Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania

A key requirement of the countries of central and eastern Europe (CEECs) that wish to join the EU is that they develop the administrative capacity to implement effectively the acquis communautaire. The 'twinning' programme is designed to assist in this process. Drawing on experiences in Romania, and linking these to debates on Europeanization, this article argues that the success of twinning to date is related to the design of the programme, institutional fluidity and politicization within central administration, the individual agency and the reform commitment of those hosting twinning projects.

Hidden Contradictions and Conditionality: Conceptualisations of Inclusive Education in International Law

The nature of education that children with disabilities should receive has been subject to much debate. This article critically assesses the ways in which the international human rights framework has conceptualised ‘inclusive education’. It argues that the right to education for children with disabilities in international law is constitutive of hidden contradictions and conditionality. This is most evident with respect to conceptualisations of ‘inclusion’ and ‘support’, and their respective emphases upon the extent of individual impairment or ‘deficit’ rather than upon the extent of institutional or structural deficit. It is vital that the new Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities pays close attention to the utilisation of these concepts lest the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities further legitimises the ‘special needs’ educational discourse to which children with disabilities have been subject.

Rethinking crises and the accretion of executive power: the “War on Terror” and conditionality evidence from seven political systems

External shocks to democratic systems are likely to threaten the stability of relations between the executive and the representative assembly. This article investigates the impact of the so-called “war on terror” on executive-assembly relations in comparative perspective. We analyze data from seven countries, which varied in terms of form of government, level of democracy, culture, social structure, and geographic location, to evaluate its effects. We find that whereas in some systems the “war on terror” altered the balance of power between the executive and the assembly, in other cases the extant balance of power was preserved. We postulate various conditions under which the constitutionally sanctioned balance of power is most likely to be preserved in times of crisis.

Fiscal adjustment, conditionality and politics in IMF programs

A common feature in programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the use of conditionalities, macroeconomic and structural measures that a requesting country should adopt to obtain an assistance package. The objective of this work is to conduct an empirical analysis of the economic and political determinants of such conditionalities. In particular, our main contribution consists in the development of a new measure of conditionality, fiscal adjustment, and its comparison with the most used in the literature, the number of conditions. We choose fiscal adjustment because it is an adequate proxy for program austerity, since its implementation carries economic and political costs. In the empirical exercise, we use data from 184 programs in the period of 1999 and 2012, and estimate how our two measures of conditionalities respond to the economic and political factors. Our results suggest that they are quite different. The main determinant of the number of conditions is the political proximity of the borrowing country to the Fund’s major shareholders, the members of G5. On the other hand, the main determinant of fiscal adjustment is the size of the government fiscal deficit. Finally, we did not find correlation between the size of fiscal adjustment and the number of conditions. These results suggest that the analysis of the content of IMF programs should take into account the different measures of agreed conditionality.

Criticisms and suggestions on the cross-conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank

Includes bibliography

EU Conditionality on Nationality-Sensitive Matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Promoting Democracy or Maintaining the Status Quo? EDAP 05/2013

This paper will analyse the impact of the EU conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and its efficacy in promoting democratic changes in this country. It will be argued that as BiH is a unique case, its constitutional constraints must be taken into account because every reform that affects the difficult balance between the three main ethno-religious groups of BiH is perceived as a nationality-sensitive issue and is therefore vulnerable to political pressure. With reference to two specific situations where EU has demanded the BiH political elites to adopt EU-compatible reforms, namely the police reform process and the implementation of the Sejdić and Finci ruling, it will be argued that the use of the conditionality tool has increased inter-ethnic polarization among the political parties, thus preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina from moving forward in the EU integration process.

Macroeconomic Conditionality in Cohesion Policy: Added Value or Unnecessary Burden? European Policy Brief No. 13, November 2012

Macroeconomic conditionality has become one of the major elements in discussions on the future of EU cohesion policy. Such conditional-ity would make the cohesion budget dependent on EU economic governance rules. This would have advantages for economic governance and, to a lesser extent, the efficiency of cohesion policy and the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations. Yet, conditionality also risks entailing serious disadvantages for the end beneficiaries and cohesion policy itself. If the EU decides to put macroeconomic conditionality in place, it needs to reconsider the design and agree on an ample cohesion budget.

Don’t complicate it even further: Macroeconomic Conditionality as a Substitute for new Structural Reform Contracts. European Policy Brief No. 15, May 2013

The idea of introducing contracts between Member States and the EU on structural reforms has its merits, it also has several disadvantages. Most notably, the contracts risk rendering European economic governance even more complex and cumbersome. It is therefore sensible to first try to integrate the structural reform contracts into one of the foreseen economic governance instruments. This Policy Brief argues that macroeconomic conditionality can serve this purpose. With some minor reforms, it could even become a full-fledged substitute for structural reform contracts – without suffering some of latter’s disadvantages.