Unity stronger than divisions. Ukraine's internal diversity. OSW Point of View Number 40, March 2014

Ukraine is deeply divided internally, although as a result of the changes that have taken place since its independence, the country’s internal divisions now have less and less to do with territorial divides, and the split into historical ‘sub-Ukraines’ has become less pronounced, especially for the younger generation. Ukraine is not a country of two competing regional identities, one in the west, the other in the east. The western identity, in which the unity of Ukraine is a key value, coexists with the multiple and diverse local patriotisms of the different regions in the east and the south of the country. The present protest movement has consolidated the country’s sense of unity. Its opponents have also been championing the indivisibility of Ukraine, even while they demanded a thorough decentralisation of the country, which was often mistaken for separatism. Russia has been stirring up separatist tendencies in Ukraine, but with little success. Crimea is an exception here, because in most respects it has remained unaffected by the dynamics of the social processes transforming mainland Ukraine – separatist tendencies are indeed deeply rooted in the peninsula.

Chasing globalisation: Germany's economic relations with the BRIC countries. OSW Report, November 2013

The Eurozone crisis has forced German exporters to speed up their expansion onto the emerging markets, in particular Brazil, Russia, India and China. The development observed in those countries has become an important substitute for the consequences of the economic slowdown in Europe.To illustrate the scale of cooperation between Germany and the BRIC countries, it is enough to quote figures concerning Germany’s trade. Between 2000-2011 the share of trade with the BRIC states in the entire German trade exchange rose from 5.5% to 13.3%. In the same period opposite tendencies were observed in the figures relating to trade with the USA, whose share in German trade fell from 9.6% to 6.2%. The report discusses the major tendencies present in Germany’s cooperation with the BRIC countries, and examines how the German state supports German companies in their business activities on these markets. The main method used to investigate these processes is the economic analysis of trade and capital flows between Germany and the BRIC countries, supplemented by conclusions drawn from discussions with German experts. The main issue discussed in the text is the role of the state in stimulating the expansion of German companies onto the BRIC markets. In the context of these activities, political relations and the proper use of export and investment guarantees and development aid are of major importance.

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

Svodboda party - the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing scene. OSW Commentary No. 56, 2011-07-04

Even though the national-level political scene in Ukraine is dominated by the Party of Regions, the west of the country has seen a progressing increase in the activity of the Svoboda (Freedom) party, a group that combines participation in the democratically elected local government of Eastern Galicia with street actions, characteristic of anti-system groups. This party has brought a new quality to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, as it refers to the rhetoric of European anti-liberal and neo-nationalist movements, and its emergence is a clear response to public demand for a group of this sort. The increase in its popularity plays into the hands of the Party of Regions, which is seeking to weaken the more moderate opposition parties (mainly the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc). However, Svoboda retains its independence from the ruling camp. This party, in all likelihood, will become a permanent and important player in Ukrainian political life, although its influence may be restricted to Eastern Galicia. Svoboda is determined to fight the tendencies in Ukrainian politics and the social sphere which it considers pro-Russian. Its attitude towards Russia and Russians, furthermore, is unambiguously hostile. In the case of Poland, it reduces mutual relations almost exclusively to the historical aspects, strongly criticising the commemoration of the victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s (UPA) crimes. This may cause tension in Polish-Ukrainian relations, where they are affected by decisions made by local governments controlled by the Svoboda Party.

'The power gained, we will never surrender': Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic crisis. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), October 2009

Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot. The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia; Putin after re-election: The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term. OSW Study 16/2004

North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.

Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

Euro 2012 – Ukraine’s wasted opportunity? OSW Commentary 80, 2012-06.08

Ukraine saw hosting the European Football Championship as an important project in terms of image-building and modernisation from the very beginning. The country’s government assumed, during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych alike, that Euro 2012 would provide a major impulse for economic development and show that the young Ukrainian state was capable of successfully preparing one of the most important sport tournaments in the world. Although UEFA’s decision raised eyebrows both in the West and in Ukraine, after initial delays the work gained momentum and, shortly before the championship, Ukraine’s progress could be evaluated as being satisfactory at the least. As part of the preparations, four stadiums were built or modernised, four airports in the host cities were developed and 1,600 km of roads were repaired or built from the ground up. The investments have doubtlessly contributed to an improvement of the infrastructure in Ukraine, but it would be rather inaccurate to say that Euro 2012 has brought about a real modernisation of the country. The funds allocated for the preparations were relatively modest, and part of them was spent in a non-transparent way, which gives rise to suspicions of corruption. The chance to improve Ukraine’s perception in the West has been to a great extent lost due to the trial of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, who was sentenced to seven years in prison in October 2011. Over the past few weeks, Euro 2012 as a sports event has been overshadowed by discussions among Western politicians and in the Western media about rising authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine. In turn, football is currently treated as a minor issue in Ukraine’s internal politics. The government has so far not used Euro 2012 to improve its popularity although hosting it is supported by a clear majority of the Ukrainian public. It is still an open question as to whether the Ukrainian government will try to capitalise politically on this sports event; this is especially significant as parliamentary elections are approaching.

Analysing the Contribution of Business Services to European Economic Growth. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 9/February 2007

The sector business services contributes directly and indirectly to aggregate economic growth in Europe. The direct contribution comes from the sector’s own dynamism. Though the business-services industry appears to be characterised by strong cyclical volatility, there was also a strong structural growth. Business services actually generated more than half of total net employment growth in the European Union since the second half of the 1990s. Apart from this direct growth contribution, the sector also contributed in an indirect way to economic growth by generating knowledge and productivity spill-overs for other industries. The knowledge role of business services is reflected in its employment characteristics. The business-services industry created spill-overs in three ways: original innovations, knowledge diffusion, and the reduction of human capital indivisibilities at firm level. The share of knowledge-intensive business services in the intermediate inputs of the total economy has risen sharply in the last decade. Firm-level scale diseconomies with regard to knowledge and skill inputs are reduced by external deliveries of such inputs, thereby exploiting positive external scale economies. The process goes along with an increasingly complex social division of labour between economic sectors. The European business-services industry itself is characterised by a relatively weak productivity growth. Does this contribute to growth stagnation tendencies à la the socalled “Baumol disease”? The paper argues that there is no reason to expect this as long as the productivity and growth spill-overs from business services to other sectors are large enough. Finally, the paper concludes by suggesting several policy elements that could boost the role of business services in European economic growth. This might to achieve some of the ambitious Lisbon goals with respect to employment, productivity and innovation.

American Attitudes on European Political Integration — The Nixon-Kissinger Legacy. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2007

This paper concentrates on the Nixon-Kissinger view of European political integration. In contrast with the mainstream position of the American Administrations during the 1950s and 1960s, Kissinger was convinced that by encouraging European unity, the United States was in fact creating its own rival. The start of a new system of European foreign policy cooperation in 1970 was seen by Kissinger as a particularly important example of Europe’s attempt to challenge the American hegemony. Kissinger emphasized the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. Three main lines of action were pursued to keep the development of the European Community under control: maintaining bilateral contacts with key European allies, requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table, and linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe. The legacy of this policy still seems to influence the current American policy on the European Union. The Nixon-Kissinger term was, however, detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations. Tendencies to emulate it should therefore be discouraged.

A Convergence Process in Household Credit in Central and Eastern Europe. ECRI Commentary No. 16, 30 October 2015

The liberalisation of Eastern Europe’s market during the 1990s and the 2004 EU enlargement have had a great impact on the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Indeed, prior to these events, the financial system and household credit markets in CEE were underdeveloped. Nonetheless, it appeared to numerous economists that the development of the CEE financial system and credit markets was following an intensely positive trend, raising the question of sustainability. Many variables impact the level and growth rate of credit; several economists point out that a convergence process might be one of the most important. Using a descriptive statistics approach, it seems likely that a convergence process began during the 1990s, when the CEE countries opened their economies. However, it also seems that the main driver of this household credit convergence process is the GDP per capita convergence process. Indeed, credit to households and GDP per capita have followed broadly similar tendencies over the last 20 years and it has been shown in the literature that they appear to influence each other. The consistency of this potential convergence process is also confirmed by the breakdown of household credit by type and maturity. There is a tendency towards similar household credit markets in Europe. However, it seems that this potential convergence process was slowed down by the financial crisis. Fortunately, the crisis also stabilised the share of loans in foreign currency in CEE countries. This might add more stability to credit markets in Eastern Europe.

Selbstbestimmung und Parteien in Südtirol: Territoriale und europäische Parteistrategien zwischen Autonomie und Sezession = Self-determination and parties in South Tyrol: Territorial and European party strategies between autonomy and secession. EDAP Paper 03/2016 03/2016

Since the final conflict settlement between Italy and Austria in 1992, ethnic politics in South Tyrol experienced insightful transformations. The consociational political system, which was implemented to tame centrifugal tendencies, has been losing its balance over the last decade, with proautonomy stances ceding ground to secessionist pressure in the Germanspeaking intra-ethnic arena. Adopting a contextual and strategic perspective on self-determination, this article traces the evolution of ethno-regionalist party strategies on the territorial and European dimension of party competition through a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of their electoral manifestos in the period between 1993 and 2013. In line with newest research on party strategies, the article empirically shows the strategic capacity of ethnic minority parties to challenge each other not only by shifting their positions on the different issue dimensions but also by the reframing of issues. While the increasing competition on the center-periphery axis leads to a new territorial frame, the rise of secessionism is accompagned by an end to the pro-European elite consensus.