Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and Autocrats’ Duration

This paper enquires into whether economic sanctions are effective in destabilizing authoritarian rulers. We argue that this effect is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Thus, personalist regimes and monarchies, which are more dependent on aid and resource rents to maintain their patronage networks, are more likely to be affected by sanctions. In contrast, single-party and military regimes are able to maintain (and even increase) their tax revenues and to reallocate their expenditures and so increase their levels of cooptation. Data on sanction episodes, authoritarian rulers and regimes covering the period 1946–2000 have allowed us to test our hypotheses. To do so, duration models have been run, and the results confirm that personalist autocrats are more vulnerable to foreign pressure. Concretely, the analysis of the modes of exit reveals that sanctions increase the likelihood of an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup. Sanctions are basically ineffective when targeting single-party or military regimes.

Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions

This paper explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition, and how different authoritarian rulers respond to foreign pressure. If sanctions are assumed to increase the price of loyalty to the regime, then rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. In contrast, when constraints are severe due to reduced aid and trade, dictators are expected to greatly increase their levels of repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), we show that the empirical patterns conform well to our theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit more substantial sectors of the population and especially the urban classes. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes reduce spending in all categories, especially capital expenditures, while increasing repression much more than other regime types when targeted by sanctions.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

La sécurité collective dans l’unipolarité : la crise nucléaire iranienne

L’argument central de notre thèse est qu’une structure internationale unipolaire non hégémonique favorise la sécurité collective. Après avoir montré que telle est la structure actuelle et avoir justifié notre positionnement théorique néolibéral, nous avons eu recours au modèle d’interaction du « leader-suiveur de Stackelberg », pour démontrer qu’une coopération conflictuelle entre États rationnels est possible, ce qui leur permet de surmonter leur dilemme de l’action collective. Une coopération possible en raison de l’existence d’un intérêt mutuel et d’un leader favorisant la coopération entre ces États, ainsi que de conditions leur permettant de mettre en place une ‘stratégie de la réciprocité’. Ils forment alors ce qu’on appelle le « groupe de Stackelberg ». Le suiveur de la périphérie, ou ‘défecteur’ doit, pour sa part, non seulement s’ajuster à l’intérêt mutuel ainsi défini, mais aussi coopérer et négocier avec le groupe, et ce, sous la pression de sanctions, voire d’un usage ultime de la force si besoin est. Après l’éventuel succès de ces négociations, un équilibre de Stackelberg favorisé par le leader, soit la puissance unipolaire et non hégémonique, est alors atteint et la coopération permet, alors, à chacun de retirer un bénéfice de cet intérêt mutuel. Dans notre cas, le groupe de Stackelberg est constitué des membres du G5 + 1, soit les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Allemagne, agissant sous le leadership américain; l’Iran est un suiveur de la périphérie, soupçonné de défection, et l’intérêt mutuel est celui de la lutte contre la prolifération des ADM. Notre évaluation empirique montre que les conditions de la réciprocité des membres de ce groupe sont réunies et que celles de l’Iran sont en cours de négociation.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Análisis de las sanciones internacionales en el marco del tratado de no proliferación nuclear. Estudio de caso: energía atómica en Irán (2006-2015)

El presente trabajo de Grado tiene como propósito examinar la incidencia de las sancionesinternacionales en el marco del régimen de no proliferación nuclear en el caso de Irán durante el periodo 2006-2015, teniendo en cuenta factores históricos de años anteriores. Se analiza y explica cómo las sanciones internacionales pueden ser una medida persuasiva por violar ciertos artículos del Tratado de no Proliferación Nuclear. Finalmente identifica y analiza los tipos de sanciones económicas, financieras y comerciales que los Estados y el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas le han impuesto a Irán, así como la manera en que estas han incidido en la esfera política iraní y mundial.

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

Proposed economic sanctions against South Africa [microform] : hearings and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, and on Africa, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, second session, on H.R. 1590, H.R. 1051, H.R. 2443, H.R. 3317, and H.R. 3328, March 22, 23; April 20, 28; and May 3, 1988.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 89 H381-23

Economic sanctions against Rhodesia [microform] : hearings before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session ....

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

Rhodesian sanctions, should the United States lift them? : Hearing and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, on S. 2076, December 5 and 11, 1979.

Mode of access: Internet.

Immigration reform : status of employer sanctions after second year and plans for third year : statement of Arnold P. Jones, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives /

"May 17,1989."

The United Nations Security Council Sanctions and International Human Rights

Peer reviewed

Une analyse de la sanction économique en droit international

Le principal reproche qui est adressé au droit international est la faiblesse de ses mécanismes de sanctions. Pour cette raison, plusieurs penseurs juridiques ont conclu que le droit international n'existait pas. Le présent mémoire vise donc à étudier la rhétorique derrière cette affirmation et à examiner sa validité. Pour ce faire, nous analysons dans un premier temps la relation entre la sanction et le droit à travers le cadre positiviste du XIXe siècle. Nous étudions tour à tour les soi-disant critères constitutifs de la sanction. Nous les comparons avec d'autres ordres non juridiques pour ensuite rejeter le postulat positiviste qui fait de la contrainte et de la centralisation des pouvoirs les éléments essentiels de la sanction. Nous étudions ensuite le cadre d'adoption des sanctions économiques du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Cette étape nous permet d'expliquer les principales faiblesses et limitations du droit international. Parmi celles-ci, le manque de coopération internationale, le droit de veto et le principe de la souveraineté nationale sont les éléments qui freinent l'adoption des sanctions coopération internationale. Nous examinons ensuite les objectifs derrière l'imposition des sanctions ainsi que leur efficacité. Finalement, nous étudions les embargos en général et les embargos sur les armes. Cette étude nous permet d'une part de démontrer les effets des sanctions économiques sur la population civile et sur les États tiers. D'autre part, elle nous permet de mieux comprendre les problèmes relatifs à l'administration d'une sanction, ainsi qu'aux mesures de contournement des interdictions.