What affective neuroscience means for science of consciousness

The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious processing in cognitive neurosciences, which is based on the identification of brain circuits responsible for the processing of (cognitive) representations. Within cognitive neurosciences, the frontal lobes are assigned the role of coordinators in maintaining affective states and their emotional expressions under cognitive control. An intermediary view is the Damasio-Bechara Somatic Marker model, which puts cognition under partial somatic-affective control. We present here our efforts to make a synthesis of these views, by proposing the existence of two interacting brain circuits; the first one in charge of cognitive processes and the second mediating feelings about cognitive contents. The coupling of the two circuits promotes an endogenous feedback that supports conscious processes. Within this framework, we present the defence that detailed study of both affective and cognitive processes, their interactions, as well of their respective brain networks, is necessary for a science of consciousness.© MSM 2013.

A blueprint for affective computing: A sourcebook

A Blueprint for Affective Computing: A sourcebook and manual is the very first attempt to ground affective computing within the disciplines of psychology, affective neuroscience, and philosophy. This book illustrates the contributions of each of these disciplines to the development of the ever-growing field of affective computing. In addition, it demonstrates practical examples of cross-fertilization between disciplines in order to highlight the need for integration of computer science, engineering and the affective sciences.

Cognitive influences on the affective representation of touch and the sight of touch in the human brain

We show that the affective experience of touch and the sight of touch can be modulated by cognition, and investigate in an fMRI study where top-down cognitive modulations of bottom-up somatosensory and visual processing of touch and its affective value occur in the human brain. The cognitive modulation was produced by word labels, 'Rich moisturizing cream' or 'Basic cream', while cream was being applied to the forearm, or was seen being applied to a forearm. The subjective pleasantness and richness were modulated by the word labels, as were the fMRI activations to touch in parietal cortex area 7, the insula and ventral striatum. The cognitive labels influenced the activations to the sight of touch and also the correlations with pleasantness in the pregenual cingulate/orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum. Further evidence of how the orbitofrontal cortex is involved in affective aspects of touch was that touch to the forearm [which has C fiber Touch (CT) afferents sensitive to light touch] compared with touch to the glabrous skin of the hand (which does not) revealed activation in the mid-orbitofrontal cortex. This is of interest as previous studies have suggested that the CT system is important in affiliative caress-like touch between individuals.

Distinct contributions of Brodmann areas 1 and 2 to body ownership.

Although body ownership-i.e. the feeling that our bodies belong to us-modulates activity within the primary somatosensory cortex (S1), it is still unknown whether this modulation occurs within a somatotopically defined portion of S1. We induced an illusory feeling of ownership for another person's finger by asking participants to hold their palm against another person's palm and to stroke the two joined index fingers with the index and thumb of their other hand. This illusion (numbness illusion) does not occur if the stroking is performed asynchronously or by the other person. We combined this somatosensory paradigm with ultra-high field functional magnetic resonance imaging finger mapping to study whether illusory body ownership modulates activity within different finger-specific areas of S1. The results revealed that the numbness illusion is associated with activity in Brodmann area (BA) 1 within the representation of the finger stroking the other person's finger and in BA 2 contralateral to the stroked finger. These results show that changes in bodily experience modulate the activity within certain subregions of S1, with a different finger-topographical selectivity between the representations of the stroking and of the stroked hand, and reveal that the high degree of somatosensory specialization in S1 extends to bodily self-consciousness.

Aging is associated with positive responding to neutral information but reduced recovery from negative information

Studies on aging and emotion suggest an increase in reported positive affect, a processing bias of positive over negative information, as well as increasingly adaptive regulation in response to negative events with advancing age. These findings imply that older individuals evaluate information differently, resulting in lowered reactivity to, and/or faster recovery from, negative information, while maintaining more positive responding to positive information. We examined this hypothesis in an ongoing study on Midlife in the US (MIDUS II) where emotional reactivity and recovery were assessed in a large number of respondents (N = 159) from a wide age range (36–84 years). We recorded eye-blink startle magnitudes and corrugator activity during and after the presentation of positive, neutral and negative pictures. The most robust age effect was found in response to neutral stimuli, where increasing age is associated with a decreased corrugator and eyeblink startle response to neutral stimuli. These data suggest that an age-related positivity effect does not essentially alter the response to emotion-laden information, but is reflected in a more positive interpretation of affectively ambiguous information. Furthermore, older women showed reduced corrugator recovery from negative pictures relative to the younger women and men, suggesting that an age-related prioritization of well-being is not necessarily reflected in adaptive regulation of negative affect.

Temporal dynamics of emotional responding: amygdala recovery predicts emotional traits

An individual’s affective style is influenced by many things, including the manner in which an individual responds to an emotional challenge. Emotional response is composed of a number of factors, two of which are the initial reactivity to an emotional stimulus and the subsequent recovery once the stimulus terminates or ceases to be relevant. However, most neuroimaging studies examining emotional processing in humans focus on the magnitude of initial reactivity to a stimulus rather than the prolonged response. In this study, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging to study the time course of amygdala activity in healthy adults in response to presentation of negative images. We split the amygdala time course into an initial reactivity period and a recovery period beginning after the offset of the stimulus. We find that initial reactivity in the amygdala does not predict trait measures of affective style. Conversely, amygdala recovery shows predictive power such that slower amygdala recovery from negative images predicts greater trait neuroticism, in addition to lower levels of likability of a set of social stimuli (neutral faces). These data underscore the importance of taking into account temporal dynamics when studying affective processing using neuroimaging.

