em dois capítulos. O primeiro discute a aplicação dos conceitos de probabilidade subjetiva e incerteza Knigthiana a modelos de VaR e a importância da avaliação do “risco de modelo”, que compreende os riscos de estimação, especificação e identificação. O ensaio propõe que a metodologia dos “quatro elementos” de risco operacional (dados internos, externos, ambiente de negócios e cenários) seja estendida à mensuração de outros riscos (risco de mercado e risco de crédito). A segunda parte deste último ensaio trata da aplicação do elemento análise de cenários para a mensuração da volatilidade condicional nas datas de divulgação econômica relevante, especificamente nos dias de reuniões do Copom.

Intervenções governamentais no mercado de crédito bancário brasileiro: bancos públicos e bancos privados varejistas competem entre si?

O presente estudo investiga se há competição entre os bancos públicos e privados varejistas na presença de intervenções governamentais impostas ao mercado de crédito bancário brasileiro, tais como o aumento da oferta de crédito via bancos públicos e a campanha de redução dos spreads bancários capitaneada pelos bancos governamentais. Os resultados encontrados no modelo Diff-in-Diff indicam que os bancos públicos apresentam ritmo de crescimento do estoque de crédito, nível de aprovisionamento, rentabilidade da carteira de crédito, retorno operacional, bem como custo do funding superiores aos bancos privados após o tratamento. Ademais, há evidências de mudanças na estratégia de alocação de recursos dos bancos privados em relação aos pares públicos, tendo as instituições bancárias privadas preferido aumentar a participação de ativos líquidos no balanço em detrimento de operações de crédito após o tratamento. Esses resultados sugerem que os bancos privados não competem com os bancos públicos no segmento de varejo quando estes adotam estratégias de alocação de recursos difusas à maximização do lucro esperado para um dado risco.

Comparative analysis of Spanish Banks’ Standalone credit profile

The paper studies the relationship between four differently rated bank’s financial profile and their standalone credit rating issued by Moody’s. The comparative analysis shows an example that despite their pricing power and geographical coverage, larger banks do not necessarily have better credit ratings. Instead, business model and risk appetite seem to be the defining factors of banks’ vulnerability to shocks, such as the Spanish real estate crisis. The risk-return relationship is also identified in the banks’ fundamentals meaning that while expansionary strategy in riskier asset classes enhances margins, it also potentially distorts the credit risk profile.

Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

Monitoring bank performance in the presence of risk

This paper proposes a managerial control tool that integrates risk in efficiency scores. Building on existing efficiency specifications, our proposal reflects the real banking technology and accurately models the relationship between desirable and undesirable outputs. Specifically, the undesirable output is defined as non-performing loans to capture credit risk, and is linked only to the relevant dimension of the output set. We empirically illustrate how our efficiency measure functions for managerial control purposes. The application considers a unique dataset of Costa Rican banks during 1998-2012. Efficiency scores? implications are mostly discussed at bank-level, and their interpretations are enhanced by using accounting ratios. We also show the usefulness of our tool for corporate governance by examining performance changes around executive turnover. Results confirm that appointing CEOs from outside the bank significantly improves performance, thus suggesting the potential benefits of new organisational practices.

Inflationary bias and state owned financial institutions

This article explains why the existence of state owned financial institutions makes it more difficult for a country to balance its budget. We show that states can use their financiaI institutions to transfer their deficits to the federal govemment. As a result, there is a bias towards Iarge deficits and high inflation rates. Our model also predicts that state owned financiaI institutions should underperform the market, mainly because they concentrate their portfolios on non-performing loans to their own shareholders, that is, the states. Brazil and Argentina are two countries with a history of high inflation that confirm our predictions .

Estrutura de mercado da indústria bancária e apetite ao risco no Brasil: uma análise dos anos 2001 a 2013

O presente trabalho analisou em que medida a estrutura de mercado da indústria bancária brasileira – em níveis de concentração e competição – afeta o apetite ao risco de seus agentes. Para tanto, o estudo examinou a relação entre indicadores de concentração (C3 e HHI), competição (Estatística-H) e de risco (NPL, Z-score) para o período entre 2001 e 2013. A relação entre non-performing loans (NPL), concentração e competição foi empiricamente testada através de modelos de dados em painel. Os resultados indicam que a concentração bancária tem impacto significativo no NPL, sugerindo que sistemas mais concentrados são mais frágeis. Por outro lado, os resultados para competição e NPL indicam que em ambientes mais competitivos podem gerar sistemas financeiros menos instáveis.

Factors affecting the technical efficiency of production of the Brazilian banking system : a comparison of four statistical models in the context of data envelopment analysis

This paper uses an output oriented Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) measure of technical efficiency to assess the technical efficiencies of the Brazilian banking system. Four approaches to estimation are compared in order to assess the significance of factors affecting inefficiency. These are nonparametric Analysis of Covariance, maximum likelihood using a family of exponential distributions, maximum likelihood using a family of truncated normal distributions, and the normal Tobit model. The sole focus of the paper is on a combined measure of output and the data analyzed refers to the year 2001. The factors of interest in the analysis and likely to affect efficiency are bank nature (multiple and commercial), bank type (credit, business, bursary and retail), bank size (large, medium, small and micro), bank control (private and public), bank origin (domestic and foreign), and non-performing loans. The latter is a measure of bank risk. All quantitative variables, including non-performing loans, are measured on a per employee basis. The best fits to the data are provided by the exponential family and the nonparametric Analysis of Covariance. The significance of a factor however varies according to the model fit although it can be said that there is some agreements between the best models. A highly significant association in all models fitted is observed only for nonperforming loans. The nonparametric Analysis of Covariance is more consistent with the inefficiency median responses observed for the qualitative factors. The findings of the analysis reinforce the significant association of the level of bank inefficiency, measured by DEA residuals, with the risk of bank failure.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.