The influence of safety ownership on occupational road safety outcomes

Questionnaires and interviews were conducted with employees and senior managers from three Australian organisations to explore the relationship between perceived managerial ownership of safety responsibilities and occupational road safety. It was found that the perceived authority of the person primarily responsible for managing road risks and perceived shared ownership of safety tasks were both significant independent predictors of safer driving behaviours. It was identified that the position of the person accepting primary risk management responsibilities was typically a member of the OHS team and typically in a management position. The extent that ownership was shared across members within the researched organisations varied, with personnel from OHS and fleet management typically accepting partial ownership of managing occupational road risks. Based on the findings, several recommendations are made to assist practitioners in managing occupational road risks.

The impact of board independence and ownership structure on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of Irish-listed companies

Purpose – This study seeks to provide valuable new insight into the timeliness of corporate internet reporting (TCIR) by a sample of Irish-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply an updated version of Abdelsalam et al. TCIR index to assess the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. The index encompasses 13 criteria that are used to measure the TCIR for a sample of Irish-listed companies. In addition, the authors assess the timeliness of posting companies’ annual and interim reports to their web sites. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of board independence and ownership structure on the TCIR behaviour. Board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman’s dual role and average tenure of directors. Ownership structure is represented by managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. Findings – It is found that Irish-listed companies, on average, satisfy only 46 per cent of the timeliness criteria assessed by the timeliness index. After controlling for size, audit fees and firm performance, evidence that TCIR is positively associated with board of director’s independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership is provided. Furthermore, it is found that large companies are faster in posting their annual reports to their web sites. The findings suggest that board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s TCIR behaviour, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Practical implications – The findings highlight the need for improvement in TCIR by Irish-listed companies in many areas, especially in regard to the regular updates of information provided on their web sites. Originality/value – This study represents one of the first comprehensive examinations of the important dimension of the TCIR in Irish-listed companies.

The impact of board independence and ownership structure on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of Irish-listed companies

Purpose – This study seeks to provide valuable new insight into the timeliness of corporate internet reporting (TCIR) by a sample of Irish-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply an updated version of Abdelsalam et al. TCIR index to assess the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. The index encompasses 13 criteria that are used to measure the TCIR for a sample of Irish-listed companies. In addition, the authors assess the timeliness of posting companies’ annual and interim reports to their web sites. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of board independence and ownership structure on the TCIR behaviour. Board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman’s dual role and average tenure of directors. Ownership structure is represented by managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. Findings – It is found that Irish-listed companies, on average, satisfy only 46 per cent of the timeliness criteria assessed by the timeliness index. After controlling for size, audit fees and firm performance, evidence that TCIR is positively associated with board of director’s independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership is provided. Furthermore, it is found that large companies are faster in posting their annual reports to their web sites. The findings suggest that board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s TCIR behaviour, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Practical implications – The findings highlight the need for improvement in TCIR by Irish-listed companies in many areas, especially in regard to the regular updates of information provided on their web sites. Originality/value – This study represents one of the first comprehensive examinations of the important dimension of the TCIR in Irish-listed companies.

Monitoring style drift : evidence from U.S. Equity funds

This thesis examines the stewardship and investment style monitoring by managers and boards of U.S. equity funds. Results indicate that complying with a fund’s declared style, especially in value-growth dimension, remains a challenge for fund managers and boards, and that style-based investors should be aware of the risk of style drift since fund managers and boards do not always monitor the fund’s investment style as stated in the prospectus. Results also show that the quality of fund stewardship, as reflected by fund board quality, corporate culture, manager compensation, regulatory history, and fees are effective in ensuring that fund managers and boards perform their fiduciary obligation by increasing monitoring of the fund investment style.

Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.

Ownership structure and business evaluation practices in family SMEs : evidence from empirical research in Italy

This paper presents early results from a pilot project which aims to investigate the relationship between proprietary structure of small and medium- sized Italian family firms and their owners’ orientation towards a “business evaluation process”. Evidence from many studies point out the importance of family business in a worldwide economic environment: in Italy 93% of the businesses are represented by family firms; 98% of them have less than 50 employees (Italian Association of Family Firms, 2004) so we judged family SMEs as a relevant field of investigation. In this study we assume a broad definition of family business as “a firm whose control (50% of shares or voting rights) is closely held by the members of the same family” (Corbetta,1995). “Business evaluation process” is intended here both as “continuous evaluation process” (which is the expression of a well developed managerial attitude) or as an “immediate valuation” (i.e. in the case of new shareholder’s entrance, share exchange among siblings, etc). We set two hypotheses to be tested in this paper: the first is “quantitative” and aims to verify whether the number of owners (independent variable) in a family firm is positively correlated to the business evaluation process. If a family firm is led by only one subject, it is more likely that personal values, culture and feelings may affect his choices more than “purely economic opportunities”; so there is less concern about monitoring economic performance or about the economic value of the firm. As the shareholders’ number increases, economic aspects in managing the firm grow in importance over the personal values and "value orientation" acquires a central role. The second hypothesis investigates if and to what extent the presence of “non- family members” among the owners affects their orientation to the business evaluation process. The “Cramer’s V” test has been used to test the hypotheses; both were not confirmed from these early results; next steps will lead to make an inferential analysis on a representative sample of the population.

