850 resultados para Liquidity crisis
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A cikkben a magyar fedezetlen bankközi forintpiac hálózatának időbeli alakulását vizsgáljuk 2002 decemberétől 2009 márciusáig. Bemutatjuk a piac általános jellemzőit (forgalom, kamatláb, koncentráció stb.) és az alapvető hálózati mutatókat. Azt tapasztaljuk, hogy az időszak első felében ezek a jellemzők lényegében stabilak voltak. 2006-2007-től kezdve azonban a mutatók egy része kezdett jelentősen megváltozni: a hitelfelvevők koncentrációja nőtt, az átlagos közelség és az átlagos fokszám csökkent, továbbá a hálózat magjának mérete is csökkent. Ezek a jelek arra utalhatnak, hogy a bankok már a válság kitörése előtt érzékelték a növekvő hitelkockázatot, és egyre inkább megválogatták, hogy kinek adnak hitelt. Figyelemre méltó, hogy mindeközben az általános piaci mutatók (forgalom, kamatláb, illetve ezek volatilitása) semmiféle változásra utaló jelet nem tükröztek egészen 2008 októberéig, de ekkor hirtelen minden mutatóban egyértelművé vált a rezsimváltás. Végül részletesen elemezzük az egyes szereplők viselkedését, és megmutatjuk, hogy válságban az egyes szerepek drasztikusan megváltoztak (például forrásokból nyelők lettek, és fordítva). / === / The article examines the changes in the network of Hungary's uncovered interbank forint market over the period Decembcr 2000 to March 2009. It presents the general features of the market (volume, interest rates, concentration etc.) and its basic network. It is found that the features were largely stable in the first half of the period, but some of the indicators began to change significantly in 2006-7: the concentration of borrowers incrcased, average distance and average degree declined, as did the size of the core of the network. These signs pointed to the fact that the banks had sensed an increase in credit risk even before the crisis broke and were becoming increasingly choosy selective in their lending. Meanwhile, however. there aerc no indications of change in the general market indicators (volume, interest rates, or volatility of these) right up to October 2008, when the change of regime was clear in all indicators. Finally, the authors analyse in detail the behaviour of each participant and show that thc roles of some altered drastically with the crisis (e.g. sources became consumers and vice versa).
Resumo:
Széleskörűen alátámasztott, empirikus tény, hogy önmagában a nagyobb volatilitás csökkenti a piac likviditását, vagyis változékonyabb piacokon várhatóan nagyobb lesz egy-egy tranzakció áreltérítő hatása. Kutatásomban azt a kérdést vizsgáltam, hogy a Budapesti Értéktőzsdén az OTP-részvény piacán a 2007/2008-as válságban tapasztalható, átmeneti likviditáscsökkenés betudható volt-e egyszerűen a megnövekedett volatilitásnak, vagy ezen túl abban más tényezők (pl. a szereplők körének és viselkedésének drasztikus megváltozása, általános forráscsökkenés stb.) is szerepet játszhattak-e. A volatilitást a loghozamok szórásával, illetve a tényleges ársávval, míg az illikviditást a Budapesti Likviditási Mértékkel (BLM) reprezentáltam. Egyrészt azt állapítottam meg, hogy az OTP esetében a tényleges ársáv szorosabban korrelál a BLM-mel, mint a szórás. Másrészt az is egyértelmű, hogy a válság előtti kapcsolat a volatilitás és a likviditás között a válságban és azután már jelentősen megváltozott. Válságban az illikviditás jóval nagyobb volt, mint amit a volatilitás növekedése alapján vártunk, a válság lecsengése után azonban megfordult ez a reláció. _________ It is a widely supported empirical fact, that the greater volatility in itself decreases the liquidity of the market, namely more volatile a market is, the higher a transaction’s price impact will be. I have examined in my paper the question, whether the decrease of liquidity during the crisis of 2007/2008 in case of the OTP stock – traded on the Budapest Stock Exchange – was the consequence of the increased volatility, or other factors had an effect on the illiquidity as well (e.g.: the drastic change of market participants’ behaviour; reduction of fi nancing sources; etc.). I have represented volatility with the standard deviation of the logreturns, and with the true range, while the illiquidity with the Budapest Liquidity Measure (BLM). On one hand I have identifi ed, that in case of the OTP, the true range has a stronger relationship with the BLM than the standard deviation has. On the other hand it was clear, that the relationship between volatility and liquidity has changed notably during and after the crisis. During crisis the illiquidity was greater than what I have estimated based on the volatility increase, but after the crisis this relation has changed.
