[Kraus collection of art auction catalogs.

Miscellaneous catalogs of exhibitions held mostly in Paris and issued by various publishers, from the H. P. Kraus collection.

Catalogue raisonné d'objets d'arts du cabinet de feu M. de Silvestre, ci-devant chevalier de l'ordre de saint-Michel et maitre a dessiner des enfans de France / ǂc par F.L. Regnault-Delalande.

Includes index.

Objectos d'artee mobiliario antigo : Palacio Foz.

Lugt,

Catalogue of the choice, curious, and extensive library of the late George Nassau /

First part auctioned "on Monday, February 16, and eleven following days, (Sunday excepted)"; second part auctioned "on Monday, March 8, and seven following days, (Sunday excepted)."

Catalogue of ancient and modern pictures, the property of a gentleman : and an assemblage of pictures of the Dutch, Italian and early English schools, from numerous private collections and different sources.

No price list.

Les ventes de tableaux, dessins, estampes et objets d'art aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (1611-1800) : essai de bibliographie /

Includes index.

[Auction catalogues]

Mode of access: Internet.

First editions of English and American authors, standard sets in fine bindings, limited editions, illustrated books, Americana, voyages and travel, a fine collection of books on art and architecture ... Property of the Southern California Group of the Antiquarian Booksellers' Association of America, to be sold at unrestricted public auction September 29, 1949 ...

295 items.

Catalogue of the valuable collection of Sanskrit manuscripts of Sir Robert Chambers which will be sold by auction, unless previously disposed of by private contract on or before the first of March 1842, by S. Leigh Sotheby on Apr. 13, 1842 and three following days.

Mode of access: Internet.

An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm chooses to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions. The value of the factory may differ among jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdictions compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infrastructure, commitments to spend on infrastructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that the expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements is the same. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that is, the mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.

Auction price anomalies: Evidence from wool auctions in Australia

Using detailed Australian wool auction data we test for further evidence of pricing anomalies at sequential auctions. We find that an anomaly frequently exists and order is frequently endogenously determined. Moreover, prices increase through some sales and decrease through others. We examine whether it is possible to explain the variation in the anomaly across sales and conclude that there is no systematic relationship between the direction of the price anomaly and the characteristics of the wool or the auction. We do, however, find evidence that an anomaly, is more likely in longer sales.

Auction of financial transmission rights in electricity market environment

An auction model is used to increase the individual profits for market players with products they do not use. A Financial Transmission Rights Auction has the goal of trade transmission rights between Bidders and helps them raise their own profits. The ISO plays a major rule on keep the system in technical limits without interfere on the auctions offers. In some auction models the ISO decide want bids are implemented on the network, always with the objective maximize the individual profits for all bidders in the auction. This paper proposes a methodology for a Financial Transmission Rights Auction and an informatics application. The application receives offers from the purchase and sale side and considers bilateral contracts as Base Case. This goal is maximize the individual profits within the system in their technical limits. The paper includes a case study for the 30 bus IEEE test case.

Distributed Model Predictive Control for Housing with Hourly Auction of Available Energy

This paper presents a distributed model predictive control (DMPC) for indoor thermal comfort that simultaneously optimizes the consumption of a limited shared energy resource. The control objective of each subsystem is to minimize the heating/cooling energy cost while maintaining the indoor temperature and used power inside bounds. In a distributed coordinated environment, the control uses multiple dynamically decoupled agents (one for each subsystem/house) aiming to achieve satisfaction of coupling constraints. According to the hourly power demand profile, each house assigns a priority level that indicates how much is willing to bid in auction for consume the limited clean resource. This procedure allows the bidding value vary hourly and consequently, the agents order to access to the clean energy also varies. Despite of power constraints, all houses have also thermal comfort constraints that must be fulfilled. The system is simulated with several houses in a distributed environment.

Distributed MPC for Thermal Comfort and Load Allocation with Energy Auction

This paper presents a distributed predictive control methodology for indoor thermal comfort that optimizes the consumption of a limited shared energy resource using an integrated demand-side management approach that involves a power price auction and an appliance loads allocation scheme. The control objective for each subsystem (house or building) aims to minimize the energy cost while maintaining the indoor temperature inside comfort limits. In a distributed coordinated multi-agent ecosystem, each house or building control agent achieves its objectives while sharing, among them, the available energy through the introduction of particular coupling constraints in their underlying optimization problem. Coordination is maintained by a daily green energy auction bring in a demand-side management approach. Also the implemented distributed MPC algorithm is described and validated with simulation studies.

Reverse Auction: A Potential Strategy for Reduction of Pharmacological Therapy Cost

Background:Polypharmacy is a significant economic burden.Objective:We tested whether using reverse auction (RA) as compared with commercial pharmacy (CP) to purchase medicine results in lower pharmaceutical costs for heart failure (HF) and heart transplantation (HT) outpatients.Methods:We compared the costs via RA versus CP in 808 HF and 147 HT patients followed from 2009 through 2011, and evaluated the influence of clinical and demographic variables on cost.Results:The monthly cost per patient for HF drugs acquired via RA was $10.15 (IQ 3.51-40.22) versus $161.76 (IQ 86.05‑340.15) via CP; for HT, those costs were $393.08 (IQ 124.74-774.76) and $1,207.70 (IQ 604.48-2,499.97), respectively.Conclusion:RA may reduce the cost of prescription drugs for HF and HT, potentially making HF treatment more accessible. Clinical characteristics can influence the cost and benefits of RA. RA may be a new health policy strategy to reduce costs of prescribed medications for HF and HT patients, reducing the economic burden of treatment.