Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods.

We consider the problem of provisioon and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. the efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible.

Tax concessions for charities : competitive neutrality, the tax base and "public goods" choice

It is argued that concerns arise about the integrity and fairness of the taxation regime where charitable organizations, which avail themselves of the tax exemption status while undertaking commercial activities, compete directly with the for-profit sector. The appropriateness of the tax concessions granted to charitable organizations is considered in respect of income derived from commercial activities. It is principally argued that the traditional line of reasoning for imposing limitations on tax concessions focuses on an incorrect underlying inquiry. Traditionally, it is argued that limitations should be imposed because of unfair competition, lack of competitive neutrality, or an arbitrary decision relating to a lack of deserving. However, it is argued that a more appropriate question from which to base any limitations is one which considers the value attached to the integrity of the taxation regime as a whole, and the tax base specifically compared to the public good of charities. When the correct underlying question is asked, sound taxation policy ensues, as a less arbitrary approach may be adopted to limit the scope of tax concessions available to charitable organizations.

The Private Provision of International Impure Public Goods: the Case of Climate Policy

33 p.

Public goods in networks

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Public goods and procreation.

Procreation is the ultimate public goods problem. Each new child affects the welfare of many other people, and some (but not all) children produce uncompensated value that future people will enjoy. This essay addresses challenges that arise if we think of procreation and parenting as public goods. These include whether individual choices are likely to lead to a socially desirable outcome, and whether changes in laws, social norms, or access to genetic engineering and embryo selection might improve the aggregate outcome of our reproductive choices.

Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?

Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.

Neoliberalism, the University, Public Goods, and Agricultural Innovation

After World War II, most industrialising nations adopted some form of welfare-state approach to balance the economic activities of self-interested agents and social welfare. In the realm of scientific research and innovation, this often meant that governments took primary responsibility for funding public research organisations, including research universities and government laboratories. Over the past four decades, however, the significance of private funding for agricultural research has increased, and academic scientists now often work in public-private partnerships. We argue that this trend needs to be carefully monitored because public goods are likely to be overlooked and undervalued in such arrangements. In the interest of developing indicators to monitor the trend, we document public and private funding for agricultural research and agricultural innovation in four countries: the USA, the UK, Ireland and Germany. Our results show that although neoliberalism is evident in each country, it is not homogeneous in its application and impacts, suggesting that national and institutional contexts matter. This article is directed at stimulating debates on the relationships between university research, agricultural innovation and public goods.

Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle.

We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization by Miyagawa (2001a).

Outsourcing the nation-state : a rational choice framework for the provision of public goods

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal