Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not robust to the inclusion of private information. In particular, this paper analyzes a generalization of the Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model, which relaxes the assumption that all consumers are perfectly informed about the level of fundamentals. In this environment, the KFG equilibrium of zero devaluation is only one of many possible equilibria. In all the other equilibria, the lack of perfect information delays the attack on the currency past the point at which the shadow exchange rate equals the peg, giving rise to unpredictable and discrete devaluations.

Contracting externalities and multiple equilibria in sectors: Theory and evidence

We consider an economy where the production technology has constantreturns to scale but where in the descentralized equilibrium thereare aggregate increasing returns to scale. The result follows froma positive contracting externality among firms. If a firms issurrounded by more firms, employees have more opportunitiesoutside their own firm. This improves employees' incentives toinvest in the presence of ex post renegotiation at the firm level,at not cost. Our leading result is that if a region is sparselypopulated or if the degree of development in the region is lowenough, there are multiple equilibria in the level of sectorialemployment. From the theoretical model we derive a non-linearfirst-order censored difference equation for sectoral employment.Our results are strongly consistent with the multiple equilibriahypothesis and the existence of a sectoral critical scale (belowwich the sector follows a delocation process). The scale of theregions' population and the degree of development reduce thecritical scale of the sector.

A simple model of multiple equilibria based on risk

This paper shows how risk may aggravate fluctuations in economies with imperfect insurance and multiple assets. A two period job matching model is studied, in which risk averse agents act both as workers and as entrepreneurs. They choose between two types of investment: one type is riskless, while the other is a risky activity that creates jobs.Equilibrium is unique under full insurance. If investment is fully insured but unemployment risk is uninsured, then precautionary saving behavior dampens output fluctuations. However, if both investment and employment are uninsured, then an increase in unemployment gives agents an incentive to shift investment away from the risky asset, further increasing unemployment. This positive feedback may lead to multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. An overlapping generations version of the model may exhibit poverty traps or persistent multiplicity. Greater insurance is doubly beneficial in this context since it can both prevent multiplicity and promote risky investment.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.

A simple model of multiple equilibria and default. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 16 July 2012

This Working Document by Daniel Gros presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. Second, a cost that increases with the size of the losses (or haircut) imposed on creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted upon them. One immediate implication of the model is that under some circumstances the creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country not to default. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate charged by investors increases the debt service burden and thus the temptation to default. Under very high debt levels credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their range.

Real options and game theoretical approaches to real estate development projects: multiple equilibria and the implications of different tie-breaking rules

This paper contributes to a fast growing literature which introduces game theory in the analysis of real option investments in a competitive setting. Specifically, in this paper we focus on the issue of multiple equilibria and on the implications that different equilibrium selections may have for the pricing of real options and for subsequent strategic decisions. We present some theoretical results of the necessary conditions to have multiple equilibria and we show under which conditions different tie-breaking rules result in different economic decisions. We then present a numerical exercise using the in formation set obtained on a real estate development in South London. We find that risk aversion reduces option value and this reduction decreases marginally as negative externalities decrease.

Climate determinism revisited: multiple equilibria in a complex climate model

Multiple equilibria in a coupled ocean–atmosphere–sea ice general circulation model (GCM) of an aquaplanet with many degrees of freedom are studied. Three different stable states are found for exactly the same set of parameters and external forcings: a cold state in which a polar sea ice cap extends into the midlatitudes; a warm state, which is ice free; and a completely sea ice–covered “snowball” state. Although low-order energy balance models of the climate are known to exhibit intransitivity (i.e., more than one climate state for a given set of governing equations), the results reported here are the first to demonstrate that this is a property of a complex coupled climate model with a consistent set of equations representing the 3D dynamics of the ocean and atmosphere. The coupled model notably includes atmospheric synoptic systems, large-scale circulation of the ocean, a fully active hydrological cycle, sea ice, and a seasonal cycle. There are no flux adjustments, with the system being solely forced by incoming solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere. It is demonstrated that the multiple equilibria owe their existence to the presence of meridional structure in ocean heat transport: namely, a large heat transport out of the tropics and a relatively weak high-latitude transport. The associated large midlatitude convergence of ocean heat transport leads to a preferred latitude at which the sea ice edge can rest. The mechanism operates in two very different ocean circulation regimes, suggesting that the stabilization of the large ice cap could be a robust feature of the climate system. Finally, the role of ocean heat convergence in permitting multiple equilibria is further explored in simpler models: an atmospheric GCM coupled to a slab mixed layer ocean and an energy balance model