Resumo:
[ES]Este trabajo tiene como objetivo fundamental, valorar si podría haber sido distinto el transcurso de la crisis actual de haber existido mayor transparencia. Al mismo tiempo, también se tratan de observar tanto las medidas actuales como futuras tomadas al respecto. Para ello, se plantean una serie de objetivos secundarios con la finalidad de conseguir de esta manera guiar el desarrollo ordenado de los acontecimientos. Uno de estos objetivos es ver cuál ha sido el origen y desarrollo de la crisis. Para ello, se ha planteado el surgimiento de las hipotecas subprime, base de un sistema que empezó a fallar cuando muchas de estas fueron insolventes. Además, la globalización del sistema financiero contribuyó a que el número de afectados por la titulización de estas hipotecas, un procedimiento muy habitual entonces, fuese mayor. De esta manera, la crisis que surgió originariamente en Estados Unidos pasó a afectar prácticamente a todos los demás países. Otros de los objetivos, están centrados alrededor de la falta de transparencia, sus consecuencias y las medidas paliativas tomadas tanto presentes como futuras. Todo esto se ha planteado acerca de varios aspectos, pero quizás los más importante son los que tratan acerca de la transparencia de los procedimientos bancarios, los cuales debido a su opacidad contribuyeron a generar desconfianza en el sistema interbancario, derivando en un colapso del mismo y en crisis de liquidez.
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This study investigates the impact of liquidity crises on the relationship between stock (value and size) premiums and default risk in the US market. It first examines whether financial distress can explain value and size premiums, and then, subsequently, aims to determine whether liquidity crises increase the risk of value and size premium investment strategies. The study employs a time-varying approach and a sample of US stock returns for the period between January 1982 and March 2011, a period which includes the current liquidity crisis, so as to examine the relationship between default risk, liquidity crises and value and size premiums. The findings indicate that the default premium has explanatory power for value and size and premiums, which affect firms with different characteristics. We also find that liquidity crises may actually increase the risks related to size and value premium strategies.
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The liquidity crisis that swept through the financial markets in 2007 triggered multi-billion losses and forced buyouts of some large banks. The resulting credit crunch is sometimes compared to the great recession in the early twentieth century. But the crisis also serves as a reminder of the significance of the interbank market and of proper central bank policy in this market. This thesis deals with implementation of monetary policy in the interbank market and examines how central bank tools affect commercial banks' decisions. I answer the following questions: • What is the relationship between the policy setup and interbank interest rate volatility? (averaging reserve requirement reduces the volatility) • What can explain a weak relationship between market liquidity and the interest rate? (high reserve requirement buffer) • What determines banks' decisions on when to satisfy the reserve requirement? (market frictions) • How did the liquidity crisis that began in 2007 affect interbank market behaviour? (resulted in higher credit risk and trading frictions as well as expected liquidity shortage)
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This case study – and accompanying teaching note – briefly describes the history of the Espírito Santo family, a banking dynasty who led one of Portugal’s leading economic and financial groups, along with its “crown jewel”, Banco Espírito Santo. It chronicles how the corporate governance issues at BES allowed the family to exploit the bank, its shareholders and its customers, so as to support its unprofitable non-financial businesses. This left the bank in a poor financial situation, which deteriorated beyond control, leaving regulators – whose actions are also analysed here – with no alternative, amidst a severe liquidity crisis, but to apply a resolution measure, pinning large losses on junior bondholders and shareholders before recapitalising the bank.
