Identity fraud and torrens - minimising the risks and allocating the loss to achieve a sustainable system

Immediate indefeasibility is the cornerstone of the Torrens system of land registration. However, when combined with the apparent ease in which forged mortgages become registered, the operation of this doctrine can come into question. This article seeks to argue that, rather than question indefeasibility, the focus should be on the verification of identity of parties to land transactions. Whilst no system can ever be infallible, it is suggested that by correctly imposing the responsibility for identity verification on the appropriate individual, the Torrens system can retain immediate indefeasibility as its paramount principle, yet achieve the optimum level of fairness in terms of allocation of responsibility and loss. With the dawn of a new era of electronic conveyancing about to begin, the framework suggested here provides a model for minimising the risks of forged mortgages and appropriately allocating the loss.

Identity fraud and land registration systems : an Australian perspective

There is no doubt that fraud in relation to land transactions is a problem that resonates amongst land academics, practitioners, and stakeholders involved in conveyancing. As each land registration and conveyancing process increasingly moves towards a fully electronic environment, we need to make sure that we understand and guard against the frauds that can occur. What this paper does is examine the types of fraud that have occurred in paper-based conveyancing systems in Australia and considers how they might be undertaken in the National Electronic Conveyancing System (NECS) that is currently under development. Whilst no system can ever be infallible, it is suggested that by correctly imposing the responsibility for identity verification on the appropriate individual, the conveyancing system adopted can achieve the optimum level of fairness in terms of allocation of responsibility and loss. As we sit on the cusp of a new era of electronic conveyancing, the framework suggested here provides a model for minimising the risks of forged mortgages and appropriately allocating the loss. Importantly it also recognises that the electronic environment will see new opportunities for those with criminal intent to undermine the integrity of land transactions. An appreciation of this now, can see the appropriate measures put in place to minimise the risk.

Land fraud and inappropriate dealings in an electronic environment : An Australian and New Zealand perspective

The thesis presented in this paper is that the land fraud committed by Matthew Perrin in Queensland and inflicted upon Roger Mildenhall in Western Australia demonstrates the need for urgent procedural reform to the conveyancing process. Should this not occur, then calls to reform the substantive principles of the Torrens system will be heard throughout the jurisdictions that adopt title by registration, particularly in those places where immediate indefeasibility is still the norm. This paper closely examines the factual matrix behind both of these frauds, and asks what steps should have been taken to prevent them occurring. With 2012 bringing us Australian legislation embedding a national e-conveyancing system and a new Land Transfer Act for New Zealand we ask what legislative measures should be introduced to minimise the potential for such fraud. In undertaking this study, we reflect on whether the activities of Perrin and the criminals responsible for stealing Mildenhall's land would have succeeded under the present system for automated registration utilised in New Zealand.

Detecting False Identity through Behavioural Patterns

T. Boongoen and Q. Shen. 'Detecting False Identity through Behavioural Patterns', In Proceedings of International Crime Science Conference, British Library, London UK, 2008. Publisher's online version forthcoming.;The full text is currently unavailable in CADAIR pending approval by the publisher. Sponsorship: UK EPSRC grant EP/D057086

Economic Impact of Identity Theft in India: Lessons from Western Countries

In this computerized, globalised and internet world our computer collects various types of information’s about every human being and stores them in files secreted deep on its hard drive. Files like cache, browser history and other temporary Internet files can be used to store sensitive information like logins and passwords, names addresses, and even credit card numbers. Now, a hacker can get at this information by wrong means and share with someone else or can install some nasty software on your computer that will extract your sensitive and secret information. Identity Theft posses a very serious problem to everyone today. If you have a driver’s license, a bank account, a computer, ration card number, PAN card number, ATM card or simply a social security number you are more than at risk, you are a target. Whether you are new to the idea of ID Theft, or you have some unanswered questions, we’ve compiled a quick refresher list below that should bring you up to speed. Identity theft is a term used to refer to fraud that involves pretending to be someone else in order to steal money or get other benefits. Identity theft is a serious crime, which is increasing at tremendous rate all over the world after the Internet evolution. There is widespread agreement that identity theft causes financial damage to consumers, lending institutions, retail establishments, and the economy as a whole. Surprisingly, there is little good public information available about the scope of the crime and the actual damages it inflicts. Accounts of identity theft in recent mass media and in film or literature have centered on the exploits of 'hackers' - variously lauded or reviled - who are depicted as cleverly subverting corporate firewalls or other data protection defenses to gain unauthorized access to credit card details, personnel records and other information. Reality is more complicated, with electronic identity fraud taking a range of forms. The impact of those forms is not necessarily quantifiable as a financial loss; it can involve intangible damage to reputation, time spent dealing with disinformation and exclusion from particular services because a stolen name has been used improperly. Overall we can consider electronic networks as an enabler for identity theft, with the thief for example gaining information online for action offline and the basis for theft or other injury online. As Fisher pointed out "These new forms of hightech identity and securities fraud pose serious risks to investors and brokerage firms across the globe," I am a victim of identity theft. Being a victim of identity theft I felt the need for creating an awareness among the computer and internet users particularly youngsters in India. Nearly 70 per cent of Indian‘s population are living in villages. Government of India already started providing computer and internet facilities even to the remote villages through various rural development and rural upliftment programmes. Highly educated people, established companies, world famous financial institutions are becoming victim of identity theft. The question here is how vulnerable the illiterate and innocent rural people are if they suddenly exposed to a new device through which some one can extract and exploit their personal data without their knowledge? In this research work an attempt has been made to bring out the real problems associated with Identity theft in developed countries from an economist point of view.

