A face inconstitucional do novo marco regulatório do petróleo

A descoberta do pré-sal motivou intensa atividade legislativa que alterou o regime sob o qual o petróleo é explorado no Brasil. Neste contexto, foram instituídas mudanças na distribuição das participações governamentais, notadamente no que se refere ao pagamento dos royalties e participações especiais aos Estados e Municípios produtores de petróleo. Representantes de alguns destes Estados, insatisfeitos frente ao novo marco regulatório, ajuizaram Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade (ADI nº 4.917, ADI nº. 4.916, ADI nº. 4.492 e ADI nº. 4.920) perante o Supremo Tribunal Federal, questionando, em suma, a violação ao pacto federativo, ao ato jurídico perfeito, ao direito adquirido, à segurança jurídica e ao princípio da isonomia.

Rules of the Constitutional Convention, 1901 : with lists of the stnading committees, the officers of the Convention, and a roll of the delegates.

Mode of access: Internet.

Constitutional law; an introductory treatise designed for use in the United States naval academy, and in other schools where the principles of the Constitution are studied,

Mode of access: Internet.

Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015

We argue that safeguards are necessary to ensure human rights are adequately protected. All systems of blocking access to online content necessarily raise difficult and problematic issues of infringement of freedom of speech and access to information. Given the importance of access to information across the breadth of modern life, great care must be taken to ensure that any measures designed to protect copyright by blocking access to online locations are proportionate. Any measures to block access to online content must be carefully tailored to avoid serious and disproportionate impact on human rights. This means first that the measures must be effective and adapted to achieve a legitimate purpose. The experience of foreign jurisdictions suggests that this legislation is unlikely to be effective. Unless and until there is clear evidence that the proposed scheme is likely to increase effective returns to Australian creators, this legislation should not be introduced. Second, the principle of proportionality requires ensuring that the proposed legislation does not unnecessarily burden legitimate speech or access to information. As currently worded, the draft legislation may result in online locations being blocked even though they would, if operated in Australia, not contravene Australian law. This is unacceptable, and if introduced, the law should be drafted so that it is clearly limited only to foreign locations where there is clear and compelling evidence that the location would authorise copyright infringement if it were in Australia. Third, proportionality requires that measures are reasonable and strike an appropriate balance between competing interests. This draft legislation provides few safeguards for the public interest or the interests of private actors who would access legitimate information. New safeguards should be introduced to ensure that the public interest is well represented at both the stage of the primary application and at any applications to rescind or vary injunctions. We recommend that: The legislation not be introduced unless and until there is compelling evidence that it will have a real and significant positive impact on the effective incomes of Australian creators. The ‘facilitates an infringement’ test in s 115A(1)(b) should be replaced with ‘authorises infringement’. The ‘primary purpose’ test in s 115A(1)(c) should be replaced with: “the online location has no substantial non-infringing uses”. An explicit role for public interest groups as amici curiae should be introduced. Costs of successful applications should be borne by applicants. Injunctions should be valid only for renewable two year terms. Section 115A(5) should be clarified, and cl (b) and (c) be removed. The effectiveness of the scheme should be evaluated in two years.

Sovereignty, Article 4(2) TEU and the Respect of National Identities: Swinging the Balance of Power in Favour of the Member States?

The question of whether and to what extent sovereignty has been transferred to the European Union (EU) from its Member States remains a central debate within the EU and is interlinked with issues such as Kompetenz-Kompetenz, direct effect and primacy. Central to any claim to sovereignty is the principle of primacy, which requires that Member States uphold EU law over national law where there is a conflict. However, limitations to primacy can traditionally be found in national jurisprudence and the Maastricht Treaty introduced a possible EU limitation with the requirement that the EU respect national identities of Member States. The Lisbon Treaty provided only minimal further support to the principle of primacy whilst simultaneously developing the provision on national identities, now found within Article 4(2) TEU. There are indications from the literature, national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the EU that the provision is gathering strength as a legal tool and is likely to have a wider scope than the text might indicate. In its new role, Article 4(2) TEU bolsters the Member States’ claim to sovereignty and the possibility to uphold aspects crucial to them in conflict with EU law and the principle of primacy. Consequently, it is central to the relationship between the constitutional courts of the Member States and the CJEU, and where the final elements of control remain in ‘hard cases’. However, it does so as part of EU law, thereby facilitating the evasion of direct fundamental conflicts and reflecting the concept of constitutional pluralism.

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context : Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond /

After the electoral reform in 1994, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a multi-party system toward a two-party system over the course of five House of Representatives election cycles. In contrast, after Taiwan’s constitutional amendment in 2005, a two-party system emerged in the first post-reform legislative election in 2008. Critically, however, Taiwan’s president is directly elected while Japan’s prime minister is indirectly elected. The contributors conclude that the higher the payoffs of holding the executive office and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems to demonstrate its generality. They find the effect of executive competition on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The findings presented in this book have important implications for political reform. Often, reformers are motivated by high hopes of solving some political problems and enhancing the quality of democracy. But, as this group of scholars demonstrates, electoral reform alone is not a panacea. Whether and to what extent it achieves the advocated goals depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.

