987 resultados para Bank regulation
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The paper provides a theoretical insight into bank regulation and the process of internationalisation by examining the concepts of regulatory push and market pull within the context of Japanese bank entry into London during the 1980s. Rugman and Verbeke's [(1998). Corporate strategy and international environmental policy. Journal of International Business Studies, 29(4), 819–833] Consistency of Home and Host Government Goals model is utilised to structure the discussion, which centres on a situation where there is a conflict of goals between multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the home government but goal alignment between MNEs and the host government. As such the paper examines a relatively under-researched aspect of internationalisation and concludes that in certain circumstances internationalisation can occur despite great ‘psychic distance’. The paper also argues that although bank regulation can lead to a conflict situation it can also be conducive to the development of a strong home base and the development of firm specific advantages.
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For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.
Regulation of European Banks and Business Models: Towards a new paradigm? CEPS Paperbacks. June 2012
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Amidst talks of establishing an EU-wide banking union, the recent changes in the regulatory framework and the rethinking of the future of European banking structure, the future of EU bank regulation is inextricably linked to banks’ business models. Using a sample of over 70 banks, which overlaps with those subjected to the EBA’s 2011 stress tests, this report emphasizes the key regulatory gaps that emerge from a comprehensive analysis of the soundness and performance of bank business models and provides policy-makers with guidance to reinforce the evolving regulatory framework in European banking.
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Banks are often excluded in corporate finance research mainly because of the regulatory concerns. Compares to non-bank firms, banks are heavily regulated due to its special economic role of money and the uncertainty. Heavy regulation on banks could reduce the information asymmetry between the managers and investor by limiting the behaviour of banks at the time of the Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO), and by increasing the incentive for banks to avoid excessive risk-taking. Therefore, the market may be less likely to assume that bank issued securities signal information that the bank is overvalued compared to their non-bank counterparts. The objective of this thesis is therefore to examine commercial banks issued securities announcement effect. Three interrelated research questions are addressed in this thesis: 1) What is the difference in convertible bond announcement effect between banks and non-banks firm? 2) What is the difference in SEO announcement effect between banks and non-banks? 3) How do the stringency levels of bank regulation impact on the announcement effects of bank issued SEO? By using the U.S. convertible bond and SEO data from 1982 to 2012, I find that the bank issued a convertible bond and SEO announcement experience higher cumulative abnormal return than non-bank. This is consistent with the view that bank regulation reveals positive information about banks. Since banks are heavily regulated, the market is less likely to assume that the issuance of the convertible bond and SEO by banks signals information that is overvalued. These results are robust after controlling for a number of firm-, issue-, and market-specific characteristics. These results are robust by considering the different categories of non-bank industries by undertaking tests in relation to the differences in the CARS upon convertible bond/ SEO across industries, as well as the unbalanced sample between banks and non-banks by using the matched sample analysis. However, the relation between the stringency level of bank regulation and bank issued securities announcement effect may be nonlinear. As hypothesised, I find that bank regulation has an inverted U-shaped relation with the announcement effect of bank SEO by using the SEO data across 21 countries from 2001 to 2012. Under a less bank regulation environment, the market reacts more positively to the bank SEO announcement for an increase in the level of bank regulation. However, the bank SEO announcement effects become more negative if the bank regulation becomes too stringent. This inverted U-shaped relationship is robust after I use the exogenous cross-country, cross-year variation in the timing of the Basel II adoption as the instrument to assess the causal impact of bank regulation on SEO announcement effects. However, the stringency of regulation does not have a significant impact on the announcement effects of involuntary bank equity issuance.
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Can the lessons of the past help us to prevent another banking collapse in the future? This is the first book to tell the story of the rise and fall of British banking stability in the past two centuries, and it sheds new light on why banking systems crash and the factors underpinning banking stability. John Turner shows that there were only two major banking crises in Britain during this time: the crisis of 1825–6 and the Great Crash of 2007–8. Although there were episodic bouts of instability in the interim, the banking system was crisis-free. Why was the British banking system stable for such a long time and why did the British banking system implode in 2008? In answering these questions, the book explores the long-run evolution of bank regulation, the role of the Bank of England, bank rescues and the need to hold shareholders to account.