Ownership and co-management: towards the integrated management of Lake Victoria

The management of Lake Victoria is a high priority to the riparian countries that benefit directly from its resources. Management regulations have been formulated and implemented with the aim of maintaining the lake's ecological quality as well as sustaining fisheries exploitation for economic gain. Results indicate, however, that the regulations have not been successful in maintaining the state of the lake's ecosystem nor the fisheries. There has been a continuing decline in fish catches as well as declining biodiversity. Currently, the riparian countries are considering the introduction of a co-management regime as an alternative managerial strategy to address the lake's problems. In this paper it is argued that the failure of the former management regulations was because ownership of the lake was not clearly defined. It is further argued that even if co-management were to be successfully instituted, it will yield very minimal results if the problem of ownership is not properly addressed. This paper explores the ownership status of the lake based on data collected in Tanzania, and examines the relationship between, and significance of, ownership and co-management. The research makes recommendations for how these concepts can contribute to an integrated management of the lake

Corporate Ownership, Control, and Firm Performance in Victorian Britain

Scholars have long debated whether ownership structure matters for firm performance. The standard view with respect to Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a detrimental effect on operating profit and shareholder value. Here, we examine this view using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial agency problems. In contrast, we find that directors who were independent of large family owners were more likely to increase shareholder value.

Merger decisions and executive stock ownership in acquiring firms

This study supports the proposition that managerial welfare affects merger decisions. The abnormal stock returns experienced by bidder firms, from the time of the announcement of a merger bid through the stockholder approval date, are positively relaterd to the percentage of own-company stock held by the senior management of the bidder. The results suggest that substantial amounts of own-company share ownership help align the interests of stockholders and management.

Board composition, ownership structure and dividend policies in an emerging market: further evidence from CASE 50

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine dividend policies in an emerging capital market, in a country undergoing a transitional period. Design/methodology/approach – Using pooled cross-sectional observations from the top 50 listed Egyptian firms between 2003 and 2005, this study examines the effect of board of directors’ composition and ownership structure on dividend policies in Egypt. Findings – It is found that there is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and firm performance, and both dividend decision and payout ratio. The results confirm that firms with a higher return on equity and a higher institutional ownership distribute higher levels of dividend. No significant association was found between board composition and dividend decisions or ratios. Originality/value – This study provides additional evidence of the applicability of the signalling model in the emerging market of Egypt. It was found that despite the high institutional ownership and the closely held nature of the firms, which imply lower agency costs, the payment of higher dividend was considered necessary to attract capital during this transitional period.

Ownership structure and operating performance: evidence from the European maritime industry

In this paper we examine the relation between ownership structure and operating performance for European maritime firms. Using a sample of 266 firm-year observations, during the period 2002–2004, we provide evidence that operating performance is positively related with foreign held shares and investment corporation held shares, indicating better investor protection from managerial opportunism. We also find no relation between operating performance and employee held shares, suggesting no relation between employee commitment and firms’ economic performance. Furthermore, we find no relation between operating performance and government held shares, indicating that government may not adequately protect shareholders’ interests from managerial opportunism. Finally, we do find a positive relation between operating performance and portfolio held shares for code law maritime firms but not for common law maritime firms. Results are robust after adjusting for various firm and country risk characteristics. Overall, our results on the importance of the ownership structure are new to this setting and add to a large body of evidence linking ownership characteristics to corporate performance.

Developing a market orientation in a transitional economy:the role of government regulation and ownership structure

In this article, the authors report the findings of an exploratory study that examines the challenges of developing a market orientation in China, the world’s largest transitional economy. The findings suggest that though managerial actions are relevant, in transitional economies, environmental factors—most notably, government policies—are a major influence on firms’ aspirations to be market oriented.

The impact of regulation and ownership structure on market orientation in the tourism industry in China

The nature of market orientation and its impact on business performance and other related outcomes have been extensively researched in a range of service contexts including tourism. In contrast, our understanding of the factors that influence market orientation is still limited. This paper reports on a study that contributes to our understanding of the determinants of market orientation within the tourism sector by focusing specifically on the role played by two strategically important variables, namely government regulation and ownership structure. The study analyses two national samples of hotels and travel services in the rapidly growing tourism industry in China. The hotel sector has been open to foreign investment for two decades and has a diversified ownership structure, whereas the travel services sector has been dominated by government owned firms and relatively closed to foreign investment. The results of the survey suggest that of the two new antecedents, only government regulation has a significant role to play in driving market orientation. Internally, access to appropriate managerial and marketing capabilities was identified as a significant predictor of the development of market orientation.

Board composition, ownership structure and dividend policies in an emerging market: further evidence from CASE 50

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine dividend policies in an emerging capital market, in a country undergoing a transitional period. Design/methodology/approach – Using pooled cross-sectional observations from the top 50 listed Egyptian firms between 2003 and 2005, this study examines the effect of board of directors’ composition and ownership structure on dividend policies in Egypt. Findings – It is found that there is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and firm performance, and both dividend decision and payout ratio. The results confirm that firms with a higher return on equity and a higher institutional ownership distribute higher levels of dividend. No significant association was found between board composition and dividend decisions or ratios. Originality/value – This study provides additional evidence of the applicability of the signalling model in the emerging market of Egypt. It was found that despite the high institutional ownership and the closely held nature of the firms, which imply lower agency costs, the payment of higher dividend was considered necessary to attract capital during this transitional period.