Remembering beliefs

Optimal decision-making requires us to accurately pinpoint the basis of our thoughts, e.g. whether they originate from our memory or our imagination. This paper argues that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly as it pertains to memory. I look to the source monitoring literature to reconcile circumstances where mnemic beliefs and mnemic qualia conflict. By separating the experience of remembering from biological facts of memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory qualia without memory (e.g. déjà vu, false memories) or a failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. functional amnesia, unintentional plagiarism). I argue that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief revision is a way to rationally incorporate information from conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent difficulties as an epistemic source. I conclude with a Bayesian defense of source monitoring based on C.I. Lewis’ coherence argument for memorial knowledge.

The Bayesian Foundations of solution concepts of games

We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors and so on.We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successfulIy eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively unàominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984». Moreover, sufficient condi tions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior. We also provide Aumann's (1985) results on correlated equilibria .

Integrating science through Bayesian Belief Networks : case study of Lyngbya in Moreton Bay

Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) are emerging as valuable tools for investigating complex ecological problems. In a BBN, the important variables in a problem are identified and causal relationships are represented graphically. Underpinning this is the probabilistic framework in which variables can take on a finite range of mutually exclusive states. Associated with each variable is a conditional probability table (CPT), showing the probability of a variable attaining each of its possible states conditioned on all possible combinations of it parents. Whilst the variables (nodes) are connected, the CPT attached to each node can be quantified independently. This allows each variable to be populated with the best data available, including expert opinion, simulation results or observed data. It also allows the information to be easily updated as better data become available ----- ----- This paper reports on the process of developing a BBN to better understand the initial rapid growth phase (initiation) of a marine cyanobacterium, Lyngbya majuscula, in Moreton Bay, Queensland. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Lyngbya blooms in this region have increased in severity and extent over the past decade. Lyngbya has been associated with acute dermatitis and a range of other health problems in humans. Blooms have been linked to ecosystem degradation and have also damaged commercial and recreational fisheries. However, the causes of blooms are as yet poorly understood.

Bayesian versus frequentist statistical inference for investi gating a one-off cancer cluster reported to a health department

Background The problem of silent multiple comparisons is one of the most difficult statistical problems faced by scientists. It is a particular problem for investigating a one-off cancer cluster reported to a health department because any one of hundreds, or possibly thousands, of neighbourhoods, schools, or workplaces could have reported a cluster, which could have been for any one of several types of cancer or any one of several time periods. Methods This paper contrasts the frequentist approach with a Bayesian approach for dealing with silent multiple comparisons in the context of a one-off cluster reported to a health department. Two published cluster investigations were re-analysed using the Dunn-Sidak method to adjust frequentist p-values and confidence intervals for silent multiple comparisons. Bayesian methods were based on the Gamma distribution. Results Bayesian analysis with non-informative priors produced results similar to the frequentist analysis, and suggested that both clusters represented a statistical excess. In the frequentist framework, the statistical significance of both clusters was extremely sensitive to the number of silent multiple comparisons, which can only ever be a subjective "guesstimate". The Bayesian approach is also subjective: whether there is an apparent statistical excess depends on the specified prior. Conclusion In cluster investigations, the frequentist approach is just as subjective as the Bayesian approach, but the Bayesian approach is less ambitious in that it treats the analysis as a synthesis of data and personal judgements (possibly poor ones), rather than objective reality. Bayesian analysis is (arguably) a useful tool to support complicated decision-making, because it makes the uncertainty associated with silent multiple comparisons explicit.