A proposta (i)modesta de Berkeley. Um mundo sem matéria

Berkeley’s general tenet about immaterialism is presented and discussed. I examined apart the several theses that concur to the immaterialist theory. After that, the general argument is presented and discussed. In particular, I stress Berkeley’s assumption that a world without matter and a world with matter would be indistinguishable from the point of view of (i) the content of perceptions, (ii) natural science (viz. Newtonian mechanics). I stress that this assumption depends on a relative account of circular motion, generating the centrifugal forces, as Newton shows in his bucket experiment. In spite of the efforts by Leibniz and Huygens, such a relative account of rotational motion was never presented. So the thesis about the scientific and perceptual identity between worlds with and without matter remains a simple case of wishful thinking in need for a justification.