An evaluation of the effectiveness of Value-at-Risk (VaR) models for Australian banks under Basel III

This study compares Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures for Australian banks over a period that includes the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to determine whether the methodology and parameter selection are important for capital adequacy holdings that will ultimately support a bank in a crisis period. VaR methodology promoted under Basel II was largely criticised during the GFC for its failure to capture downside risk. However, results from this study indicate that 1-year parametric and historical models produce better measures of VaR than models with longer time frames. VaR estimates produced using Monte Carlo simulations show a high percentage of violations but with lower average magnitude of a violation when they occur. VaR estimates produced by the ARMA GARCH model also show a relatively high percentage of violations, however, the average magnitude of a violation is quite low. Our findings support the design of the revised Basel II VaR methodology which has also been adopted under Basel III.

Basel Zionist Congress attendees Portraits; Groups

John D. Hope's grandfather's grandmother attended this conference

Studio portrait of expressionist painter Emil Luethy; Basel Portraits Men

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Exterior view of expressionist painter Emil Luethy's home; Gotthardstr. 41 (Basel?) Architecture Residences Exterior

Handwritten on verso: zu obest mein Atelier (My studio on the top floor)

Rabbi Leo Baeck, E.L. Ehrlich of Basel, Herbert Strauss of Bern, and Rabbi Eugen Messinger of Bern outside of the West End Synagogue, London, at the International Meeting of the World Union for Progressive Judaism.

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Rabbi Eugen Messinger of Bern, Dr. Herbert Strauss of Bern and E.L. Ehrlich of Basel outside of the West End Synagogue, London, at the International Meeting of the World Union for Progressive Judaism.

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Studio portrait of expressionist painter Emil Luethy; Basel Portraits Men

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Exterior view of expressionist painter Emil Luethy's home; Gotthardstr. 41 (Basel?) Architecture Residences Exterior

Handwritten on verso: zu obest mein Atelier (My studio on the top floor)

Does Basel Compliance Matter for Bank Performance ?

The global financial crisis underscored the importance of regulation and supervision to a well functioning banking system that efficiently channels financial resources into investment. In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate by assessing whether compliance with international regulatory standards and protocols enhances bank operating efficiency. We focus specifically on the adoption of international capital standards and the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP). The relationship between bank efficiency and regulatory compliance is investigated using the (Simar and Wilson 2007) double bootstrapping approach on an international sample of publicly listed banks. Our results indicate that overall BCP compliance, or indeed compliance with any of its individual chapters, has no association with bank efficiency.

Does Basel Compliance Matter for Bank Performance?

The global financial crisis underscored the importance of regulation and supervision to a well-functioning banking system that efficiently channels financial resources into investment. In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate by assessing whether compliance with international regulatory standards and protocols enhances bank operating efficiency. We focus specifically on the adoption of international capital standards and the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP). The relationship between bank efficiency and regulatory compliance is investigated using the Simar and Wilson (2007. J. Econ. 136 (1), 31) double bootstrapping approach on an international sample of publicly listed banks. Our results indicate that overall BCP compliance, or indeed compliance with any of its individual chapters,has no association with bank efficiency.

O impacto da implementação do Basel III no capital dos bancos portugueses

Este trabalho é uma análise dos efeitos da implementação das últimas recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) também conhecidas como o Basel III de 2010 que deverão ser faseadamente implementadas desde 1 de Janeiro de 2013 até 1 de Janeiro de 2019, no capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses. Neste trabalho assume-se que os ativos pesados pelo risco de 2012 mantêm-se constantes e o capital terá de ser aumentado segundo as recomendações ano após ano até ao fim de 2018. Com esta análise, pretende-se entender o nível de robustez do capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses e se os mesmos têm capital e reservas suficientes para satisfazer as recomendações de capital mínimo sugeridas pelo BCBS ou caso contrário, se necessitarão de novas injeções de capital ou terão de reduzir a sua atividade económica. O Basel III ainda não foi implementado em Portugal, pois a União Europeia está no processo de desenvolvimento e implementação do Credit Requirement Directive IV (CRD IV) que é uma recomendação que todos os bancos centrais dos países da zona Euro deverão impor aos respetivos bancos. Esta diretiva da União Europeia é baseada totalmente nas recomendações do Basel III e deverá ser implementada em 2014 ou nos anos seguintes. Até agora, os bancos Portugueses seguem um sistema com base no aviso 6/2010 do Banco de Portugal que recomenda o cálculo dos rácios core tier 1, tier 1 e tier 2 usando o método notações internas (IRB) de avaliação da exposição do banco aos riscos de crédito, operacional, etc. e onde os ativos ponderados pelo risco são calculados como 12,5 vezes o valor dos requisitos totais de fundos calculados pelo banco. Este método é baseado nas recomendações do Basel II que serão substituídas pelo Basel III. Dado que um dos principais motivos para a crise económica e financeira que assolou o mundo em 2007 foi a acumulação de alavancagem excessiva e gradual erosão da qualidade da base do capital próprio dos bancos, é importante analisar a posição dos bancos Portugueses, que embora não sejam muito grandes a nível global, controlam a economia do país. Espera-se que com a implementação das recomendações do Basel III não haja no futuro uma repetição dos choques sistémicos de 2007. Os resultados deste estudo usando o método padrão recomendado pelo BCBS mostram que de catorze bancos Portugueses incluídos neste estudo, apenas seis (BES, Montepio, Finantia, BIG, Invest e BIC) conseguem enquadrar nas recomendações mínimas do Basel III até 1-1- 2019 e alguns outros estão marginalmente abaixo dos rácios mínimos (CGD, Itaú e Crédito Agrícola).

Market risk charge of the trading book: a comparison of the Basel II and Basel III

This paper aims to investigate if the market capital charge of the trading book increased in Basel III compared to Basel II. I showed that the capital charge rises by 232% and 182% under the standardized and internal model, respectively. The varying liquidity horizons, the calibration to a stress period, the introduction of credit spread risk, the restrictions on correlations across risk categories and the incremental default charge boost Basel III requirements. Nevertheless, the impact of Expected shortfall at 97.5% is low and long term shocks decrease the charge. The standardized approach presents advantages and disadvantages relative to internal models.

Is the Basel III Leverage Ratio countercyclical? A study for Portuguese banks

This work analyses how the leverage ratio behaves through the cycle, vis-à-vis other capital ratios. For a sample of the largest Portuguese banks, the Basel III leverage ratio is indeed countercyclical. This result is relevant from a regulatory perspective, since the introduction of a limit on the leverage ratio will function as a restriction in the banks’ balance sheet size, reducing the economic costs associated with the excessive growth of leverage in periods of economic expansion followed by aggressive deleveraging in the downturn. However, one cannot exclude that restrictions on banks’ leverage incentivize its transference to less regulated intermediaries.