35 resultados para turn-taking
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
Despite broad agreement among central bankers, policy-makers and economists that creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress in building this union has been painfully slow. This is largely due to the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of bad loans made in the past. Taking a cue from Copernicus, Thomas Mayer suggests in this new CEPS Policy Brief that the impasse may be broken by turning the whole process on its head. So, instead of trying to move from common bank supervision, over to bank resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he proposes reversing the process by starting with deposit insurance, moving from there to resolution and ending with supervision.
Resumo:
Despite apparent consensus that the creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress is painfully slow. The Single Supervisory Mechanism may not be ready before the middle of next year, the Single Resolution Mechanism may require a laborious change of the EU Treaty and common deposit insurance has been postponed into the indefinite future. Any real progress has been prevented by the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of past bad loans. In this Policy Brief, Thomas Mayer suggests that a radically new approach is needed if there is any prospect of moving beyond this impasse to reach full Banking Union. Instead of trying to move from common bank supervision over to resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he argues that policy-makers should go backwards and start with deposit insurance, move from there to resolution, and end with supervision.
Resumo:
Drawing on his direct participation in the latest round of climate talks in Warsaw, Andrei Marcu looks at the results of the 19th COP through the lens of three basic questions, with a view to understanding how much progress was made and where we stand two years ahead of Paris. Are the targets adequate and how do we reach environmentally adequate targets? Can one understand and compare what other Parties are promising to do to ensure that the level of effort is comparable and equitable, and that companies are not asked to do more than their competitors in other jurisdictions? Is there comparability and equity in the eyes of the beholder? Do we understand what tools each country uses (what is available, what one gets as support) to ensure that no one country (and its companies) gets an easier ride or competitive advantage in meeting the commitment/promises that countries make. The author asserts that these questions need to be answered if an agreement is to be reached in 2015. And if they are not, he warns of mistrust, fear of carbon leakage and the temptation to resort to protectionist measures to compensate for competitive disadvantage.
Resumo:
The world economy is going through its biggest transformation in a relatively short space time. There have been many explanations for this phenomenon but the unprecedented scale and pace of this change and, most crucially, its implications, still seems little understood. In turn, there has been little preparation for, or adjustment to, this changing world, though if the change continues at this pace, the effectiveness of many global institutions in their current form will be threatened. We highlight the dramatic degree of the shifts taking place in world GDP and trade and include fresh projections of what world trade patterns might look like in 2020, should the trends observed over the past decade to continue. We also show the resulting shift in trade relationships for many key countries. European member states tend to have quite different trading partners’ profiles, and this heterogeneity is quite likely to become more pronounced with time. This, in turn, suggests a significant challenge for the effective functioning of the euro area and weakens the original rationale of its creation. If our projections to 2020 are broadly right, then many established frameworks for the running of the world economy and its governance are not going to be fit for purpose, and will need to change. The global monetary system itself, and global organisations such as the IMF, G7, and G20 are going to have to adapt considerably if they want to remain legitimate representatives of the world order. The alternative is their relegation to irrelevance.