From Structure to Substance: Has the Constitutional Treaty improved the Chances for a Common Foreign and Security Policy? Research Papers in Law, 6/2005

From the Introduction. A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is an issue of the day. While most academic and many political observers believe that it would be in the interest of the Union to have a common policy, there is quite some disagreement as to how this is to be achieved and whether it should be accomplished in an assured and regular manner or whether it should come about on an ad hoc basis only when it is in the clear interest of all member states at any particular time. In other words, is a common foreign policy to be a fundamental characteristic of the Union or is it to be an occasional occurrence when advantageous and convenient, the ‘C’ in CFSP – as one observer has sarcastically commented – standing not for ‘Common’ but for ‘Convenient’?2

Information Guide: Common Foreign and Security Policy

A guide to the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with hyperlinks to sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites

European Foreign and Security Policy since the Lisbon Treaty – From Common to single? ZEI Discussion Paper C226, 2014

Since the Lisbon Treaty, all organizational conditions have been created for the systematic use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Military and civil structures, especially the operational headquarters and associated common structures like transport command, have been established. Until now there has been limited activity in crisis resolution, outside of Bosnia and Macedonia, and therefore little has been done in replacement of NATO. It is therefore difficult to assess the development of the common policy on conflict prevention and crisis management and it has been shown that in all cases NATO should come into play as planned from the outset.

The Art of Adaptation : A study on the Europeanization of Finland's foreign and security policy

This study examines how Finnish foreign and security policy has been influenced by the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy. It points to a growing interplay and misfit between the external expectations originating from the European level and the domestic expectations and traditional ways-of-doing-things. It is concluded that the deepening European integration in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy has played a significant role in a number of transformations in the Finnish policies since 1995. New, more European, meanings have been attached to the key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy. Neutrality and traditional peacekeeping have been replaced by a minimalist reading of military non-alignment and participation in crisis management operations and EU battle groups. Traditional small state identity has been recast more and more as small member stateness . At the same time Finland has entered an era of post-consensus in national foreign and security policy. A key theoretical argument in the background of the study is that collective understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with domestic understandings, cause adaptation pressures on domestic-level processes and may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. This means that Europeanization is principally seen as identity reconstruction. Consequently, the theoretical framework of the study builds on the Europeanization research literature and constructivist IR theory on state identity. Foreign and security policy is defined as the practice in which state identity is reproduced, and the key foreign and security policy concepts are seen as the vehicles of identity production. It is concluded that for Finland, participation in the EU s foreign, security and defence policies represents not only a tool for responding to the changes in the international security environment but also a new means of self-identification. Concerning the Finnish attempts of projecting national interests on the European security policy agenda, it is concluded that they mainly relate to the compatibility of the potential development of EU s defence dimension with the Finnish military non-alignment. Although neutrality was cast aside in the official security policy when Finland joined the EU, the analysis shows that its impact has continued in the domestic political debate and in the mind-set of the decision-makers. The primary research material includes official Finnish foreign and security policy documentation and the related parliamentary debates from 1994 to 2007. This study serves also as a comprehensive empirical overview on Finland s reactions and contributions to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Does Europe Need a Common Foreign & Security Policy? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 06.1, 15 September, 1996

CFSP's performance is widely regarded as weak. Why did Europe's stance in world politics not improve with the Treaty of Maastricht? The article analyses the present policy approach and the institutionalist and militarystrategic reform proposals. It is argued that policy and proposals suffer from drawbacks leading to an uncomprehensive formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both do not provide CFSP with a necessary strategy but instead largely duplicate existing organizations. Furthermore, they propose concepts that are not viable because member states do not agree on a common defense policy. In addition, they fail to offer answers adequate to today's challenges, which are not primarily military in nature. Instead, a socioeconomic security policy appears to be a more realistic option. It is necessary because no other organization provides it sufficiently; it is viable because member states could agree on iti and it is adequate because the stabilization of countries in Eastern Europe is best achieved by social and economic policy-and not by military deterrence.