How reliable is internet-based self-reported identity, socio-demographic and obesity measures in European adults?

In e-health intervention studies, there are concerns about the reliability of internet-based, self-reported (SR) data and about the potential for identity fraud. This study introduced and tested a novel procedure for assessing the validity of internet-based, SR identity and validated anthropometric and demographic data via measurements performed face-to-face in a validation study (VS). Participants (n = 140) from seven European countries, participating in the Food4Me intervention study which aimed to test the efficacy of personalised nutrition approaches delivered via the internet, were invited to take part in the VS. Participants visited a research centre in each country within 2 weeks of providing SR data via the internet. Participants received detailed instructions on how to perform each measurement. Individual’s identity was checked visually and by repeated collection and analysis of buccal cell DNA for 33 genetic variants. Validation of identity using genomic information showed perfect concordance between SR and VS. Similar results were found for demographic data (age and sex verification). We observed strong intra-class correlation coefficients between SR and VS for anthropometric data (height 0.990, weight 0.994 and BMI 0.983). However, internet-based SR weight was under-reported (Δ −0.70 kg [−3.6 to 2.1], p < 0.0001) and, therefore, BMI was lower for SR data (Δ −0.29 kg m−2 [−1.5 to 1.0], p < 0.0001). BMI classification was correct in 93 % of cases. We demonstrate the utility of genotype information for detection of possible identity fraud in e-health studies and confirm the reliability of internet-based, SR anthropometric and demographic data collected in the Food4Me study.

Attributes of identity document credibility: A synthesis of expert knowledge

In broad terms — including a thief's use of existing credit card, bank, or other accounts — the number of identity fraud victims in the United States ranges 9-10 million per year, or roughly 4% of the US adult population. The average annual theft per stolen identity was estimated at $6,383 in 2006, up approximately 22% from $5,248 in 2003; an increase in estimated total theft from $53.2 billion in 2003 to $56.6 billion in 2006. About three million Americans each year fall victim to the worst kind of identity fraud: new account fraud. Names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and other data are acquired fraudulently from the issuing organization, or from the victim then these data are used to create fraudulent identity documents. In turn, these are presented to other organizations as evidence of identity, used to open new lines of credit, secure loans, “flip” property, or otherwise turn a profit in a victim's name. This is much more time consuming — and typically more costly — to repair than fraudulent use of existing accounts. ^ This research borrows from well-established theoretical backgrounds, in an effort to answer the question – what is it that makes identity documents credible? Most importantly, identification of the components of credibility draws upon personal construct psychology, the underpinning for the repertory grid technique, a form of structured interviewing that arrives at a description of the interviewee’s constructs on a given topic, such as credibility of identity documents. This represents substantial contribution to theory, being the first research to use the repertory grid technique to elicit from experts, their mental constructs used to evaluate credibility of different types of identity documents reviewed in the course of opening new accounts. The research identified twenty-one characteristics, different ones of which are present on different types of identity documents. Expert evaluations of these documents in different scenarios suggest that visual characteristics are most important for a physical document, while authenticated personal data are most important for a digital document. ^

Attributes of Identity Document Credibility: A Synthesis of Expert Knowledge

In broad terms — including a thief's use of existing credit card, bank, or other accounts — the number of identity fraud victims in the United States ranges 9-10 million per year, or roughly 4% of the US adult population. The average annual theft per stolen identity was estimated at $6,383 in 2006, up approximately 22% from $5,248 in 2003; an increase in estimated total theft from $53.2 billion in 2003 to $56.6 billion in 2006. About three million Americans each year fall victim to the worst kind of identity fraud: new account fraud. Names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and other data are acquired fraudulently from the issuing organization, or from the victim then these data are used to create fraudulent identity documents. In turn, these are presented to other organizations as evidence of identity, used to open new lines of credit, secure loans, “flip” property, or otherwise turn a profit in a victim's name. This is much more time consuming — and typically more costly — to repair than fraudulent use of existing accounts. This research borrows from well-established theoretical backgrounds, in an effort to answer the question – what is it that makes identity documents credible? Most importantly, identification of the components of credibility draws upon personal construct psychology, the underpinning for the repertory grid technique, a form of structured interviewing that arrives at a description of the interviewee’s constructs on a given topic, such as credibility of identity documents. This represents substantial contribution to theory, being the first research to use the repertory grid technique to elicit from experts, their mental constructs used to evaluate credibility of different types of identity documents reviewed in the course of opening new accounts. The research identified twenty-one characteristics, different ones of which are present on different types of identity documents. Expert evaluations of these documents in different scenarios suggest that visual characteristics are most important for a physical document, while authenticated personal data are most important for a digital document.

