Independent regulatory commissions. Report of the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (pursuant to section 136 of the legislative reorganization act of 1946, Public Law 601, 79th congress, and house resolution 56, as amended, 86th congress)

January 3, 1961.

Independent regulatory commissions : report of the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [pursuant to section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, P.L. 601, 79th Cong., and H. Res. 99, as amended, 85th Congress.

Mode of access: Internet.

Comparison of elected and appointed regulatory commissions.

"November 1982."

The media accountability of independent regulatory agencies

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are increasingly attracting academic and societal attention, as they represent the institutional cornerstone of the regulatory state and play a key role in policy-making. Besides the expected benefits in terms of credibility and efficiency, these regulators are said to bring about a 'democratic deficit', following their statutory separation from democratic institutions. Consequently, a 'multi-pronged system of control' is required. This article focuses on a specific component of this system, that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether media coverage of IRAs meets the necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential 'accountability forum' for regulators. The results of a comparison of two contrasted cases - the British and Swiss competition commissions - mostly support the expectations, because they show that media coverage of IRAs corresponds to that of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.

Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis

Independent regulatory agencies are one of the main institutional features of the 'rising regulatory state' in Western Europe. Governments are increasingly willing to abandon their regulatory competencies and to delegate them to specialized institutions that are at least partially beyond their control. This article examines the empirical consistency of one particular explanation of this phenomenon, namely the credibility hypothesis, claiming that governments delegate powers so as to enhance the credibility of their policies. Three observable implications are derived from the general hypothesis, linking credibility and delegation to veto players, complexity and interdependence. An independence index is developed to measure agency independence, which is then used in a multivariate analysis where the impact of credibility concerns on delegation is tested. The analysis relies on an original data set comprising independence scores for thirty-three regulators. Results show that the credibility hypothesis can explain a good deal of the variation in delegation. The economic nature of regulation is a strong determinant of agency independence, but is mediated by national institutions in the form of veto players.

The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

This article studies the diffusion of the main institutional feature of regulatory capitalism, namely, independent regulatory agencies. While only a few such authorities existed in Europe in the early 1980s, by the end of the twentieth century they had spread impressively across countries and sectors. The analysis finds that three classes of factors (bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal) explain this trend. First, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies was an attempt to improve credible commitment capacity when liberalizing and privatizing utilities and to alleviate the political uncertainty problem, namely, the risk to a government that its policies will be changed when it loses power. Second, Europeanization favored the creation of independent regulators. Third, individual decisions were interdependent, as governments were influenced by the decisions of others in an emulation process where the symbolic properties of independent regulators mattered more than the functions they performed.

Legitimacy and Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical Review

This article reviews the literature that deals with the problem of legitimizing regulatory governance, with a special attention to the question of the accountability of independent regulatory agencies. The discussion begins with the presentation of the traditional arguments concerning the democratic deficit of the regulatory state. The positive evaluation of regulatory performance by citizens is presented as an alternative source of legitimacy. It follows the discussion of the existing approaches to make agencies accountable, so as to ensure the procedural legitimacy of regulatory governance. Some insights concerning new forms of accountability are offered in the last section, namely with reference to the establishment and ongoing consolidation of formal and informal networks of regulators.