A judicialização das políticas públicas de telecomunicações e as demandas dos consumidores: o impacto da ação judicial

A tese parte da seguinte hipótese: a intervenção judicial possibilita a alteração das políticas regulatórias, tendo por base o caso das telecomunicações no Brasil. O primeiro capítulo descreve o processo de privatização do setor regulado e a formação de um novo ambiente empresarial, com destaque para a organização de um sistema legal e regulamentar para possibilitar o funcionamento do novo sistema. O segundo capítulo mostra como é formada a doutrina jurídica, no campo do Direito Administrativo, que serviu de junção para o novo setor empresarial e as instituições regulatórias que surgiram, denominadas agências reguladoras. O terceiro capítulo focaliza a construção institucional das agências reguladoras, bem como os dilemas institucionais que a acompanharam. O quarto capítulo resenha o debate teórico sobre a judicialização da política, com foco nas políticas públicas, bem como analisa as ações diretas de inconstitucionalidade, ajuizadas com o objetivo de paralisar a privatização. O quinto capítulo detalha a insurgência dos consumidores, em um movimento de base que permitiu a alteração regulamentar no topo. O último narra o Projeto Expressinho, uma proposta para o estabelecimento desta seara jurisdicional por um meio alternativo de resolução de conflitos. As considerações finais evidenciam que foram introduzidas características do modelo de direito responsivo, que é descrito por Nonet e Selnick. A conclusão é que os traços de responsividade no sistema político e judicial brasileiro tendem a aprofundar este tipo de intervenção, tendo se mostrado como um canal mais efetivo para a permeabilidade social do que o eram as propaladas audiências e consultas públicas.

Getting Constitutional Theory into Proportion: A Matter of Interpretation?

Gibbs, N., Getting Constitutional Theory into Proportion: A Matter of Interpretation?, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 27 (1), 175-191. RAE2008

‘The Judiciary and Political Change in Africa: Developing Transitional Jurisprudence in Nigeria’

At a time of increased evaluations of law, human rights, and the rise of judicial power all over the globe, the work of most African judiciaries and the principles of the jurisprudence they espouse in promoting social justice remain an unlikely focus of comparative legal scholarship. This ought not to be so in view of the considerable activities of the courts on the continent in the dawn of the third wave of democratization. This article explores the work of the Nigerian Supreme Court in the political transition to democracy since 1999. Utilizing insights from the work of Ruti Teitel, it attempts to outline some of the major constitutional and extraconstitutional principles adopted by the Court in mediating intergovernmental contestations in the turbulent transition away from almost three decades of authoritarian military rule. It emerges that the task of fostering social transformation through the “weakest” branch seriously tasks the institutional integrity of the judiciary.

Ensino fundamental de nove anos: processo de implantação no munícipio de Rio Claro

The object of this study was to analyze the process of implementing the compulsory education to nine years, according to the Law 11.274/06, in Rio Claro. Thus it was established a brief analysis of the trajectory of Brazilian educational policy that began with the Law of Directives and Bases 4.024/61 and was followed by the Law 5.692/71, the 1988 Federal Constitution, the Law of Directives and Bases 9394 / 96, the National Educational Plan - Law 10.172/01, Law 11.114/05, 11.274/06 and the Constitutional Amendment. 59/2009, pointing to increase access to education that aims to expand and ensure free education and compulsory basic education for children aging from 04 to 17 years old. The research has been based on collecting bibliographical data, information and data for the municipality of Rio Claro, through official documents, semi-structured interviews, and research on government websites. The expansion of basic education to nine years has been securing the rights gained over time through education. Moreover, this expansion of education promotes a questioning about the quality of teaching and a concern for the financial contributions required for education.

Self-Organizing Maps of Molecular Descriptors for Sesquiterpene Lactones and Their Application to the Chemotaxonomy of the Asteraceae Family

The Asteraceae, one of the largest families among angiosperms, is chemically characterised by the production of sesquiterpene lactones (SLs). A total of 1,111 SLs, which were extracted from 658 species, 161 genera, 63 subtribes and 15 tribes of Asteraceae, were represented and registered in two dimensions in the SISTEMATX, an in-house software system, and were associated with their botanical sources. The respective 11 block of descriptors: Constitutional, Functional groups, BCUT, Atom-centred, 2D autocorrelations, Topological, Geometrical, RDF, 3D-MoRSE, GETAWAY and WHIM were used as input data to separate the botanical occurrences through self-organising maps. Maps that were generated with each descriptor divided the Asteraceae tribes, with total index values between 66.7% and 83.6%. The analysis of the results shows evident similarities among the Heliantheae, Helenieae and Eupatorieae tribes as well as between the Anthemideae and Inuleae tribes. Those observations are in agreement with systematic classifications that were proposed by Bremer, which use mainly morphological and molecular data, therefore chemical markers partially corroborate with these classifications. The results demonstrate that the atom-centred and RDF descriptors can be used as a tool for taxonomic classification in low hierarchical levels, such as tribes. Descriptors obtained through fragments or by the two-dimensional representation of the SL structures were sufficient to obtain significant results, and better results were not achieved by using descriptors derived from three-dimensional representations of SLs. Such models based on physico-chemical properties can project new design SLs, similar structures from literature or even unreported structures in two-dimensional chemical space. Therefore, the generated SOMs can predict the most probable tribe where a biologically active molecule can be found according Bremer classification.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.