Immediate indefeasibility : is it under threat?

Immediate indefeasibility has been adopted in Australia for close to 40 years. Recently however, and against the backdrop of economic fragility and global deregulation, there has been a polite questioning of its place. In Australia, some may argue that case law developments and legislative reform have placed indefeasibility under the microscope — in New Zealand, a similar telescoping by the respected views of their Law Commission. This note examines these reforms. It concludes that these reforms do not place immediate indefeasibility under threat. Rather, they modify and adapt the doctrine to fit within the context of contemporary financial instruments. Nevertheless, changes have so far been piecemeal, and its time for a consistent and logical examination of this issue to occur on the national, rather than the stage of each state.

Qualified indefeasibility and the careless mortgagee

In recent years a great deal of case law has been generated in relation to mortgages where the mortgagee has not engaged in adequate identity verification of the mortgagor and the mortgage has subsequently been found to be forged. As a result, careless mortgagee provisions operate in Queensland as an exception to indefeasibility. Similar provisions are expected to commence soon in New South Wales. This article examines the mortgagee’s position with the benefit of indefeasibility and then considers the impact of the careless mortgagee provisions on the rights of a mortgagee under a forged mortgage, concluding that the provisions significantly change the dynamic between a registered mortgagee and registered owner who has not signed the mortgage. These provisions appear to give the mortgagee a conditional indefeasibility, with the intention of reducing the State’s exposure to the payment of compensation in the case of identity fraud. They are however, more successful in the case of forgery by a third party rather than forgery by a co-owner.

Electronic conveyancing in Australia: Is anyone concerned about security?

Three proof requirements as essential for a sustainable land registration system. These were proof of identity, proof of ownership, and authority to deal. Our attention in this paper is drawn to the latter two requirements and will ask whether the introduction of the Property Exchange of Australia (PEXA), and its underpinning regulatory regime will meet the concerns that we have in relation to proof of ownership and authority to deal. In drawing out some problems with PEXA, we then offer an innovative idea, sourced from the transfer of equities that could serve to generate discussion on how we can ensure the Torrens system of land registration is sustainable for another 160 years.

A Quiz on Privacy

Created for INFO2009 coursework.

The Donald Mackay Churchill Fellowship to study methods of preventing and supporting victims of online fraud

Every day inboxes are being flooded with invitations to invest money in overseas schemes, notifications of overseas lottery wins and inheritances, as well as emails from banks and other institutions asking for customers to confirm information about their identity and account details. While these requests may seem outrageous, many believe the request to be true and respond, through the sending of money or personal details. This can have devastating consequences, financially, emotionally and physically. While enforcement action is important, greater success is likely to come in the area of prevention, which avoids victim losses in the first place. Considerable victim support is also required by victims who have suffered significant losses, in trying to get their lives back on track. This project examined fraud prevention strategies and support services for victims of online fraud across the United Kingdom, United States of America and Canada. While much work has already been undertaken in Queensland, there is considerable room for improvement and a great deal can be learnt from these overseas jurisdictions. There are several examples of innovative and effective responses, particularly in the area of victim support, that are highlighted throughout this report. It is advocated that Australia can continue to improve its position regarding the prevention and support of online fraud victims, by applying the knowledge and expertise learnt overseas to a local context.

Identity verification in conveyancing : the failure of current legislative and regulatory measures, and recommendations for change

"Defrauding land titles systems impacts upon us all. Those who deal in land include ordinary citizens, big business, small business, governments, not-for-profit organisation, deceased estates...Fraud here touches almost everybody." the thesis presented in this paper is that the current and disparate steps taken by jurisdictions to alleviate land fraud associated with identity-based crimes are inadequate. The centrepiece of the analysis is the consideration of two scenarios that have recently occurred. One is the typical scenario where a spouse forges the partner's signature to obtain a mortgage from a financial institution. The second is atypical. It involves a sophisticated overseas fraud duping many stakeholders involved in the conveyancing process. After outlining these scenarios, we will examine how identity verification requirements of the United Kingdom, Ontario, the Australian states, and New Zealand would have been applied to these two frauds. Our conclusion is that even though some jurisdictions may have prevented the frauds from occurring, the current requirements are inadequate. We use the lessons learnt to propose what we consider core principles for identity verification in land transactions.