The Effects of Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions on EU-Russian Trade Flows. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2016

After Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014 and then intervened, manu militari, in the Eastern part of Ukraine, the European Union wanted to show its disapproval and put pressure on Russia to change its behaviour. A wide variety of measures were taken, including the imposition of individual restrictions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, but also the suspension of development loans from the EBRD. But the EU (together with the United States) also took, in July and September 2014, a set of broader measures: limited access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for targeted Russian financial institutions and energy and defence companies; export and import bans on trade in arms; an export ban for dual-use goods and reduction of Russia’s access to sensitive technologies and services linked to oil production.

Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. CEPS Working Document No. 400, September 2014

While EU and US sanctions against Russia over its aggression in Ukraine, and Russia’s counter-sanctions, are much discussed due to their evident political significance, less attention has been given to Russia’s punitive sanctions against the three Eastern European states – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – that have signed with the EU Association Agreements (AA), which include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) provisions. This paper therefore documents these trade policy restrictions and embargoes imposed by Russia, and provides some first indications of their impact. The immediate impact on trade flows, especially for agri-food products, has been substantial, albeit with some leakage through Belarus. The main instrument for the Russian measures has been allegations of non-conformity with Russian technical standards, although the correlation of these allegations with movements in Russia’s geopolitical postures makes it obvious that the Russian technical agencies are following political guidelines dressed up as scientific evidence. These measures also push the three states into diversifying their trade marketing efforts in favour of the EU and other world markets, with Georgia already having taken significant steps in this direction, since in its case the Russian sanctions date back to 2006. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s threat to cancel CIS free trade preferences infiltrated trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia, leading on 12 September to their proposed postponement until the end of 2015 of the ‘provisional’ implementation of a large part of the AA/DCFTA. This was immediately followed on 16 September by ratification of the AA/DCFTA by both the Rada in Kyiv and the European Parliament, which will lead to its full and definitive entry into force when the 28 EU member states have also ratified it. However Putin followed the day after with a letter to Poroshenko making an abusive interpretation of the 12 September understanding.

RED vs. REDD: Biofuel Policy vs. Forest Conservation. Factor Markets Working Document No. 41, May 2013

This paper assesses the complex interplay between global Renewable Energy Directives (RED) and the United Nations programme to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD). We examine the interaction of the two policies using a scenario approach with a recursive-dynamic global Computable General Equilibrium model. The consequences of a global biofuel directive on worldwide land use, agricultural production, international trade flows, food prices and food security out to 2030 are evaluated with and without a strict global REDD policy. We address a key methodological challenge of how to model the supply of land in the face of restrictions over its availability, as arises under the REDD policy. The paper introduces a flexible land supply function, which allows for large changes in the total potential land availability for agriculture. Our results show that whilst both RED and REDD are designed to reduce emissions, they have opposing impacts on land use. RED policies are found to extend land use whereas the REDD policy leads to an overall reduction in land use and intensification of agriculture. Strict REDD policies to protect forest and woodland lead to higher land prices in all regions. World food prices are slightly higher overall with some significant regional increases, notably in Southern Africa and Indonesia, leading to reductions in food security in these countries. This said, real food prices in 2030 are still lower than the 2010 level, even with the RED and REDD policies in place. Overall this suggests that RED and REDD are feasible from a worldwide perspective, although the results show that there are some regional problems that need to be resolved. The results show that countries directly affected by forest and woodland protection would be the most economically vulnerable when the REDD policy is implemented. The introduction of REDD policies reduces global trade in agricultural products and moves some developing countries to a net importing position for agricultural products. This suggests that the protection of forests and woodlands in these regions reverses their comparative advantage as they move from being land-abundant to land-scarce regions. The full REDD policy setting, however, foresees providing compensation to these countries to cover their economic losses.