Polymethine cyanine dyes in beta-cyclodextrin solution: multiple equilibria and chemical oxidation

Absorption and fluorescence spectroscopy, electrochemical techniques, and semiempirical calculations were employed to characterize the multiple complexation equilibria between two polymethine cyanine dyes (IR-786 and Indocyanine green-ICG, 5) and beta-cyclodextrin (beta-CD, L), as well as the chemical reactivity of the complexed and uncomplexed species against the oxidizing agents hypochlorite (HC) and hydrogen peroxide (HP). IR-786 dimerization is favored with the increase in beta-CD concentration in the form of (SL)(2) complexes. In the case of ICG, free dimers (D) and SL complexes are favored. Both IR-786 and ICG react and discolor in the presence of HC and HP. For IR-786, the reaction with HP and HC proceeds with observed rate constants of 10(-3) and 0.28 s(-1) and second-order rate constants (k(2)) of similar to 10(-3) and 10(4) M(-1) s(-1), respectively. The intermediate species observed in the bleaching reactions of IR-786 and ICG were shown, by cyclic voltammetry and VIS absorption, to result from one electron oxidation. IR-786 complexed with beta-CD is protected against bleaching in the presence of HP and HC by factors of 20 and 4, respectively. This protection was not observed in ICG complexes. Superdelocalizability profile of both dyes and frontier orbital analysis indicates that beta-CD does not protect ICG from oxidation by HP or HC, whereas the 2:2 IR-786/beta-Cd complex is able to avoid the oxidation of IR-786. We concluded that the decrease in the chemical reactivity of the dyes against oxidant agents in the presence of beta-CD is due to the formation of (SL)(2) complexes. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Multiple equilibria and protectionism

In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!

Analysis of mangrove forest succession, using sediment cores: a case study in the Cananéia -Iguape coastal system, São Paulo Brazil

Sediment cores are an essential tool for the analysis of the dynamics of mangrove succession. Coring was used to correlate changes in depositional environments and lateral sedimentary facies with discrete stages of forest succession at the Cananéia-Iguape Coastal System in southeastern Brazil. A local level successional pattern was examined based on four core series T1) a sediment bank; T2) a smooth cordgrass Spartina alterniflora bank; T3) an active mangrove progradation fringe dominated by Laguncularia racemosa, and; T4) a mature mangrove forest dominated by Avicennia schaueriana. Cores were macroscopically described in terms of color, texture, sedimentary structure and organic components. The base of all cores exhibited a similar pattern suggesting common vertical progressive changes in depositional conditions and subsequent successional colonization pattern throughout the forest. The progradation zone is an exposed bank, colonized by S. alterniflora. L. racemosa, replaces S. alterniflora as progradation takes place. As the substrate consolidates A. schaueriana replaces L. racemosa and attains the greatest structural development in the mature forest. Cores collected within the A. schaueriana dominated stand contained S. alterniflora fragments near the base, confirming that a smooth cordgrass habitat characterized the establishment and early seral stages. Cores provide a reliable approach to describe local-level successional sequences in dynamic settings subject to drivers operating on multiple temporal and spatial scales where spatial heterogeneity can lead to multiple equilibria and where similar successional end-points may be reached through convergent paths.

Interactive expectations

In modeling expectation formation, economic agents are usually viewed as forming expectations adaptively or in accordance with some rationality postulate. We offer an alternative nonlinear model where agents exchange their opinions and information with each other. Such a model yields multiple equilibria, or attracting distributions, that are persistent but subject to sudden large jumps. Using German Federal Statistical Office economic indicators and German IFO Poll expectational data, we show that this kind of model performs well in simulation experiments. Focusing upon producers' expectations in the consumption goods sector, we also discover evidence that structural change in the interactive process occurred over the period of investigation (1970-1998). Specifically, interactions in expectation formation seem to have become less important over time.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).