Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009. Second edition, revised

Introduction. The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated. Over the course of last year, two new factors strongly affected Gazprom’s capability to operate on the EU market. One was the ongoing global economic crisis, which has depressed demand for gas both in Russia and in Europe. Gazprom has cut both its own production and the quantities of gas it purchases from the Central Asian states, and the decrease in export revenues has forced the company to modify some of its current investment plans. Less demand for gas and the need to reduce production are also having a positive impact – the Russian company is likely to avoid the difficulties in meeting all of its export commitments which, only a year or so ago, it was expected to experience. The other factor affecting Gazprom’s expansion in Europe is the observed radicalisation of the rhetoric and actions of both the company itself and of the Russian authorities with regard to the gas sector as broadly understood. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, which resulted in a two-week interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, was the most prominent example of this radicalisation. The hardening of rhetoric in the ongoing energy talks with the EU and other actors, and increased political and business activities designed to promote Russian gas interests in Europe, in particular the lobbying for the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, are further signs of this shift in tone. These issues raise the question of whether, and to what extent, the current condition of Gazprom’s finance will permit the company to implement the infrastructural projects it has been endorsing and its other investment plans in Europe. Another important question is whether the currently observed changes in how Gazprom operates will take on a more permanent character, and what consequences this will have for the European Union. The first part of this report discusses Gazprom’s production and export potential. The second comprehensively presents the scope and nature of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. Finally, the third part presents the Russian company’s methods of operation on foreign markets. The data presented in the report come mainly from the statistics of the International Energy Agency, the European Commission and Gazprom, as well as the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Statistical Office. The figures presented here also include proprietary calculations by the OSW based on figures disclosed by energy companies and reports by professional press and news agencies.

Lisbon Treaty: Year I

The completion of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (from now on the Treaty) in November and its entry into force on 1 December 2009 marked the end of an extraordinary and unprecedented lengthy process of institutional change of the European Union. The Treaty had been signed on 13 December 2007, almost two years before its entry into force, by no means an excessive duration compared to the ratification of previous modifications of the Treaties. But the Treaty – in strictly legal terms a substantial set of amendments to two previous treaties renamed in the process – has a long history. Initial proposals for institutional reform date back to the German reunification in 1989-1990. They went through lengthy debates that eventually led to the European Convention and the 'Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe' of 20031 and from there to the 'Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe' of 20042. If the current form of the Treaty is a clear consequence of the difficulties of the ratification process of the Constitution, the ideas that provide the substance can be traced back to the final years of the past century. The pages that follow are not a legal analysis but an attempt to identify changes and to assess their significance3.

Rok Putina. Obwod kaliningradzki w kontekscie rozszerzenia Unii Europejskiej. Prace OSW 2/2001. = Putin's Year. The Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of EU enlargement. OSW Study 2/2001

Last year Kaliningrad became the subject of an international debate involving first of all the European Union, Russia, the USA, and the countries bordering the enclave, Poland and Lithuania. Such keen interest in a small region of less than a million inhabitants was mainly due to the fact that Kaliningrad has found itself in the very centre of two processes which are of paramount importance for Europe: EU and NATO enlargement. If Lithuania becomes a member of those units and Poland joins the EU, this Russian enclave will become an island surrounded on all land borders by a totally different, political, economic and military entity. In the course of the debate many questions were raised about the situation in the Oblast and how it affects neighbouring countries, the real interests and intentions of the parties involved in the debate, and the future of the region. The authors of this publication are attempting to answer these questions. The first part of this analysis is devoted to presenting the most important internal problems of the enclave, considering their influence on the surrounding world and the consequences of adopting the acquis communautaire in Poland and Lithuania. The second part characterises Moscow's policies towards Kaliningrad on the one hand, and those of Western countries on the other. Finally, the authors discuss the probable ways in which the situation in the enclave will develop.

One year of Ukraine’s De-communisation. A change in the historical narrative. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 211/16.05.2016

A year ago, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted four bills on the policy of national memory: on granting access to the archives of the repressive organs of the Communist totalitarian regime in the years 1917–1991, on the legal status and commemoration of Ukrainian independence fighters in the twentieth century, on the immortalisation of the victory over Nazism in the Second World War, 1939–1945, and on the condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and the forbidding of their symbolism from being promoted. The laws came into force on 21 May 2015. After a year, it can be stated that only the latter two are being observed – the official narrative regarding World War II has been changed, mainly due to the activity of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR), but also as a result of public statements by President Petro Poroshenko. The process of removing from public places the names and commemorations referring to the Soviet era is underway, and the fears that this may trigger serious conflicts have not proved true. From roughly a thousand placenames subject to de-communisation some two thirds have been changed so far (parliamentary bills regarding the remaining ones are awaiting approval) and most statues of Communist leaders have been removed. However, the law concerning independence fighters, which raised the most serious controversies, did not have any practical consequences. Moreover, nothing suggests that this could change. The implementation of the de-communisation laws is associated with a significant change in Ukrainian patriotic narrative: it is no longer focused on national martyrdom and it is beginning to emphasize heroic motives, which is in line with wartime needs. The fact that some of these motives are likely to trigger problems in Ukraine’s relations with Poland seems to be viewed as a marginal ‘by-product’.