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Temos vindo a assistir nos últimos anos a uma evolução no que respeita à avaliação do risco de crédito. As constantes alterações de regulamentação bancária, que resultam dos Acordos de Basileia, têm vindo a impor novas normas que condicionam a quantidade e a qualidade do risco de crédito que as Instituições de Crédito podem assumir nos seus balanços. É de grande importância as Instituições de Crédito avaliarem o risco de crédito, as garantias e o custo de capital, pois têm um impacto direto na sua gestão nomeadamente quanto à afetação de recursos e proteção contra perdas. Desta forma, pretende-se com o presente trabalho elaborar e estruturar um modelo de rating interno através de técnicas estatísticas, assim como identificar as variáveis estatisticamente relevantes no modelo considerado. Foi delineada uma metodologia de investigação mista, considerando na primeira parte do trabalho uma pesquisa qualitativa e na segunda parte uma abordagem quantitativa. Através da análise documental, fez-se uma abordagem dos conceitos teóricos e da regulamentação que serve de base ao presente trabalho. No estudo de caso, o modelo de rating interno foi desenvolvido utilizando a técnica estatística designada de regressão linear múltipla. A amostra considerada foi obtida através da base de dados SABI e é constituída por cem empresas solventes, situadas na zona de Paredes, num horizonte temporal de 2011-2013. A nossa análise baseou-se em três cenários, correspondendo cada cenário aos dados de cada ano (2011, 2012 e 2013). Para validar os pressupostos do modelo foram efetuados testes estatísticos de Durbin Watson e o teste de significância - F (ANOVA). Por fim, para obtermos a classificação de rating de cada variável foi aplicada a técnica dos percentis. Pela análise dos três cenários considerados, verificou-se que o cenário dois foi o que obteve maior coeficiente de determinação. Verificou-se ainda que as variáveis independentes, rácio de liquidez geral, grau de cobertura do ativo total pelo fundo de maneio e rácio de endividamento global são estatisticamente relevantes.
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This case study – and accompanying teaching note – briefly describes the history of the Espírito Santo family, a banking dynasty who led one of Portugal’s leading economic and financial groups, along with its “crown jewel”, Banco Espírito Santo. It chronicles how the corporate governance issues at BES allowed the family to exploit the bank, its shareholders and its customers, so as to support its unprofitable non-financial businesses. This left the bank in a poor financial situation, which deteriorated beyond control, leaving regulators – whose actions are also analysed here – with no alternative, amidst a severe liquidity crisis, but to apply a resolution measure, pinning large losses on junior bondholders and shareholders before recapitalising the bank.
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L’objectif de ce papier est de déterminer les facteurs susceptibles d’expliquer les faillites bancaires au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) entre 1980 et 1995. Utilisant le modèle logit conditionnel sur des données en panel, nos résultats montrent que les variables qui affectent positivement la probabilité de faire faillite des banques sont : i) le niveau d’endettement auprès de la banque centrale; ii) un faible niveau de comptes disponibles et à vue; iii) les portefeuilles d’effets commerciaux par rapport au total des crédits; iv) le faible montant des dépôts à terme de plus de 2 ans à 10 ans par rapport aux actifs totaux; et v) le ratio actifs liquides sur actifs totaux. En revanche, les variables qui contribuent positivement sur la vraisemblance de survie des banques sont les suivantes : i) le ratio capital sur actifs totaux; ii) les bénéfices nets par rapport aux actifs totaux; iii) le ratio crédit total sur actifs totaux; iv) les dépôts à terme à 2 ans par rapport aux actifs totaux; et v) le niveau des engagements sous forme de cautions et avals par rapport aux actifs totaux. Les ratios portefeuilles d’effets commerciaux et actifs liquides par rapport aux actifs totaux sont les variables qui expliquent la faillite des banques commerciales, alors que ce sont les dépôts à terme de plus de 2 ans à 10 ans qui sont à l’origine des faillites des banques de développement. Ces faillites ont été considérablement réduites par la création en 1989 de la commission de réglementation bancaire régionale. Dans l’UEMOA, seule la variable affectée au Sénégal semble contribuer positivement sur la probabilité de faire faillite.
