STRATEGIES FOR SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE IN RECESSIONS: PRO OR COUNTER-CYCLICAL?

Recessions are recurring events in which most firms suffer severe impacts while others are less affected or may even prosper. Strategic management has made little progress in understanding such performance differences. In a scenario of decreased demand, intensified competition, and higher uncertainty, most firms try to survive by pro-cyclically cutting costs and investments. But firms could take advantage of undervalued resources in the market to counter-cyclically invest in new business opportunities to overtake competitors. We survey Brazilian firms in various industries about the 2008-2009 recession and analyze data using PLS-SEM. We find that while most firms pro-cyclically reduce costs and investments in recessions, a counter-cyclical strategy of investing in opportunities created by changes in the market enables superior performance. Most successful are firms with a propensity to recognize opportunities, an entrepreneurial orientation to invest, and the flexibility to efficiently implement investments.

Fiscal policy in Brazil: from counter-cyclical response to crisis

The main goal of this article is to identify the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on output in Brazil from 1997 to 2014, and, more specifically, to estimate those effects when the output falls below its potential level. To do so, we estimate VAR (vector autoregressive) models to generate impulse-response functions and causality/endogeneity tests. Our most remarkable results indicate the following channel of economic policy in Brazil: to foster output, government spending increases causing increases in both tax rates and revenue and the short-term interest rate. A fiscal stimulus via spending seems efficient for economic performance as well as monetary policy; however, the latter operates pro-cyclically in the way we defined here, while the former is predominantly countercyclical. As the monetary shock had a negative effect on GDP growth and GDP growth responded positively to the fiscal shock, it seems that the economic policy has given poise to growth with one hand and taken it with the other one. The monetary policy is only reacting to the fiscal stimuli. We were not able to find any statistically significant response of the output to tax changes, but vice versa seems work in the Brazilian case.

Capital-account and counter-cyclical prudential regulations in developing countries

Includes bibliography

Capital-account and counter-cyclical prudential regulations in developing countries

Includes bibliography

Brazil: the international financial crisis and counter-cyclical policies

Includes bibliography

Analyzing the ACRE Program

The new farm bill enacted by Congress in June 2008 includes a new revenue-based safety-net, the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) Program, that will be available to producers beginning with the 2009 crop year. This analysis of the mechanics of ACRE and the relevant yields and prices to include in ACRE can help producers assess whether ACRE will be a good choice for this crop year and beyond.

Analyzing ACRE: Results for 2009 and Decisions for 2010

In 2009, agricultural producers participating in federal farm programs had to decide between staying in the existing Direct and Counter-Cyclical Program (DCP), and the new Average Crop Revenue Election Program (ACRE). If producers chose to keep the DCP, their farm income safety net is strictly tied to crop prices, with a combination of marketing loans, counter-cyclical payments and direct payments. If producers chose the new ACRE program, they changed their farm income safety net to a combination of price and revenue. The new ACRE component is based on revenue and replaces the counter-cyclical payment. The other parts of the safety net for ACRE participants remain tied to price, albeit at lower levels (direct payments reduced 20 percent, marketing loan rates reduced 30 percent).

Making an ACRE Decision for 2009

The initial sign-up period for 2009 farm commodity programs and the choice between the new ACRE (Average Crop Revenue Election) program and the existing DCP (Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment) program is quickly winding down. But as the current August 14 deadline approaches, producers know more and more about the potential safety net provided under the ACRE program, and have a better opportunity to analyze the economics of choosing ACRE versus the DCP program before visiting their USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA) office.

Income taxation with habit formation and consumption externalities

We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.

The Optimal Distribution of the Tax Burden over the Business Cycle

This paper analyses optimal income taxes over the business cycle under a balanced-budget restriction, for low, middle and high income households. A model incorporating capital-skill complementarity in production and differential access to capital and labour markets is developed to capture the cyclical characteristics of the US economy, as well as the empirical observations on wage (skill premium) and wealth inequality. We .nd that the tax rate for high income agents is optimally the least volatile and the tax rate for low income agents the least countercyclical. In contrast, the path of optimal taxes for the middle income group is found to be very volatile and counter-cyclical. We further find that the optimal response to output-enhancing capital equipment technology and spending cuts is to increase the progressivity of income taxes. Finally, in response to positive TFP shocks, taxation becomes more progressive after about two years.

