60 resultados para the eastern range of Hengduan Mountain
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).
Resumo:
In the first year and a half of its existence, the EEAS and its head have become the target of extensive criticism for the shortcomings of EU foreign policy; shortcomings that in fact date back to the creation of the European Union. The EU’s diplomatic service has been blamed variously for ‘lacking clarity,’ ‘acting too slowly’ and ‘being unable to bridge the institutional divide’. In this Commentary author Hrant Kostanyan argues that the EEAS’ discretionary power in the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework is restricted by the decision-making procedures between a wide range of stakeholders: the member states and the partner countries, as well as by the EU institutions, international organisations and the Civil Society Forum. Since this decision-making process places a substantial number of brakes on the discretionary power of the EEAS, any responsible analysis or critique of the service should take these constraints into consideration. Ultimately, the EEAS is only able to craft EU foreign policy insofar as it is allowed to do so.
Resumo:
In assessing the third Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit at Vilnius on November 28-29th, this CEPS Commentary concludes that the event fell far short of its initial ambition to define the geopolitical finalité of EU-EaP relations by projecting a path towards future accession to the EU for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Resumo:
Established in 2009, during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Prague, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum supports the development of civil society organisations from the EU-28 and the six Partnership countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. After four years of operation, the Secretariat of the Forum’s Steering Committee commissioned CEPS to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of its programme. This report singles out the institutionalisation and socialisation inculcated among its members as the Forum’s greatest accomplishment. In contrast to its internal developments, it argues that the external policy successes of the Forum remain modest. This report is the first attempt to conduct an in-depth assessment of the Forum's Annual Assembly, the Steering Committee and its Secretariat, the Working Groups and National Platforms. Ten actionable recommendations are put forward aimed at improving the Civil Society Forum’s standing and performance.