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A significant part of bank lending in the UK is secured on commercial property and valuations play an important part in this process. They are an integral part of risk management within the banking sector. It is therefore important that valuations are independent and objective and are used properly to ensure that secured lending is soundly based from the perspective of both lender and borrower. The purpose of this research is to examine objectivity and transparency in the valuation process for bank lending and to identify any influences which may undermine the process. A detailed analysis of 31 valuation negligence cases has been followed by two focus groups of lenders and valuers and also questionnaire surveys of commercial lenders and valuers. Many stakeholders exist, for example lenders, borrowers and brokers, who are able to influence the process in various ways. The strongest evidence of overt influence in the process comes from the method of valuer selection with borrowers and brokers seen to be heavily involved. There is some also some evidence of influence during the draft valuation process. A significant minority of valuers feel that inappropriate pressure is applied by borrowers and brokers yet there is no apparent part of the process that leads to this. The panel system employed by lenders is found to be a significant part of the system and merits further examination. The pressure felt by valuers needs more investigation along with the question of if and how the process could dispel such feelings. This is seen as particularly important in the context of bank regulation.
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A significant part of bank lending in the UK is secured on commercial property and valuations play an important part in this process. They are an integral part of risk management within the banking sector. It is therefore important that valuations are independent and objective and are used properly to ensure that secured lending is soundly based from the perspective of both lender and borrower. The purpose of this research is to examine objectivity and transparency in the valuation process for bank lending and to identify any influences which may undermine the process. A detailed analysis of 31 valuation negligence cases has been followed by two focus groups of lenders and valuers and also questionnaire surveys of commercial lenders and valuers. Many stakeholders exist, for example lenders, borrowers and brokers, who are able to influence the process in various ways. The strongest evidence of overt influence in the process comes from the method of valuer selection with borrowers and brokers seen to be heavily involved. There is some also some evidence of influence during the draft valuation process. A significant minority of valuers feel that inappropriate pressure is applied by borrowers and brokers yet there is no apparent part of the process that leads to this. The panel system employed by lenders is found to be a significant part of the system and merits further examination. The pressure felt by valuers needs more investigation along with the question of if and how the process could dispel such feelings. This is seen as particularly important in the context of bank regulation.
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This article builds on advances in social ontology to develop a new understanding of how mainstream economic modelling affects reality. We propose a new framework for analysing and describing how models intervene in the social sphere. This framework allows us to identify and articulate three key epistemic features of models as interventions: specificity, portability and formal precision. The second part of the article uses our framework to demonstrate how specificity, portability and formal precision explain the use of moral hazard models in a variety of different policy contexts, including worker compensation schemes, bank regulation and the euro-sovereign debt crisis.
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Includes bibliography
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Pós-graduação em Engenharia de Produção - FEB
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This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking "stability inefficiency" derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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(Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analyse the main instruments for risk mitigation in infrastructure financing with Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs). Their review coincided with the global financial crisis of 2007-08, and is highly relevant in current times considering the sovereign debt crisis, the lack of available capital and the increases in bank regulation in Western economies. The current macroeconomic environment has seen a slowdown in the level of finance for infrastructure projects, as they pose a higher credit risk given their requirements for long term investments. The rationale for this work is to look for innovative solutions that are focused on the credit risk mitigation of infrastructure and energy projects whilst optimizing the economic capital allocation for commercial banks. This objective is achieved through risk-sharing with MFIs and looking for capital relief in project finance transactions. This research finds out the answer to the main question: "What is the impact of risk-sharing with MFIs on project finance transactions to increase their efficiency and viability?", and is developed from the perspective of a commercial bank assessing the economic