The EU’s comprehensive approach towards security: the Lisbon Treaty and “smart power”. EU Centre Singpore Policy Brief No. 6, May 2013

The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a comprehensive security actor. With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a reaction to the failure of the EU to act during the wars in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU has a wide range of instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management as well as post-crisis intervention at its disposal. Observers typically agree that “hard power” is no longer sufficient to address the complex security challenges of today’s world while the EU, often criticised for only utilising “soft power”, is now able to exercise “smart power”. Through a comprehensive approach, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can now use the various instruments at its disposal, such as diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities in a joined-up manner. This mix of tools and instruments is helping the EU to achieve the aim set out in its European Security Strategy: “a secure Europe in a better world”.

Decoding the canada's foreing and security policy: tracking the strategic and ethicliberal approaches of a middle power's behavior

The article attempts to explain the main paradox faced by Canada at formulating its foreign policy on international security. Explained in economic and political terms, this paradox consists in the contradiction between the Canadian ability to achieve its strategic goals, serving to its own national interest and its dependence on the United States. The first section outlines three representative examples to evaluate this paradox: the Canada’s position in North American security regime, the US-Canada economic security relations, and the universe of possibilities for action of Canada as a middle power. The second section suggests that liberal agenda, especially concerning to ethical issues, has been established by this country to minimize this paradox. By pursing this agenda, Canada is able to reaffirm its national identity and therefore its independence on the United States. The third section evaluates both the explained paradox and the reaffirmation of Canadian identity during the Jean Chrétien (1993-2003), Paul Martin (2003-2006) and Stephen Harper’s (2006) governments.

Identity, Ideology, and Cinema: Making Sense of Japan's Foreign and Security Policies in the 1950s and 2000s

Japan is an important ally of the United States–the world’s third biggest economy, and one of the regional great powers in Asia. Making sense of Japan’s foreign and security policies is crucial for the future of peace and stability in Northeast Asia, where the possible sources of conflict such as territorial disputes or the disputes over Japan’s war legacy issues are observed. This dissertation explored Japan’s foreign and security policies based on Japan’s identities and unconscious ideologies. It employed an analysis of selected Japanese films from the late 1940s to the late 1950s, as well as from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. The analysis demonstrated that Japan’s foreign and security policies could be understood in terms of a broader social narrative that was visible in Japanese popular cultural products, including films and literatures. Narratives of Japanese families from the patriarch’s point of view, for example, had constantly shaped Japan’s foreign and security policies. As a result, the world was ordered hierarchically in the eyes of the Japan Self. In the 1950s, Japan tenaciously constructed close but asymmetrical security relations with the U.S. in which Japan willingly subjugated itself to the U.S. In the 2000s, Japan again constructed close relations with the U.S. by doing its best to support American responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks by mobilizing Japan’s SDFs in the way Japan had never done in the past. The concepts of identity and unconscious ideology are helpful in understanding how Japan’s own understanding of self, of others, and of the world have shaped its own behaviors. These concepts also enable Japan to reevaluate its own behaviors reflexively, which departs from existing alternative approaches. This study provided a critical analytical explanation of the dynamics at work in Japan’s sense of identity, particularly with regard to its foreign and security policies.

Why EU promotion is at odds with successful crisis management: public relations, news coverage, and the Aceh Monitoring Mission. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 10, September 2012

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its accompanying Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions can be tools used to increase the international profile of the European Union. Nevertheless, CSDP missions garner little news coverage. This article argues that the very nature of the missions themselves makes them poor vehicles for EU promotion for political, institutional, and logistical reasons. By definition, they are conducted in the middle of crises, making news coverage politically sensitive. The very act of reporting could undermine the mission. Institutionally, all CSDP missions are intergovernmental, making press statements slow, overly bureaucratic, and of little interest to journalists. Logistically, the missions are often located in remote, undeveloped parts of the world, making it difficult and expensive for European and international journalists to cover. Moreover, these regions in crisis seldom have a thriving, local free press. Using the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) as a case study, the author concludes that although a mission may do good, CSDP missions cannot fulfil the political function of raising the profile of the EU.