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This case study describes OxyCapital’s intervention in Cabelte’s operational and financial restructuring. Despite Cabelte’s strong debt burden, OxyCapital believed that the Group’s financial difficulties were temporary and that it had growth potential if the said restructuring would be implemented. Hence, while striving for an operational turnaround, OxyCapital managed to reach an agreement among not only the several banks but also the Group’s shareholder for the financial restructuring. The transaction included the acquisition of a majority stake on the Group’s share capital and of a significant part of Cabelte’s bank debt by OxyCapital’s Corporate Restructuring Fund.
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Dentro de este estudio de caso se busca identificar las posibles causas por las cuales una empresa de alto prestigio y reconocimiento por los consumidores colombianos, como lo era Jeans and Jackets, luego de treinta (30) años de funcionamiento se vio en la necesidad de acogerse a la Ley de Reestructuración Económica (Ley 550 de 1999) con el fin de reestructurar sus pasivos en un momento de crisis global que fue impredecible para muchas compañías. Desde el principio, el “Core Business” de Jeans and Jackets era la venta de prendas sofisticadas y de alta calidad a los jóvenes, especialmente en la capital de la República, con el fin de convertirse en la marca líder de este segmento de la industria. Este estudio de caso pretende identificar cuáles fueron las decisiones estratégicas implementadas por parte de la alta gerencia de la compañía en el contexto mencionado anteriormente que llevaron a la empresa a una crisis de liquidez. La metodología utilizada para el desarrollo de este estudio de caso se basa en variables cualitativas que permitan realizar un análisis profundo y la indagación sobre el fenómeno de morbilidad empresarial; De la misma manera se utilizan variables cuantitativas para observar la situación de la empresa financieramente y el desempeño económico de la misma.
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Spain has a long tradition of encouraging toll highways by granting concessions to private companies. Concessions in Spain have been characterized by a willingness to transfer considerable risk to the private sector. Traffic demand, acquisition of the right-of-way, and financial risk have often been allocated to the private sector. From 1996 to 2011, 16 toll highway concessions, covering a total distance of 835 km, were awarded by the central government of Spain with this approach. Some of those highways started their operations just before the economic recession began. The recession had negative consequences for Spain's economy. The gross domestic product per capita plummeted, and the unemployment rate increased from 9% to 20% of the working population in just 2 years. The recession also had severe consequences for the economic performance of toll highway concessions. Traffic levels declined at a much greater rate than did the gross domestic product. In addition, the conditions imposed by the financial markets on borrowers became much stricter because of the liquidity crisis. This study analyzes the impact that the economic recession ultimately had on the performance of toll highway concessions in Spain and the actions that the government adopted to avoid the bankruptcy of the concessionaires. It was found that the economic recession helped identify some deficiencies in how risk had been allocated in Spain. The measures that both Spain and the European Union are adopting so as to improve risk allocation are discussed.
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This paper examines the effects of liquidity during the 2007–09 crisis, focussing on the Senior Tranche of the CDX.NA.IG Index and on Moody's AAA Corporate Bond Index. It aims to understand whether the sharp increase in the credit spreads of these AAA-rated credit indices can be explained by worse credit fundamentals alone or whether it also reflects a lack of depth in the relevant markets, the scarcity of risk-capital, and the liquidity preference exhibited by investors. Using cointegration analysis and error correction models, the paper shows that during the crisis lower market and funding liquidity are important drivers of the increase in the credit spread of the AAA-rated structured product, whilst they are less significant in explaining credit spread changes for a portfolio of unstructured credit instruments. Looking at the experience of the subprime crisis, the study shows that when the conditions under which securitisation can work properly (liquidity, transparency and tradability) suddenly disappear, investors are left highly exposed to systemic risk.
