Aphomoioo : existir entre o processo e a obra

Coming from the need to express an image – aphomoioo – is more than a dissertation trying to prove its argument. It is the result of an experimentation born from within an anguish felt through an image. An uncontrollable desire that transforms my need into an answer to my craft. Through a discursive organization of speech enmeshed by psychoanalytic, biological, philosophical and linguistic concepts, we are allowed to discover that existing is more than agreeing on a target with an end but, as the relationship that it is, it does not define us as beings, but as an active/interactive limit. And this identity which puts us face to face with the reality - constructed and constructive - seeking to describe the similarity of the existence of things, the images. These beings from the reality that sends us to the symbolic place of our existence, the mundanity. A restlessness that is embedded into every action of knowing that, through language, establishes as true everything which silences the symbolic through a rule of conduct - the principle of reason - a formal rule of all knowledge that establishes the contemplative way for all knowledge originally set up as one signification event. The nature of our organization as living beings, our structural coupling, is what enables us to conclude that all formalities established as knowledge are born into a delirium that is expressed in the conformity of an answer. That being the end of an aphomoioo. The purpose of a "doing" that expresses itself into an image that is projected into a representation. A "doing" made after an image through an ergo genesis – the "artwork" – an answer to my making that expresses the image of my separation from myself as an image of ego established in a represented projection of my hallucinatory image

Aristotelian predicables, universality and realism: the logic of comparison in topics as denying the view that Aristotle was a realist

Aristotle is reportedly held to have been a Moderate Realist in that he would maintain that a concept derives from an act of grasping a mind-independent universal object that exists somehow inside of the many different things which the concept is predicated of. As far as a universal is independent of mind, it would stand for the proper object of a concept that subsumes a given number of things as its own instantiations. But we claim that Aristotle rejected such a view and instead did perceive and comprehend universality as a feature of thought rather than as a feature of reality in its own right. As showed in the chapters of Topics regarding the so-called logic of comparison (with the support of Albert the Great’s commentary), each predicate can be more or less consistent with the attribute of the subject of which it may be predicated. Both essential and accidental attributes assume a definite degree of being related to the degree of belonging to substance. Unlike particular things, the universality of a concept is to be understood always in comparison with another concept according to a hierarchy of predicates in terms of universality degree arranged by comparative terms such as ‘more’, ‘less’, and ‘likewise’. What is really mind-independent are the truth conditions which make a universal true when exclusively referring to a set of things identically meant by the same predicate whose universality is given by the place occupied in the hierarchy of predicates.