Essays in higher moment asset pricing and liquidity risk

This thesis focuses on theoretical asset pricing models and their empirical applications. I aim to investigate the following noteworthy problems: i) if the relationship between asset prices and investors' propensities to gamble and to fear disaster is time varying, ii) if the conflicting evidence for the firm and market level skewness can be explained by downside risk, Hi) if costly learning drives liquidity risk. Moreover, empirical tests support the above assumptions and provide novel findings in asset pricing, investment decisions, and firms' funding liquidity. The first chapter considers a partial equilibrium model where investors have heterogeneous propensities to gamble and fear disaster. Skewness preference represents the desire to gamble, while kurtosis aversion represents fear of extreme returns. Using US data from 1988 to 2012, my model demonstrates that in bad times, risk aversion is higher, more people fear disaster, and fewer people gamble, in contrast to good times. This leads to a new empirical finding: gambling preference has a greater impact on asset prices during market downturns than during booms. The second chapter consists of two essays. The first essay introduces a foramula based on conditional CAPM for decomposing the market skewness. We find that the major market upward and downward movements can be well preadicted by the asymmetric comovement of betas, which is characterized by an indicator called "Systematic Downside Risk" (SDR). We find that SDR can efafectively forecast future stock market movements and we obtain out-of-sample R-squares (compared with a strategy using historical mean) of more than 2.27% with monthly data. The second essay reconciles a well-known empirical fact: aggregating positively skewed firm returns leads to negatively skewed market return. We reconcile this fact through firms' greater response to negative maraket news than positive market news. We also propose several market return predictors, such as downside idiosyncratic skewness. The third chapter studies the funding liquidity risk based on a general equialibrium model which features two agents: one entrepreneur and one external investor. Only the investor needs to acquire information to estimate the unobservable fundamentals driving the economic outputs. The novelty is that information acquisition is more costly in bad times than in good times, i.e. counter-cyclical information cost, as supported by previous empirical evidence. Later we show that liquidity risks are principally driven by costly learning. Résumé Cette thèse présente des modèles théoriques dévaluation des actifs et leurs applications empiriques. Mon objectif est d'étudier les problèmes suivants: la relation entre l'évaluation des actifs et les tendances des investisseurs à parier et à crainadre le désastre varie selon le temps ; les indications contraires pour l'entreprise et l'asymétrie des niveaux de marché peuvent être expliquées par les risques de perte en cas de baisse; l'apprentissage coûteux augmente le risque de liquidité. En outre, des tests empiriques confirment les suppositions ci-dessus et fournissent de nouvelles découvertes en ce qui concerne l'évaluation des actifs, les décisions relatives aux investissements et la liquidité de financement des entreprises. Le premier chapitre examine un modèle d'équilibre où les investisseurs ont des tendances hétérogènes à parier et à craindre le désastre. La préférence asymétrique représente le désir de parier, alors que le kurtosis d'aversion représente la crainte du désastre. En utilisant les données des Etats-Unis de 1988 à 2012, mon modèle démontre que dans les mauvaises périodes, l'aversion du risque est plus grande, plus de gens craignent le désastre et moins de gens parient, conatrairement aux bonnes périodes. Ceci mène à une nouvelle découverte empirique: la préférence relative au pari a un plus grand impact sur les évaluations des actifs durant les ralentissements de marché que durant les booms économiques. Exploitant uniquement cette relation générera un revenu excédentaire annuel de 7,74% qui n'est pas expliqué par les modèles factoriels populaires. Le second chapitre comprend deux essais. Le premier essai introduit une foramule base sur le CAPM conditionnel pour décomposer l'asymétrie du marché. Nous avons découvert que les mouvements de hausses et de baisses majeures du marché peuvent être prédits par les mouvements communs des bêtas. Un inadicateur appelé Systematic Downside Risk, SDR (risque de ralentissement systématique) est créé pour caractériser cette asymétrie dans les mouvements communs des bêtas. Nous avons découvert que le risque de ralentissement systématique peut prévoir les prochains mouvements des marchés boursiers de manière efficace, et nous obtenons des carrés R hors échantillon (comparés avec une stratégie utilisant des moyens historiques) de plus de 2,272% avec des données mensuelles. Un investisseur qui évalue le marché en utilisant le risque de ralentissement systématique aurait obtenu une forte hausse du ratio de 0,206. Le second essai fait cadrer un fait empirique bien connu dans l'asymétrie des niveaux de march et d'entreprise, le total des revenus des entreprises positiveament asymétriques conduit à un revenu de marché négativement asymétrique. Nous décomposons l'asymétrie des revenus du marché au niveau de l'entreprise et faisons cadrer ce fait par une plus grande réaction des entreprises aux nouvelles négatives du marché qu'aux nouvelles positives du marché. Cette décomposition révélé plusieurs variables de revenus de marché efficaces tels que l'asymétrie caractéristique pondérée par la volatilité ainsi que l'asymétrie caractéristique de ralentissement. Le troisième chapitre fournit une nouvelle base théorique pour les problèmes de liquidité qui varient selon le temps au sein d'un environnement de marché incomplet. Nous proposons un modèle d'équilibre général avec deux agents: un entrepreneur et un investisseur externe. Seul l'investisseur a besoin de connaitre le véritable état de l'entreprise, par conséquent, les informations de paiement coutent de l'argent. La nouveauté est que l'acquisition de l'information coute plus cher durant les mauvaises périodes que durant les bonnes périodes, comme cela a été confirmé par de précédentes expériences. Lorsque la récession comamence, l'apprentissage coûteux fait augmenter les primes de liquidité causant un problème d'évaporation de liquidité, comme cela a été aussi confirmé par de précédentes expériences.