capital used and analysing the relevant variables for it: Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). An overview of project finance for the infrastructure and energy sectors in terms of the volume of transactions worldwide is outlined, along with a summary of risk-sharing financing with MFIs. A review of the current regulatory framework beneath risk-sharing in structured finance with MFIs is also analysed. From here, the impact of risk-sharing and the diversification effect in infrastructure and energy projects is assessed, from the perspective of economic capital allocation for a commercial bank. CreditMetrics (J. P. Morgan, 1997) is applied over an existing well diversified portfolio of project finance infrastructure and energy investments, working with the main risk capital measures: economic capital, RAROC, and EVA. The conclusions of this research show that economic capital allocation on a portfolio of project finance along with risk-sharing with MFIs have a huge impact on capital relief whilst increasing performance profitability for commercial banks. There is an outstanding diversification effect due to the portfolio, which is combined with risk mitigation and an improvement in recovery rates through Partial Credit Guarantees issued by MFIs. A stress test scenario analysis is applied to the current assumptions and credit risk model, considering a downgrade in the rating for the commercial bank (lender) and an increase of default in emerging countries, presenting a direct impact on economic capital, through an increase in expected loss and a decrease in performance profitability. Getting capital relief through risk-sharing makes it more viable for commercial banks to finance infrastructure and energy projects, with the beneficial effect of a direct impact of these investments on GDP growth and employment. The main contribution of this work is to promote a strategic economic capital allocation in infrastructure and energy financing through innovative risk-sharing with MFIs and economic pricing to create economic value added for banks, and to allow the financing of more infrastructure and energy projects. This work suggests several topics for further research in relation to issues analysed. (Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analizan los principales instrumentos de mitigación de riesgos en las Instituciones Financieras Multilaterales (IFMs) para la financiación de infraestructuras. Su presentación coincidió con el inicio de la crisis financiera en Agosto de 2007, y sus consecuencias persisten en la actualidad, destacando la deuda soberana en economías desarrolladas y los problemas capitalización de los bancos. Este entorno macroeconómico ha ralentizado la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras. El actual trabajo de investigación tiene su motivación en la búsqueda de soluciones para la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, mitigando los riesgos inherentes, con el objeto de reducir el consumo de capital económico en los bancos financiadores. Este objetivo se alcanza compartiendo el riesgo de la financiación con IFMs, a través de estructuras de risk-sharing. La investigación responde la pregunta: "Cuál es el impacto de risk-sharing con IFMs, en la financiación de proyectos para aumentar su eficiencia y viabilidad?". El trabajo se desarrolla desde el enfoque de un banco comercial, estimando el consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos y analizando las principales variables del riesgo de crédito, Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). La investigación presenta las cifras globales de Project Finance en los sectores de infraestructuras y de energía, y analiza el marco regulatorio internacional en relación al consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos en los que participan IFMs. A continuación, el trabajo modeliza una cartera real, bien diversificada, de Project Finance de infraestructuras y de energía, aplicando la metodología CreditMet- rics (J. P. Morgan, 1997). Su objeto es estimar el consumo de capital económico y la rentabilidad de la cartera de proyectos a través del RAROC y EVA. La modelización permite estimar el efecto diversificación y la liberación de capital económico consecuencia del risk-sharing. Los resultados muestran el enorme impacto del efecto diversificación de la cartera, así como de las garantías parciales de las IFMs que mitigan riesgos, mejoran el recovery rate de los proyectos y reducen el consumo de capital económico para el banco comercial, mientras aumentan la rentabilidad, RAROC, y crean valor económico, EVA. En escenarios económicos de inestabilidad, empeoramiento del rating de los bancos, aumentos de default en los proyectos y de correlación en las carteras, hay un impacto directo en el capital económico y en la pérdida de rentabilidad. La liberación de capital económico, como se plantea en la presente investigación, permitirá financiar más proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, lo que repercutirá en un mayor crecimiento económico y creación de empleo. La principal contribución de este trabajo es promover la gestión activa del capital económico en la financiación de infraestructuras y de proyectos energéticos, a través de estructuras innovadoras de risk-sharing con IFMs y de creación de valor económico en los bancos comerciales, lo que mejoraría su eficiencia y capitalización. La aportación metodológica del trabajo se convierte por su originalidad en una contribución, que sugiere y facilita nuevas líneas de investigación académica en las principales variables del riesgo de crédito que afectan al capital económico en la financiación de proyectos.