Strategic entry deterrence : does it constitute a misuse of market power?

A challenge for regulators and the courts has been establishing the boundary between behaviour is exclusionary and should be condemned under s 46 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), now s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), and behaviour that is not exclusionary and might even be pro-competitive. This boundary can be especially difficult to draw in the case of entry deterring strategies. Section 46(1) prohibits corporations with a substantial degree of market power from taking advantage of that market power for one of the statutorily proscribed purposes which include preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market. Section 45(2) separately prohibits corporations from making and giving effect to contracts arrangements and understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The latest case in which the ACCC has failed to satisfy the s 46 criteria is the decision of Greenwood J in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 909 (Cement Australia case). Final orders were published in a separate judgment, in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 148 (28 February 2014). The case concerned an entry deterring strategy, namely the pre-emptive buying of input factors in an upstream market to protect an incumbent with substantial market power in a downstream market and to prevent new entry in the downstream market. Greenwood J found that while Cement Australia Pty Ltd, formerly known as Queensland Cement Ltd (QCL), had substantial market power, its conduct in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was not a contravention of s 46, because Cement Australia had not “taken advantage” of its market power. However, since Cement Australia’s purpose in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was anti-competitive, they were held to contravene s 45(2) of the TPA. The purpose of this Note is to consider only the reasons for judgment in the Cement Australia case in relation to the “taking advantage” element. The judgment was handed down on 10 September 2013. The final hearing date was 15 July 2011, so it was long-awaited. At 714 pages, it is carefully drafted.

The Impact of Emissions Trading on the Price of Electricity in Nord Pool : Market Power and Price Determination in the Nordic Electricity Market

The objective of this thesis is to find out how dominant firms in a liberalised electricity market will react when they face an increase in the level of costs due to emissions trading, and how this will effect the price of electricity. The Nordic electricity market is chosen as the setting in which to examine the question, since recent studies on the subject suggest that interaction between electricity markets and emissions trading is very much dependent on conditions specific to each market area. There is reason to believe that imperfect competition prevails in the Nordic market, thus the issue is approached through the theory of oligopolistic competition. The generation capacity available at the market, marginal cost of electricity production and seasonal levels of demand form the data based on which the dominant firms are modelled using the Cournot model of competition. The calculations are made for two levels of demand, high and low, and with several values of demand elasticity. The producers are first modelled under no carbon costs and then by adding the cost of carbon dioxide at 20€/t to those technologies subject to carbon regulation. In all cases the situation under perfect competition is determined as a comparison point for the results of the Cournot game. The results imply that the potential for market power does exist on the Nordic market, but the possibility for exercising market power depends on the demand level. In season of high demand the dominant firms may raise the price significantly above competitive levels, and the situation is aggravated when the cost of carbon dioixide is accounted for. Under low demand leves there is no difference between perfect and imperfect competition. The results are highly dependent on the price elasticity of demand.

Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Auction

Published as an article in: Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2010, vol. 37, issue 1, pages 42-69.

Market power and its effects on equilibrium in the food system

When food processors have conjectures about rival firms' responses, their profit functions can be used to estimate the degree of market power in the food system. The effects of this power are investigated analytically and through applying the results to the U.S. pork sector

Controlling market power of vertically integrated firms in electricity networks: demand response of aggregator agents

This article reports the results of an experiment that examined how demand aggregators can discipline vertically-integrated firms - generator and distributor-retailer holdings-, which have a high share in wholesale electricity market with uniform price double auction (UPDA). We initially develop a treatment where holding members redistribute the profit based on the imposition of supra-competitive prices, in equal proportions (50%-50%). Subsequently, we introduce a vertical disintegration (unbundling) treatment with holding-s information sharing, where profits are distributed according to market outcomes. Finally, a third treatment is performed to introduce two active demand aggregators, with flexible interruptible loads in real time. We found that the introduction of responsive demand aggregators neutralizes the power market and increases market efficiency, even beyond what is achieved through vertical disintegration.

Basic Income, Republican Freedom, and Effective Market Power

This article examines republican arguments for a basic income that turn on a right to exit the labour market. It gives criteria for the maintenance of republican freedom in markets, arguing that a right to exit or effective market power will guarantee republican freedom in markets. The article then considers whether a basic income is either sufficient or necessary to protect republican freedom both in labour markets and elsewhere. If a basic income is necessary to protect republican freedom in the labour market, I argue it is not sufficient to protect that freedom elsewhere. If citizens lack the means to maintain their republican freedom in the labour market, then there may be other spheres of life where they are vulnerable to subordination, whether or not they have a basic income. Some sociological evidence on cultural consumption patterns is presented.

Bank Performance: Market Power or Efficient Structure?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s, culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Significant consolidations have occurred in the banking industry. This paper considers the market-power versus the efficient-structure theories of the positive correlation between banking concentration and performance on a state-by-state basis. Temporal causality tests imply that bank concentration leads bank profitability, supporting the market-power, rather than the efficient-structure, theory of that positive correlation. Our finding suggests that bank regulators, by focusing on local banking markets, missed the initial stages of an important structural change at the state level.

Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers in Law, 7/2006

From the Introduction. The Media Sector has experienced a technological revolution in the last 15 years. Digital encoding of television signals made possible a more efficient use of the radiospectrum. Digital terrestrial television (hereinafter, “DTT”) allows now for the reception of a significant number of free-to-air channels.1 Moreover, the use of new transmission platforms (hereinafter,“platforms”), namely cable and direct-to-home satellite (hereinafter, “DTH”) paved the way for the arrival in Europe of pay-TV operators, which finance their activities mainly via subscription fees. This changing technological landscape is subject to further evolution in the near future, as incumbent telecommunications operators become increasingly interested in making available broadcasting content2 as part of their broadband offer and 3G mobile handsets can be used for the reception of TV signals....The present paper seeks to ascertain whether the Commission “regulatory approach” towards the exclusive sale of premium content is a sound one, in particular in view of the constant technological evolution outlined above. The assumptions underlying landmark Commission decisions will be compared with recent developments of the media sector in Italy. In the NewsCorp./Telepiù case, decided in 2003, the Commission imposed very strict conditions to allow the merger giving birth to Sky Italia, on the assumption that the operation created a lasting near-monopsony in the different upstream markets for the acquisition of premium intervened against the media conglomerate Mediaset (which controls, inter alia, the main three private free-to-air channels in Italy) for an alleged abuse of dominant position.17 In fact, and contrary to the forecasts made by the Commission, Mediaset was in a position to acquire the broadcasting rights of the main Italian football teams, thereby excluding the incumbent (and near-monopolist) pay-TV operator, Sky Italia. This may go to show that the reality of the sector is more complex and evolves faster than one may infer from the Commission practice, thus putting into question its stance regarding exclusivity. The experience of the evolution of the Italian media sector will be used as the starting point for the evaluation of alternative regulatory options.

Measuring market power in electricity generation: A long-term perspective using a programming model

This paper focuses on measuring the extent to which market power has been exercised in a recently deregulated electricity generation sector. Our study emphasises the need to consider the concept of market power in a long-run dynamic context. A market power index is constructed focusing on differences between actual market returns and long-run competitive returns, estimated using a programming model devised by the authors. The market power implications of hedge contracts are briefly considered. The state of Queensland Australia is used as a context for the analysis. The results suggest that generators have exercised significant market power since deregulation.