International labour standards and Queensland

Queensland’s legal labour disputes history does not exhibit the current trend seen in Canada and Switzerland (Gravel & Delpech, 2008) where cases citing International Labour Standards (ILS) are often successful (which is not presently the case in Queensland either). The two Queensland cases (Kuhler v. Inghams Enterprises P/L & Anor, 1997 and Bale v. Seltsam Pty Ltd, 1996) that have used ILSs were lost. Australia is a member state of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and a signatory of many ILSs. Yet, ILSs are not used in their legal capacity when compared to other international standards in other areas of law. It is important to recognize that ILSs are uniquely underutilized in labour law. Australian environmental, criminal, and industrial disputes consistently draw on international standards. Why not for the plight of workers? ILSs draw their power from supranational influence in that when a case cites an ILS the barrister or solicitor is going beyond legal precedence and into international peer pressure. An ILS can be appropriately used to highlight that Australian or Queensland legislation does not conform to a Convention or Recommendation. However, should the case deal with a breach of existing law based or modified by an ILS, citing the ILS is a good way to remind the court of its origin. It’s a new legal paradigm critically lacking in Queensland’s labour law practice. The following discusses the research methodology used in this paper. It is followed by a comparative discussion of results between the prevalence of ILSs and other international standards in Queensland case history. Finally, evidence showing the international trend of labour disputes using ILSs for victory is discussed.

Enforcing minimum labour standards in Australia from 2010 : correcting or compounding problems

Fair Work Australia is to provide the institutional framework for the Australian industrial relations system from January 2010. Its creation provides the opportunity to improve minimum labour standards’ enforcement in Australia. However, the experience of the past must be appreciated and traditional assumptions about the operation of the Australian enforcement system discarded if the new institution is to be effective in its role. This paper focuses on the role of unions in enforcement as well as institutional location issues to expose a number of central enforcement problems that those seeking to establish new systems and processes should consider. A number of recommendations in respect of the structure of Fair Work Australia and the continuing role of unions are suggested.

Does institutional location protect from political influence? the case of a minimum labour standards enforcement agency in Australia

Among the many factors that influence enforcement agencies, this article examines the role of the institutional location (and independence) of agencies, and an incumbent government's ideology. It is argued that institutional location affects the level of political influence on the agency's operations, while government ideology affects its willingness to resource enforcement agencies and approve regulatory activities. Evidence from the agency regulating minimum labour standards in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction (currently the Fair Work Ombudsman) highlights two divergences from the regulatory enforcement literature generally. First, notions of independence from political interference offered by institutional location are more illusory than real and, second, political need motivates political action to a greater extent than political ideology.

Minimum labour standards enforcement in Australia : caught in the crossfire?

The complex transition from convict to free labour influenced state intervention in the employment relationship, and initiated the first minimum labour standards in Australia in 1828. Since then, two principal sets of tensions have affected the enforcement of such standards: tensions between government and employers, and tensions between the major political parties over industrial and economic issues. This article argues that these tensions have resulted in a sustained legacy affecting minimum labour standards’ enforcement in Australia. The article outlines broad historical developments and contexts of minimum labour standards’ enforcement in Australia since 1828, with more contemporary exploration focusing specifically on enforcement practices and policies in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction. Current enforcement practices are an outcome of this volatile history, and past influences remain strong.

Enforceable undertakings : a new mechanism for minimum labour standards’ enforcement

Regulatory commentators have identified the need for more responsive regulation to allow enforcement agencies to respond to different types and degrees of non-compliance. One tool considered to support responsive enforcement is the Enforceable Undertaking (EU). EUs are used extensively by Australian regulators in decisions that forego litigation in exchange for offenders promising to (amongst other things) correct behaviour and comply in the future. This arguably allows regulatory agencies greater flexibility in how they obtain compliance with regulations. EUs became an additional enforcement tool for the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) under the Fair Work Act 2009. This paper is a preliminary exploration of the comparative use of EUs by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the FWO to assess their effectiveness for the minimum labour standards' environment.

Government procurement contracts and minimum labour standards enforcement: Rhetoric, duplication and distraction?

Government contracts for services typically include terms requiring contractors to comply with minimum labour standards laws. Procurement contract clauses specify reporting procedures and sanctions for non-compliance, implying that government contracting agencies will monitor and enforce minimum labour standards within contract performance management. In this article, the case of school cleaners employed under New South Wales government contracts between 2010 and 2011 is the vehicle for exploring the effectiveness of these protective clauses. We find that the inclusion of these protective clauses in procurement contracts is unnecessary in the Australian context, and any expectations that government contracting agencies will monitor and enforce labour standards are misleading. At best, the clauses are rhetoric, and at worst, they are a distraction for parties with enforcement powers.

Enforcing international financial standards in Brazil: limits and possibilities for adoption of IOSCO principles

Foreign capital and institutional investors play a key role in the Brazilian capital and financial markets. Internationally promoted regulatory patterns, especially IOSCO principles, have been increasingly influencing administrative rule making by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) as well as the adoption of transnational rules in Brazil by means of self-regulatory activity. Even though there is a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. We analyze two case studies regarding the transposition of international standards into the Brazilian legal system, which illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of financial markets regulation. The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.