Eighty-Sixth General Assembly Joint Rules Governing Lobbyists (House Concurrent Resolution 7) House Adopted 2-3-2015, Senate Adopted 2-4-2015, February 5, 2015

Eighty-Sixth General Assembly Joint Rules Governing Lobbyists (House Concurrent Resolution 7) House Adopted 2-3-2015, Senate Adopted 2-4-2015

Directory of registered lobbyists.

Includes index.

List of individual lobbyists.

Description based on: March 27, 1978; title from caption.

List of registered lobbyists.

Mode of access: Internet.

Registration and Regulation of Lobbyists : hearings before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on S. 2512, Seventy-Fourth Congress, first session, on Apr. 16, 1935.

Considers (74) S. 2512.

Information or context : what accounts for positional proximity between the European Commission and lobbyists?

Peer reviewed

Information or context : what accounts for positional proximity between the European Commission and lobbyists?

Peer reviewed

CONTAS, CORRUPÇÃO E BRANQUEAMENTO

Caso prático: das coisas mais fáceis que há para aí, seja em entidades colectivas públicas, seja em pessoas privadas – empresas, partidos políticos, sindicatos, associações e por aí afora -, é falsificar e manipular contas – sabem bem os contabilistas. Outra das coisas que também se faz com facilidade, são leis-alfaiate à medida ou por encomenda, sobretudo num país onde os chamados lóbis nem sequer estão regulamentados – sabem-no bem os juristas. § Case study: of the easiest things is there to there, whether in public legal entities, whether private persons - companies, political parties, unions, associations and besides there - it is falsifying and manipulating accounts - know and accountants. Another thing that also makes easily, are tailor-laws as or to order, especially in a country where so-called lobbyists are not even regulated - are well aware of the jurists.

Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism

This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to join one of two opposite interest lobbies or not to take part in lobbying activities. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. An equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer his lobby to cease to exist. I show the existence of an equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. Therefore, the lobbyists are rather extremists than moderates. However, the competition between those extreme lobbies results in a more moderate policy outcome relative to that initially preferred by the pro- or anti-policy government. Lobbies therefore guard against extremism, while acting as moderators of the government's preferences. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: common agency; endogenous lobbying; extremism.

From Opacity to Transparency? The Place of Organized Interests within the European Institutions

Regulació dels Grup d'interès en la governança europea és crucial per a una comprensió completa de com s'exerceix el poder a la Unió Europea (UE) i per a una descripció més precisa de com funciona el sistema polític de la UE (i dels seus principis subjacents). Un dels temes principals aquí és com els interessos privats o particulars comprometre amb un interès general o públic encarnat en una forma o altra per aquells que actuen per a la UE. Donada la varietat de temes sensibles en joc, no és d'estranyar que la qüestió de la regulació es troba amb una resistència considerable, sobre tot en la Comissió. No obstant això, els recents obstacles a la integració europea han tingut l'efecte de rellançar un debat que fa que l'ètica i la transparència de les peces centrals de l'agenda. Dinàmiques polítiques actuals semblen donar testimoni d'una creixent receptivitat de la UE a les reivindicacions del moviment ALTER-EU que busca un entorn molt més regulat per cabilderos i funcionaris comunitaris.

Lobbying: a Citizen's Guide, March 6, 2013

Lobbying is encouraging the passage, defeat, or modification of legislation. Lobbyists convey views and information to legislators in order to persuade them to act upon an idea for legislation. This is a guide to citizens about lobbying In Iowa.

Acción de organizaciones no gubernamentales frente a las semillas genéticamente modificadas en Colombia

Los efectos ambientales, económicos, sociales y culturales generados por las Semillas Genéticamente Modificadas-SGM y su control por empresas transnacionales como Monsanto, han incentivado la acción colectiva liderada por ONGs, tanto internacionalmente como en Colombia. El objetivo principal es analizar cómo la ONG “Semillas” ha incidido en las políticas colombianas relacionadas con la introducción y uso de SGM durante el periodo 2002-2013. Se centra en la Teoría de Redes Transnacionales de Defensa expuesta por M. Keck y K. Sikkink (1998). Además, se analiza el papel de las ONGs ambientales y las corporaciones transnacionales. El argumento central es que al crear vínculos con actores nacionales e internacionales y vincularse con redes y campañas con impacto transnacional, “Semillas” ha posicionado la lucha en contra de las SGM y ha logrado presionar al Estado influyendo parcialmente en sus políticas y leyes, al igual que en su posición y discurso frente al uso de SGM.

The post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament in the EU's Common Commercial Policy: Implications for bilateral trade negotiations. EU Diplomacy Paper 05/2012, July 2012

This paper sets out to conduct an empirical analysis of the post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament (EP) in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy through an examination of the ‘deep and comprehensive’ bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) currently negotiated as part of the EU’s Global Europe strategy. The EU-Korea and EU-India FTAs are used as case studies in order to determine the implications of the EP’s enhanced trade powers on the processes, actors and outcomes of EU bilateral trade policy. The EP is now endowed with the ‘hard power’ of consent in the ratification phase of FTAs, acting as a threat to strengthen its ‘soft power’ to influence negotiations. The EP is developing strategies to influence the mandate and now plays an important role in the implementation of FTAs. The entry of this new player on the Brussels trade policy field has brought about a shift in the institutional balance of power and opened up the EP as a new point of access for trade policy lobbyists. Finally, increased EP involvement in EU trade policy has brought about a politicisation of EU trade policy and greater normative outcomes of FTAs.

"To strive for economic and social justice": welfare, sexuality, and party politics in San Francisco in the 1960s

This article explores how liberal politicians like Phil Burton of San Francisco joined with welfare rights lobbyists and bureaucrats to embrace late twntieth-century notions of sexual equality through a broader reconception of economic equality brought about by the expansion of the California welfare state in the early 1960s.

Rhetoric in international standard setting process: constructing accounting reality

The paper seeks to explore in depth the ways in which rhetorical strategies are employed in the international accounting standard setting process. The study proposes that rather than simply detailing new accounting requirements, the texts and drafts of accounting standards are artefacts, i.e. deliberately and carefully crafted products, that construct, persuade and encourage certain beliefs and behaviours. The persuasive and constructive strategies are also employed by the constituents submitting comment letters on the regulatory proposals. Consequently, the international accounting standard setting process is an ‘interactive process of meaning making’ (Fairclough, 1989). The study regards accounting as a social construct based on intersubjectivity (Searle, 1995; Davidson, 1990, 1994) and posits language as a constitutive factor in the process (Saussure, 1916; Peirce, 1931-58). This approach to the use of language and the role of rhetoric as a persuasive tool to convince others to our perception of ‘accounting reality’ is supported by the sociological work of Bourdieu (1990, 1991). Bourdieu has drawn our attention to how language becomes used, controlled, reformed and reconstituted by the social agents for the purposes of establishing their dominance. In our study we explore in particular the joint IASB and FASB proposals and subsequent regulations on the scope of consolidation and relevant disclosures that address issues of off-balance sheet financing, a subject that is very timely and of great topical importance. The analysis has revealed sophisticated rhetorical devices used by both the Boards and by the lobbyists. These reflect Aristotelian ethos, pathos and logos. The research demonstrates that those using accounting standards as well as those reading comment letters on the proposals for new standards should be aware of the normative nature of these documents and the subjectivity inherent in the nature of the text.