Lender liability in the Consumer Credit Market

In many countries consumer credit legislation provides for the extension of liability for product failure to the …nancial institution that advances credit to the consumer. In particular, lender liability is imposed on those credit grantors who closely operate with the supplier of the good. This paper provides a rationale for lender-responsibility in the consumer credit market. It shows that, when judicial enforcement is ine¢cient or there is risk of seller liquidation, lender-liability helps to protect consumers who systematically underestimate the probability of product failure and overestimate the extent to which they can obtain compensation.

Lender Liability: The Legal and Management Effects on the Hospitality Industry

With the savings and loan crisis and the tail end of a recession at hand, the '90s are bound to be a difficult decade for the financing of hospitality operations through borrowing from commercial lenders. The authors discuss one of the least known dangers associated with borrowing, lender liability. The issue is discussed from both a legal and managerial perspective.

Illinois Capital Access Program : lender agreement.

"10/03"--Colophon.

Commercial property loan valuations in the UK : implications of current trends in practice and liability

This paper is the second of two papers which aim to examine the major legal liability implications of changes to the commercial property loan valuation process caused by the recession in the UK property market and to make recommendations to valuers and their professional institutions to improve the quality of the process and the result. The objectives of this paper are to address a number of the practical implications of changes to the loan valuation process within the context of legal liability. The results of an interview survey of lenders and valuers are reported and analysed. The survey examined the loan valuation process including the selection and instruction of valuers, bases of valuation and valuation reporting. In the selection and instruction process, the findings of the survey reveal two potential problems within the valuer/lender relationship. First, valuers still occasionally accept instructions from borrowers and this could lead to a conflict of interest as lenders may rely on the survey. Second, the occasional lack of formal instructions prior to the delivery of reports casts doubt on the valuer’s ability to correctly identify the needs of clients. Regarding the basis of valuation, it was found that valuers are providing valuations on bases which they do not think are appropriate. Valuers may be legally liable if they do not inform clients of their reservations and this situation must be urgently addressed. The survey also confirms previous research that valuation reports are considered to be light on contextual information concerning markets. The paper concludes by making a number of specific recommendations concerning possible improvements to the commercial property loan valuation process.

Abuse liability of intra-nasal midazolam in inhaled-cocaine abusers

Intra-nasally instilled benzodiazepines have been proposed for acute anxiety episodes. However, routes with faster absorption may increase abuse liability. This study compared abuse liability of intra-nasal midazolam between subjects with a history of intra-nasal drug abuse and non-psychiatric subjects on a single-blind randomized controlled trial. Thirty-one inhaled-cocaine abusers and 34 normal volunteers received either 1 mg intra-nasal midazolam or active placebo. Visual analogue scales assessing desire to repeat the experience (ER) and Experience Liking (EL) assessed abuse liability. Profile analysis for repeated measures showed a significant effect of time over ER (F-[5,F-57]=3.311, p=0.011) and EL (F-[5,F-57]=3.947, p=0.004), diagnostic group (cocaine abusers scoring higher on both - F-[5,F-57]=5.229, p=0.026; F-[5,F-57]=4.946, p=0.030), regardless of the administered substance. It is concluded that the intra-nasal route does not seem to pose risks for non-psychiatric individuals, but it may represent a risk in itself for subjects with a history of drug abuse through this path. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. and ECNP. All rights reserved.

Criminal Liability of Organizations, Corporations, Legal Persons, and Similar Entities on Law of Portuguese Cybercrime: A Brief Discussion on the Issue of Crimes of “False Information,” the “Damage on Other Programs or Computer Data,” the “Computer-Software Sabotage,” the “Illegitimate Access,” the “Unlawful Interception,” and “Illegitimate Reproduction of the Protected Program”

Abstract: in Portugal, and in much of the legal systems of Europe, «legal persons» are likely to be criminally responsibilities also for cybercrimes. Like for example the following crimes: «false information»; «damage on other programs or computer data»; «computer-software sabotage»; «illegitimate access»; «unlawful interception» and «illegitimate reproduction of protected program». However, in Portugal, have many exceptions. Exceptions to the «question of criminal liability» of «legal persons». Some «legal persons» can not be blamed for cybercrime. The legislature did not leave! These «legal persons» are v.g. the following («public entities»): legal persons under public law, which include the public business entities; entities utilities, regardless of ownership; or other legal persons exercising public powers. In other words, and again as an example, a Portuguese public university or a private concessionaire of a public service in Portugal, can not commit (in Portugal) any one of cybercrime pointed. Fair? Unfair. All laws should provide that all legal persons can commit cybercrimes. PS: resumo do artigo em inglês.

«Corruption» and social and economic criminal law: criminology, criminal policy, political science and law&economics - a new idea about criminal liability of legal entities

Abstract: If we think there is a significant number of legal offshore in the globalized world, then there is not even a global consensus about what «corruption» is. The «illegal corruption» in a country may be legal in another. Moreover, the great global corruption is above the law or above democratic States. And not all democratic States are «Rule of Law». Therefore, the solution is global earlier in time and space law, democratic, free and true law. While the human being does not reach a consensus of what «corruption» really is, the discussion will not go further than a caricature. One of the other problems about «corruption» is that it is very difficult to establish the imputation of crimes, including «corruption» (v.g. Portugal) on some «companies», corporations. We have a juridical problem in the composition of the art. 11. of the Portuguese Penal Code.

Hereditary Neuropathy with Liability to Pressure Palsy Presenting with Hand Drop in a Young Child

Hereditary neuropathy with liability to pressure palsy (HNPP) results from the deletion of the PMP22 gene in chromosome 17p11.2. Clinically, it presents with painless pressure palsies, typically in the 2nd and 3rd decades of life, being a rare entity in childhood. We present the case study of a six-year-old male child who presented with left hand drop that he kept for over four weeks. Electrophysiological studies suggested HNPP and genetic studies confirmed it. With this paper, we pretend to create awareness to this entity as a diagnosis to be considered in a child with painless monoparesis and to emphasize the importance of electrophysiological studies in the diagnosis.

Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

Optimal negligence rule under limited liability

We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assumingthat the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as duecare the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth ofthe injurer. We show that such a rule in fact maximizes the precautionary effort by a potentialinjurer. The idea is counterintuitive: Being softer on an injurer, in terms of the required level ofcare, actually improves the incentives to take care when he is potentially insolvent. We extendthe basic result to an entire population of potentially insolvent injurers, and find that the optimalgeneral standards of care do depend on wealth, and distribution of income. We also show theconditions for the result that higher income levels in a given society call for higher levels of carefor accidents.