Non-Quasi-Competitiveness and Stability in Cournot's Model

This paper retakes previous work of the authors, about the relationship between non-quasi-competitiveness (the increase in price caused by an increase in the number of oligopolists) and stability of the equilibrium in the classical Cournot oligopoly model. Though it has been widely accepted in the literature that the loss of quasi-competitiveness is linked, in the long run as new firms entered the market, to instability of the model, the authors in their previous work put forward a model in which a situation of monopoly changed to duopoly losing quasi-competitiveness but maintaining the stability of the equilibrium. That model could not, at the time, be extended to any number of oligopolists. The present paper exhibits such an extension. An oligopoly model is shown in which the loss of quasi-competitiveness resists the presence in the market of as many firms as one wishes and where the successive Cournot's equilibrium points are unique and asymptotically stable. In this way, for the first time, the conjecture that non-quasi- competitiveness and instability were equivalent in the long run, is proved false.

A non-quasi-competitive Cournot oligopoly with stability

This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.

Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets

It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.

Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an "active" Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Walras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a countable infinity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takes. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.

Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the a -core and ß -core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

A non-possibility theorem for joint-stability in interindustry models

Joint-stability in interindustry models relates to the mutual simultaneous consistency of the demand-driven and supply-driven models of Leontief and Ghosh, respectively. Previous work has claimed joint-stability to be an acceptable assumption from the empirical viewpoint, provided only small changes in exogenous variables are considered. We show in this note, however, that the issue has deeper theoretical roots and offer an analytical demonstration that shows the impossibility of consistency between demand-driven and supply-driven models.

Production externalities : cooperative and non-cooperative approaches

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The binding of synthetic triiodo L-thyronine analogs to human transthyretin: Molecular basis of cooperative and non-cooperative ligand recognition

Transthyretin (TTR) is a tetrameric beta-sheet-rich transporter protein directly involved in human amyloid diseases. Several classes of small molecules can bind to TTR delaying its amyloid fibril formation, thus being promising drug candidates to treat TTR amyloidoses. In the present study, we characterized the interactions of the synthetic triiodo L-thyronine analogs and thyroid hormone nuclear receptor TR beta-selecfive agonists GC-1 and GC-24 with the wild type and V30M variant of human transthyretin (TTR). To achieve this aim, we conducted in vitro TTR acid-mediated aggregation and isothermal titration calorimetry experiments and determined the TTR:GC-1 and TTR:GC-24 crystal structures. Our data indicate that both GC-1 and GC-24 bind to TTR in a non-cooperative manner and are good inhibitors of TTR aggregation, with dissociation constants for both hormone binding sites (HBS) in the low micromolar range. Analysis of the crystal structures of TTRwt:GC-1(24) complexes and their comparison with the TTRwt X-ray structure bound to its natural ligand thyroxine (T4) suggests, at the molecular level, the basis for the cooperative process displayed by T4 and the non-cooperative process provoked by both GC-1 and GC-24 during binding to TTR. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Tracking a non-cooperative target using a Doppler radar wireless sensor network

Tracking or target localization is used in a wide range of important tasks from knowing when your flight will arrive to ensuring your mail is received on time. Tracking provides the location of resources enabling solutions to complex logistical problems. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) create new opportunities when applied to tracking, such as more flexible deployment and real-time information. When radar is used as the sensing element in a tracking WSN better results can be obtained; because radar has a comparatively larger range both in distance and angle to other sensors commonly used in WSNs. This allows for less nodes deployed covering larger areas, saving money. In this report I implement a tracking WSN platform similar to what was developed by Lim, Wang, and Terzis. This consists of several sensor nodes each with a radar, a sink node connected to a host PC, and a Matlab© program to fuse sensor data. I have re-implemented their experiment with my WSN platform for tracking a non-cooperative target to verify their results and also run simulations to compare. The results of these tests are discussed and some future improvements are proposed.