Sex differences in reward-related decision processing under stress

Recent research indicates gender differences in the impact of stress on decision behavior, but little is known about the brain mechanisms involved in these gender-specific stress effects. The current study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine whether induced stress resulted in gender-specific patterns of brain activation during a decision task involving monetary reward. Specifically, we manipulated physiological stress levels using a cold pressor task, prior to a risky decision making task. Healthy men (n = 24, 12 stressed) and women (n = 23, 11 stressed) completed the decision task after either cold pressor stress or a control task during the period of cortisol response to the cold pressor. Gender differences in behavior were present in stressed participants but not controls, such that stress led to greater reward collection and faster decision speed in males but less reward collection and slower decision speed in females. A gender-by-stress interaction was observed for the dorsal striatum and anterior insula. With cold stress, activation in these regions was increased in males but decreased in females. The findings of this study indicate that the impact of stress on reward-related decision processing differs depending on gender.

Autistic traits modulate frontostriatal connectivity during processing of rewarding faces

Deficits in facial mimicry have been widely reported in autism. Some studies have suggested that these deficits are restricted to spontaneous mimicry and do not extend to volitional mimicry. We bridge these apparently inconsistent observations, by testing the impact of reward value on neural indices of mimicry, and how autistic traits modulate this impact. Neutral faces were conditioned with high and low reward. Subsequently, functional connectivity between the ventral striatum (VS) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) was measured whilst neurotypical adults (n = 30) watched happy expressions made by these conditioned faces. We found greater VS-IFG connectivity in response to high-reward vs. low-reward happy faces. This difference was negatively proportional to autistic traits, suggesting that reduced spontaneous mimicry of social stimuli seen in autism, maybe related to a failure in the modulation of the mirror system by the reward system rather than a circumscribed deficit in the mirror system.

Emotional arousal amplifies the effects of biased competition in the brain

The arousal-biased competition model predicts that arousal increases the gain on neural competition between stimuli representations. Thus, the model predicts that arousal simultaneously enhances processing of salient stimuli and impairs processing of relatively less-salient stimuli. We tested this model with a simple dot-probe task. On each trial, participants were simultaneously exposed to one face image as a salient cue stimulus and one place image as a non-salient stimulus. A border around the face cue location further increased its bottom-up saliency. Before these visual stimuli were shown, one of two tones played: one that predicted a shock (increasing arousal) or one that did not. An arousal-by-saliency interaction in category-specific brain regions (fusiform face area for salient faces and parahippocampal place area for non-salient places) indicated that brain activation associated with processing the salient stimulus was enhanced under arousal whereas activation associated with processing the non-salient stimulus was suppressed under arousal. This is the first functional magnetic resonance imaging study to demonstrate that arousal can enhance information processing for prioritized stimuli while simultaneously impairing processing of non-prioritized stimuli. Thus, it goes beyond previous research to show that arousal does not uniformly enhance perceptual processing, but instead does so selectively in ways that optimizes attention to highly salient stimuli.

Deficit in the Emotional Embodiment in Alexithymia

Alexithymia refers to difficulties in recognizing one’s own emotions and others emotions. Theories of emotional embodiment suggest that, in order to understand other peoples’ feelings, observers re-experience, or simulate, the relevant component (i.e. somatic, motor, visceral) of emotion’s expressed by others in one’s self. In this way, the emotions are “embodied”. Critically, to date, there are no studies investigating the ability of alexithymic individuals in embodying the emotions conveyed by faces. In the present dissertation different implicit paradigms and techniques falling within the field of affective neuroscience have been employed in order to test a possible deficit in the embodiment of emotions in alexithymia while subjects were requested to observe faces manifesting different expression: fear, disgust, happiness and neutral. The level of the perceptual encoding of emotional faces and the embodiment of emotions in the somato-sensory and sensory-motor system have been investigated. Moreover, non-communicative motor reaction to emotional stimuli (i.e. visceral reactions) and interoceptive abilities of alexithymic subjects have been explored. The present dissertation provided convergent evidences in support of a deficit in the processing of fearful expression in subjects with high alexithymic personality traits. Indeed, the pattern of fear induced changes in the perceptual encoding, in the somato-sensory and in the somato-motor system (both the communicative and non communicative one) is widely and consistently altered in alexithymia. This support the hypothesis of a diminished responses to fearful stimuli in alexithymia. In addition, the overall results on happiness and disgust, although preliminary, provided interesting results. Indeed, the results on happiness revealed a defective perceptual encoding, coupled with a slight difficulty (i.e. delayed responses) at the level of the communicative somato-motor system, and the emotion of disgust has been found to be abnormally embodied at the level of the somato-sensory system.

"Fact versus Fiction – How paratextual information shapes our reading processes"

Our life is full of stories: some of them depict real-life events and were reported, e.g. in the daily news or in autobiographies, whereas other stories, as often presented to us in movies and novels, are fictional. However, we have only little insights in the neurocognitive processes underlying the reading of factual as compared to fictional contents. We investigated the neurocognitive effects of reading short narratives, labeled to be either factual or fictional. Reading in a factual mode engaged an activation pattern suggesting an action-based reconstruction of the events depicted in a story. This process seems to be past-oriented and leads to shorter reaction times at the behavioral level. In contrast, the brain activation patterns corresponding to reading fiction seem to reflect a constructive simulation of what might have happened. This is in line with studies on imagination of possible past or future events.