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

The effects of fiscal policy after the global recession: assessing the evidences

This paper offers a commented review of the most recent empirical studies of the effects of fiscal contraction on economic growth, which have helped underpin the prescription that fiscal policy should be expansionary in coming years in order to contain economic semi-stagnation in the developed countries. The paper shows that there is ample literature showing that fiscal expansion helps the economy grow, and that fiscal contraction tends to reduce output and employment in the short term.

The basis of valuations for secured commercial property lending in the UK

In the context of the financial crash and the commercial property market downturn, this paper examines the basis of valuation used in the UK commercial property lending process. Post-crisis there is discussion of countercyclical measures including the monitoring of asset prices; however there is no consideration of a different approach to property valuation. This paper questions this omission, given the role that valuations play in the bank regulatory process. The different bases of valuation available to lenders within International Valuation Standards are identified as Market Value (MV), Mortgage Lending Value (MLV) and Investment Value (IV), with MV being the most used in the UK. Using the different bases in the period before the financial crisis, the UK property market is modelled at a national office, retail and industrial/warehouse sector level to determine the performance of each alternative valuation basis within the context of counter-cyclical pressures on lending. Both MLV and IV would have produced lower valuations and could have provided lenders with tools for more informed and prudent lending. The paper concludes by recognising some of the practical issues involved in adopting the different bases for the bank lending role but recommends a change to IV.

The private memory of aggregate shocks

We study constrained efficient aggregate risk sharing and its consequence for the behavior of macro-aggregates in a dynamic Mirrlees’s (1971) setting. Privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to be independent of i.i.d. publicly observed aggregate shocks. Yet, private allocations display memory with respect to past aggregate shocks, when idosyncratic shocks are also i.i.d.. Under a mild restriction on the nature of optimal allocations the result extends to more persistent idiosyncratic shocks, for all but the limit at which idiosyncratic risk disappears, and the model collapses to a pure heterogeneity repeated Mirrlees economy identical to Werning [2007]. When preferences are iso-elastic we show that an allocation is memoryless only if it displays a strong form of separability with respect to aggregate shocks. Separability characterizes the pure heterogeneity limit as well as the general case with log preferences. With less than full persistence and risk aversion different from unity both memory and non-separability characterize optimal allocations. Exploiting the fact that non-separability is associated with state-varying labor wedges, we apply a business cycle accounting procedure (e.g. Chari et al. [2007]) to the aggregate data generated by the model. We show that, whenever risk aversion is great than one our model produces efficient counter-cyclical labor wedges.