Exclusive dealing and vertical integration : the efficiency of contracts in the tuna industry /

Item 535

Reciprocally Exclusive Contracts and Endogenous Quality

Our paper investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in successive duopolies. First we show that using a limited set of feasible contracts, exclusive dealing and purchasing is going to be preferred, regardless of the level of product differentiation. In the next step, we make the choice of quality endogenous and derive the equilibrium conditions for qualities under the aforementioned contractual arrangement. Our final proposition shows that in this case the choice of quality depends exclusively on the valuation of the median consumer.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Monopoly in the UK:what determines whether the MMC finds against the investigated firms?

This paper draws on data from 73 UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission reports on monopoly between 1973 and 1995. It shows that there is a roughly two in three chance that the Commission will come to an adverse conclusion against the investigated firms in a given case. 75–80% of decisions can be explained purely in terms of the market share of the leading firm and knowledge of the broad nature of the alleged anti-competitive practice. An adverse finding is most likely in cases involving exclusive dealing, and least likely where other vertical restraints are involved.

Dealing with the Legacy of Ethnic Conflict: Confronting ‘Othering’ through Transformative Adult Education—A Northern Ireland Case Study

Despite its peace process, Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided society. The legacy of a 30-year conflict has ensured that the state continues to be prone to outbreaks of violence over contentious issues such as Orange Order parading and the flying of national flags. This paper argues that in order to address this legacy, there is a need to confront the Othering processes that have helped to generate and sustain division. It will argue that programmes of adult education can play an important role in helping the conflicting groups to reimagine their ‘exclusive’ notions of the nation to one capable of incorporating the Other.

First cases of exclusive paternal care in stink bugs (Hemiptera: Pentatomidae)

We describe paternal care in two pentatomid bugs, Lopadusa (Lopadusa) augur Stål, 1860 and Edessa nigropunctata Berg, 1884. Field and laboratory observations showed that males remain with their eggs and early hatched nymphs, while females abandon the eggs after oviposition. Guarding males defensive behaviors towards their clutches were similar to those described for guarding females of pentatomids. Since there is no detailed information on the internal phylogeny of Pentatomidae, it is not possible to make a robust inference on whether paternal care in L. augur and E. nigropunctata has arisen independently or not. If the latter, the two new cases of paternal care we describe here represent the fifth event of independent evolution of this rare behavioral trait in Heteroptera.

Exclusive vector meson production in electron-ion collisions

We calculate the nuclear cross section for coherent and incoherent vector meson production within the QCD color dipole picture, including saturation effects. Theoretical estimates for scattering on both light and heavy nuclei are given over a wide range of energy.

Does Petrolisthes armatus (Anomura, Porcellanidae) form a Species Complex or Are We Dealing with Just One Widely Distributed Species?

Fernando L. Mantelatto, Leonardo G. Pileggi, Ivana Miranda, and Ingo S. Wehrtmann (2011) Does Petrolisthes armatus (Anomura, Porcellanidae) form a species complex or are we dealing with just one widely distributed species? Zoological Studies 50(3): 372-384. Petrolisthes armatus has the widest distribution known among members of the family Porcellanidae and is one of the most ubiquitous and locally abundant intertidal decapods along the Atlantic coast of the Americas. Considering its geographical distribution and morphological plasticity, several authors postulated the existence of a P. armatus species complex. In the present study we used genetic data from the mitochondrial 16S ribosomal gene to determine the genetic variability of P. armatus from selected locations within its eastern tropical Pacific and western Atlantic distributions. Our phylogenic analysis included 49 specimens represented by 26 species of the genus Petrolisthes and 16 specimens from 10 species and 4 related genera. Genetic distances estimated among the analyzed Petrolisthes species ranged from 2.6%-22.0%; varied between 0%-5.7% for 16S. Additionally, the revision of P. armatus specimens from Pacific Costa Rica and Brazilian Waters showed no geographically significant morphological variations among the analyzed specimens. Therefore, our morphological and genetic data do not support the hypothesis of a P. armatus complex within the specimens studied herein from the Americas, but convincingly confirm the monophyly and non-separateness of the members assigned as P. armatus. http://zoolstud.sinica.edu.tw/Journals/50.3/372.pdf