Latin America's experience in dispute settlement within WTO: the cases of technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and intellectual property

Includes Bibliography

The paradox of commercialising public sector intellectual property

The juxtapositioning of government providing a public good through research and development investment on one hand and engaging in commercialisation of the research outcome on the other is a paradox. Using agricultural research as an example, we examine the nature of the paradox to determine if commercialisation potentially leads to a conflict in the role of public research institutions set up to fulfil public good responsibilities. We identify the reasons for the shift in policy towards commercialisation and greater exploitation of public sector intellectual property and how this has contributed to the emergence of the apparent inconsistency. We argue that the belief in working for public good is inherent and embedded in an organisation's history and its wider operating environment. We propose that the creation of public sector intellectual property and its commercialisation are influenced by the political, social and economic environment in which the public institutions operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An audit tool for intellectual property management: IP management in the Queensland Department of Primary Industries

Smart State is a Queensland Government initiative that recognises the central role of knowledge-based economic growth. In this context, the management of intellectual property (IP) within Queensland and Australian government research and development agencies has changed dramatically over recent years. Increasing expectations have been placed on utilising public sector IP to both underpin economic development and augment taxes by generating new revenues. Public sector research and development (R&D) management has come under greater scrutiny to commercialise and/or corporatise their activities. In a study of IP management issues in the Queensland Public Sector we developed a framework to facilitate a holistic audit of IP management in government agencies. In this paper we describe this framework as it pertains to one large public sector Agriculture R&D Agency, the Queensland Department of Primary Industries (QDPI). The four overlapping domains of the framework are: IP Generation; IP Rights; IP Uptake; and Corporate IP Support. The audit within QDPI, conducted in 2000 near the outset of Smart State, highlighted some well developed IP management practices within QDPI's traditional areas of focus of innovation (IP Generation) and IP ownership and licensing (IP Rights). However, further management practice developments are required to improve the domains of IP Uptake and Corporate IP Support.

Parallel Research, Multiple Intellectual Property Right Protection Instruments, and the Correlation among R&D Projects, September 2005

The choice of a research path in attacking scientific and technological problems is a significant component of firms’ R&D strategy. One of the findings of the patent races literature is that, in a competitive market setting, firms’ noncooperative choices of research projects display an excessive degree of correlation, as compared to the socially optimal level. The paper revisits this question in a context in which firms have access to trade secrets, in addition to patents, to assert intellectual property rights (IPR) over their discoveries. We find that the availability of multiple IPR protection instruments can move the paths chosen by firms engaged in an R&D race toward the social optimum.

Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction, June 2007

This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.