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Español: A finales del 2007 muchas entidades financieras comenzaron a mostrar cifras negativas en sus balances y tras la quiebra de entidades de gran peso económico como el banco Lehman Brothers en Estados Unidos en septiembre del 2008, el mundo se ha visto envuelto en una crisis económica de la que parece no verse el final. Las entidades financieras tradicionales han centrado sus esfuerzos en obtener las mayores rentabilidades posibles, invirtiendo sus recursos en activos muy arriesgados, que si bien en un principio generaban beneficios muy elevados, a día de hoy han hecho quebrar muchas entidades a nivel mundial y han provocado la pérdida de los ahorros de muchos ciudadanos. Ajenas a esto se encuentran las entidades microfinancieras, que con un enfoque muy diferente al de la banca tradicional, se han centrado en proporcionar financiación a aquellos que dada su situación económica y falta de garantías no podían acudir al sector financiero tradicional. Tras realizar un análisis de los resultados de ambos modelos financieros desde 2006 hasta 2012, se ha podido comprobar como el sector microfinanciero presenta resultados más favorables y muestra una mayor prosperidad de cara al futuro. Por lo general, estas entidades mantienen niveles de solvencia más elevados y emplean todos sus recursos en proporcionar financiación a sus clientes. Finalmente, la solución a los problemas del sistema financiero tradicional se basa en un aumento de los niveles de capital de sus entidades, volviendo a un modelo de banca tradicional centrado en ofrecer financiación al público, con provisiones más liquidas y mayores garantías ante necesidades de liquidez como las retiradas masivas de depósitos recientemente sufridas.
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The crisis that spread worldwide since 2007 started from the financial sector and ended to affect also real economy. This process has attracted the attention of many scholars seeking to study its causes and impacts. Notwithstanding many works on this topic, the impact of the crisis on specific industries is still rather unexplored. The present work seeks to address this issue by analyzing the confectionery industry, with particular emphasis for Italian market leaders, Ferrero S.p.A. and Perfetti Van Melle S.r.l.. The aim of the study is to assess if they have been successful in tackling the crisis, keeping a satisfactory level of profitability associated to a good financial health notwithstanding ongoing difficulties. Moreover, we seek to analyze the strategies the companies employed to survive the crisis. The concern of the paper is both quantitative and qualitative. Thus, we calculated a complete set of indicators using a specific methodology for financial statement analysis which has been conceived especially for studying Italian firms; these data have been integrated with other information retrieved from the annual reports of the companies (especially the notes to the accounts and the directors’ report). The analysis highlights that both the firms benefit from a good financial health, with Perfetti Van Melle presenting a large amount of liquidity. On the contrary, liquidity should be the main concern of Ferrero because of an excessive reliance on current liabilities. Both the firms have a good level of profitability, even if Perfetti Van Melle’s one is decreasing. The key-strategies for the success of these firms are ongoing investments in state-of-the-art plant and machinery, an increasing use of equity as the main source of funding, along with huge investments in research and advertising.
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In this paper we analyze the role of deposit insurance in providing the market with liquidity in times of financial turmoil. To do so, we look at the variation in insured and uninsured deposits between 2005Q3 and 2011Q3, controlling for liquidity, solvency and capital adequacy indicators, and find evidence that deposit insurance does provide some confidence in keeping funds in banks in times of turmoil. Additionally we follow an event study methodology to assess the impact of deposit insurance oriented policies on bank holding companies stock market returns, and find a TBTF effect.
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The recent financial crisis has drawn the attention of researchers and regulators to the importance of liquidity for stock market stability and efficiency. The ability of market-makers and investors to provide liquidity is constrained by the willingness of financial institutions to supply funding capital. This paper sheds light on the liquidity linkages between the Central Bank, Monetary Financial Institutions and market-makers as crucial elements to the well-functioning of markets. Results suggest the existence of causality between credit conditions and stock market liquidity for the Eurozone between 2003 and 2015. Similar evidence is found for the UK during the post-crisis period. Keywords: stock
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This paper investigates the role of credit and liquidity factors in explaining corporate CDS price changes during normal and crisis periods. We find that liquidity risk is more important than firm-specific credit risk regardless of market conditions. Moreover, in the period prior to the recent “Great Recession” credit risk plays no role in explaining CDS price changes. The dominance of liquidity effects casts serious doubts on the relevance of CDS price changes as an indicator of default risk dynamics. Our results show how multiple liquidity factors including firm specific and aggregate liquidity proxies as well as an asymmetric information measure are critical determinants of CDS price variations. In particular, the impact of informed traders on the CDS price increases when markets are characterised by higher uncertainty, which supports concerns of insider trading during the crisis.