Felix Ravenna.

Vols. for <1991/1992- > published: Ravenna, Edizioni del Girasole.

Chronologia secundum Graecorum rationem temporibus expositis : autore Nicephoro archiepiscopo Constantinopolis: conversa in sermonem Latinum de Graeco, & expticata a Ioachimo Camerario. Addita est narratio eiusdem camerarii de Synodo Nicaena. Accessit et nova enumeratio oecu menicarum synodorum, indicatis temporibus & praecipuis megoliis illarum.

Mode of access: Internet.

Byzantine art and archaeology.

"Unabridged and unaltered republication of the first edition published... in 1911."

Catalogue of the subjects of natural history in the Museum of the Royal Dublin Society, also of the antiquities, &c.

1813

Antiquities from Boscoreale in Field Museum of Natural History / by Herbert F. De Cou. With preface and catalogue of iron implements by F. B. Tarbell.

v.7:no.4(1912)

Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities

Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f < g if it is fake. Given that the buyer is no expert, his test may have little power: f may be close to g. Unfortunately, without much power, the buyer's test will not resolve the difficulty of adverse selection; gains from trade may remain unexploited. But now consider a "store", where the seller groups a number of items, perhaps all with the same quality, the same probability p of being genuine. (We show that in equilibrium the seller will choose to group items in this manner.) Now the buyer can conduct his test across a large sample, perhaps all, of a group of items in the seller's store. He can thereby assess the overall quality of these items; he can invert the aggregate of his test results to uncover the underlying p; he can form a "prior". There is thus no longer asymmetric information between seller and buyer: gains from trade can be exploited. This is our theory of retailing: by grouping items together - setting up a store - a seller is able to supply buyers with priors, as well as the items themselves. We show that the weaker the power of the buyer�s test (the closer f is to g), the greater the seller�s profit. So the seller has no incentive to assist the buyer � e.g., by performing her own tests on the items, or by cleaning them to reveal more about their true age. The paper ends with an analysis of which sellers should specialise in which qualities. We show that quality will be low in busy locations and high in expensive locations.

On solving fair exchange and related distributed problems in Byzantine environments

Abstract The solvability of the problem of fair exchange in a synchronous system subject to Byzantine failures is investigated in this work. The fair exchange problem arises when a group of processes are required to exchange digital items in a fair manner, which means that either each process obtains the item it was expecting or no process obtains any information on, the inputs of others. After introducing a novel specification of fair exchange that clearly separates safety and liveness, we give an overview of the difficulty of solving such a problem in the context of a fully-connected topology. On one hand, we show that no solution to fair exchange exists in the absence of an identified process that every process can trust a priori; on the other, a well-known solution to fair exchange relying on a trusted third party is recalled. These two results lead us to complete our system model with a flexible representation of the notion of trust. We then show that fair exchange is solvable if and only if a connectivity condition, named the reachable majority condition, is satisfied. The necessity of the condition is proven by an impossibility result and its sufficiency by presenting a general solution to fair exchange relying on a set of trusted processes. The focus is then turned towards a specific network topology in order to provide a fully decentralized, yet realistic, solution to fair exchange. The general solution mentioned above is optimized by reducing the computational load assumed by trusted processes as far as possible. Accordingly, our fair exchange protocol relies on trusted tamperproof modules that have limited communication abilities and are only required in key steps of the algorithm. This modular solution is then implemented in the context of a pedagogical application developed for illustrating and apprehending the complexity of fair exchange. This application, which also includes the implementation of a wide range of Byzantine behaviors, allows executions of the algorithm to be set up and monitored through a graphical display. Surprisingly, some of our results on fair exchange seem contradictory with those found in the literature of secure multiparty computation, a problem from the field of modern cryptography, although the two problems have much in common. Both problems are closely related to the notion of trusted third party, but their approaches and descriptions differ greatly. By introducing a common specification framework, a comparison is proposed in order to clarify their differences and the possible origins of the confusion between them. This leads us to introduce the problem of generalized fair computation, a generalization of fair exchange. Finally, a solution to this new problem is given by generalizing our modular solution to fair exchange

Six months residence and rravels in México ; containing remarks onthe present state of New Spain, its natural productions, state of society, manufactures, trade, agriculture and antiquities

UANL

Possessions et exorcismes dans l'hagiographie byzantine primitive (IVe-VIIe siècle)

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal