Aristotelian predicables, universality and realism: the logic of comparison in topics as denying the view that Aristotle was a realist

Aristotle is reportedly held to have been a Moderate Realist in that he would maintain that a concept derives from an act of grasping a mind-independent universal object that exists somehow inside of the many different things which the concept is predicated of. As far as a universal is independent of mind, it would stand for the proper object of a concept that subsumes a given number of things as its own instantiations. But we claim that Aristotle rejected such a view and instead did perceive and comprehend universality as a feature of thought rather than as a feature of reality in its own right. As showed in the chapters of Topics regarding the so-called logic of comparison (with the support of Albert the Great’s commentary), each predicate can be more or less consistent with the attribute of the subject of which it may be predicated. Both essential and accidental attributes assume a definite degree of being related to the degree of belonging to substance. Unlike particular things, the universality of a concept is to be understood always in comparison with another concept according to a hierarchy of predicates in terms of universality degree arranged by comparative terms such as ‘more’, ‘less’, and ‘likewise’. What is really mind-independent are the truth conditions which make a universal true when exclusively referring to a set of things identically meant by the same predicate whose universality is given by the place occupied in the hierarchy of predicates.

El uso aristotélico de variables en lógica y sus supuestos ontológicos

A logical reading on Aristotle’s Organon discovers some inconsistencies in the text which have to be solved by reducing them to metaphysical decisions of the author, if they are not just identified as deficiencies in the exposition that should be corrected. The present article tries to display a line of reading paying attention to those so-called inconsistencies, in an attempt to understand them as specific steps in Aristotle’s research. In order to this goal it focuses on the exposition procedure of the Aristotelian figures: the use of variables, whose introduction by Aristotle has been celebrated all over logical tradition. An analysis of the distinctive and internal features in this procedure will allow us to link Aristotle’s logos research and the “being qua being” investigation, and to determine also –though in a negative way– the connection between this reading and the logical-traditional one on Aristotle’s Organon.